commodities may coexist with increasing scarcity of nature’s values. It seems
uncertain whether future humans will simply conform to such situation. They
might also deeply mourn the losses, some of which might be irreversible. Ethical
approaches face different problems with future generations. A utilitarian approach to
posterity must face the abhorrent conclusion that it would be better to increase the
mere number of sentient beings as long as the worst beings still prefer to be alive
rather than non-existent. A contractarian approach does not capture the convictions
that we owe something to posterity, even though we cannot yet make contracts with
future persons. If all obligations come from real contracts and contracts are concluded for rational self-interest, contractarian ethics cannot justify binding obligations between generations. Paradoxes of future ethics consist in bringing individuals
into existence and controlling population size.
For questions of future ethics, the option value and the bequest value of TEV as
well as all service categories of ESS are taken into account. Within TEV, however,
the bequest value is nothing more than an altruistic preference that one may or may
not feel for one’s descendants or for distant future human beings. To economists,
saving something for others is a kind of sacrifice. Bequest values are comparable to
those of donorship. From natural inclination, the bequest values are mainly dedicated
to the offspring, while morality also requires concern for distant and remote future
human beings. Within a preference-based approach, it must be accepted that the
bequest values decrease with increasing distance in time and space (as is often the
case). TEV-scheme cannot see the moral difference between contingent altruistic
preferences and mandatory obligations to future generations. Being morally obliged
to do x is different from doing x out of an altruistic preference. The resulting action
may be the same, but the reasons are different. Ethicists will not like to base future
ethics solely on altruistic preferences. If so, TEV is not a suitable framework for
intergenerational justice. If so, we need to transform the category of bequest value
into a more refined and comprehensive ethical framework, recognizing rights of
future persons against present persons (Unnerstall 1999).
The moral beliefs behind the “bequest value” of TEV require a deontological
interpretation of future ethics. If the chain of generations implies a fundamental
egalitarianism between generations (no generation is “better” than any other), then
one can assume that future generations should have approximately the same living
conditions as today’s generations. If all people were equal in the present, the
standard of comparison would be easy to determine. Since humans are, at present,
highly unequal in many respects (salaries, wealth, education), it is almost impossible
to apply a comparative standard on a global scale. At the global level, one should
rather adopt an absolute standard, which is a moral threshold for a worthy human
life, however it is specified in terms of needs, welfare, or capabilities.
At a particular level, however, political communities (states, nations) can and
should pursue the strategy of bequeathing legacies to future members of a particular
state on a comparative basis. They should protect the nature capitals and the natural
heritage on their national territory. The conservation, preservation and restoration of
nature is never entirely “universal” or “global”, but must remain a special and
“located” enterprise. Grounding nature’s values touches the problem of specific
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K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth
uncertain whether future humans will simply conform to such situation. They
might also deeply mourn the losses, some of which might be irreversible. Ethical
approaches face different problems with future generations. A utilitarian approach to
posterity must face the abhorrent conclusion that it would be better to increase the
mere number of sentient beings as long as the worst beings still prefer to be alive
rather than non-existent. A contractarian approach does not capture the convictions
that we owe something to posterity, even though we cannot yet make contracts with
future persons. If all obligations come from real contracts and contracts are concluded for rational self-interest, contractarian ethics cannot justify binding obligations between generations. Paradoxes of future ethics consist in bringing individuals
into existence and controlling population size.
For questions of future ethics, the option value and the bequest value of TEV as
well as all service categories of ESS are taken into account. Within TEV, however,
the bequest value is nothing more than an altruistic preference that one may or may
not feel for one’s descendants or for distant future human beings. To economists,
saving something for others is a kind of sacrifice. Bequest values are comparable to
those of donorship. From natural inclination, the bequest values are mainly dedicated
to the offspring, while morality also requires concern for distant and remote future
human beings. Within a preference-based approach, it must be accepted that the
bequest values decrease with increasing distance in time and space (as is often the
case). TEV-scheme cannot see the moral difference between contingent altruistic
preferences and mandatory obligations to future generations. Being morally obliged
to do x is different from doing x out of an altruistic preference. The resulting action
may be the same, but the reasons are different. Ethicists will not like to base future
ethics solely on altruistic preferences. If so, TEV is not a suitable framework for
intergenerational justice. If so, we need to transform the category of bequest value
into a more refined and comprehensive ethical framework, recognizing rights of
future persons against present persons (Unnerstall 1999).
The moral beliefs behind the “bequest value” of TEV require a deontological
interpretation of future ethics. If the chain of generations implies a fundamental
egalitarianism between generations (no generation is “better” than any other), then
one can assume that future generations should have approximately the same living
conditions as today’s generations. If all people were equal in the present, the
standard of comparison would be easy to determine. Since humans are, at present,
highly unequal in many respects (salaries, wealth, education), it is almost impossible
to apply a comparative standard on a global scale. At the global level, one should
rather adopt an absolute standard, which is a moral threshold for a worthy human
life, however it is specified in terms of needs, welfare, or capabilities.
At a particular level, however, political communities (states, nations) can and
should pursue the strategy of bequeathing legacies to future members of a particular
state on a comparative basis. They should protect the nature capitals and the natural
heritage on their national territory. The conservation, preservation and restoration of
nature is never entirely “universal” or “global”, but must remain a special and
“located” enterprise. Grounding nature’s values touches the problem of specific
146
K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth