pluralistic with respect to the values of nature, and it pleads for profound reforms in
our practical dealings with nature. The first approach is (too) monistic and focuses on
the demarcation problem as the core of environmental ethics. We consider environmental pragmatism to be the most plausible framework for debating value systems
and other environmental ethical issues. Nonetheless, discussions about inherent
moral values as attributed to natural beings are very important (see Ott 2008).
The monistic search for solutions by prominent environmental ethicists is misguided because crucial moral concepts and values are essentially controversial. It is
not promising to wait for the “right” solution of the demarcation problem, from
which all rules for conservation and restoration should be derived. It is a hindrance to
hope for the only true solution to the problem, which entities are inherently morally
valuable (¼ determine the extent of the moral community), and then to derive a
theory of conservation. Moral problems must be solved as well as other problems. If
a problem is a real problem, solutions must be within reach—and so must moral
problems. However, if an idea or concept is substantially challenged, there will be no
final solution. The demarcation problem seems to be an essentially controversial
search for a “true” solution.
The extent of the solutions to the problem of demarcation put forward so far can
be determined as follows: (a) sentimentality, (b) zoo-centrism, (c) biocentrism,
(d) eco-centrism, (e) gene-based approaches, (f) (pluralistic) holism. As Ott has
argued elsewhere (Ott 2008), the demarcation problem requires the identification
of morally relevant characteristics (properties) attributed to natural beings. In this
way, one will not fall victim to the naturalistic fallacy. Candidates for morally
relevant traits are sentience, communication skills (Ott 2015) and openness to a
world “outside”. The (gradual) ability to communicate deserves special attention
(Hendlin and Ott 2016). One has long underestimated the ability to communicate
within nature, and has wrongly silenced nature. In nature, however, there is both
noise and voice. If animals can give a voice to their mental state, we can and should
interpret such voices and translate them, as advocates, into human discourse.
Most scholars would attribute inherent moral values to sentient creatures. If
inherent moral values are based on the assumption of morally relevant attributes
and the most relevant attributes (sensation, communication) are gradual, then it
might be permissible to graduate inherent moral values. We should better not
homogenize morally relevant traits. The concept of equality could trigger the errors
of homogenization of natural beings with morally relevant traits. The principle of
equal consideration of each individual sentient member of the moral community
makes grading possible. The survival strategies of mice, frogs, turtles, etc. as such
(so called “r-selection”) place hardly any value to the individual. This is of some
relevance of how we should value such r-species individuals. The moral standpoint
does not require all small wild sentient animals to be protected from suffering and
premature death (Horta 2017). Egalitarian animal welfare activism and the idea of
“policing” wild food webs exaggerate sentientism in an absurd way. The egalitarian
animal rights movement is completely reversing the way humans have treated
animals since the Neolithic Revolution. It is an absurd demand that man should
strive to reduce the pain of prey in terrestrial and even marine systems and ideally
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K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth
our practical dealings with nature. The first approach is (too) monistic and focuses on
the demarcation problem as the core of environmental ethics. We consider environmental pragmatism to be the most plausible framework for debating value systems
and other environmental ethical issues. Nonetheless, discussions about inherent
moral values as attributed to natural beings are very important (see Ott 2008).
The monistic search for solutions by prominent environmental ethicists is misguided because crucial moral concepts and values are essentially controversial. It is
not promising to wait for the “right” solution of the demarcation problem, from
which all rules for conservation and restoration should be derived. It is a hindrance to
hope for the only true solution to the problem, which entities are inherently morally
valuable (¼ determine the extent of the moral community), and then to derive a
theory of conservation. Moral problems must be solved as well as other problems. If
a problem is a real problem, solutions must be within reach—and so must moral
problems. However, if an idea or concept is substantially challenged, there will be no
final solution. The demarcation problem seems to be an essentially controversial
search for a “true” solution.
The extent of the solutions to the problem of demarcation put forward so far can
be determined as follows: (a) sentimentality, (b) zoo-centrism, (c) biocentrism,
(d) eco-centrism, (e) gene-based approaches, (f) (pluralistic) holism. As Ott has
argued elsewhere (Ott 2008), the demarcation problem requires the identification
of morally relevant characteristics (properties) attributed to natural beings. In this
way, one will not fall victim to the naturalistic fallacy. Candidates for morally
relevant traits are sentience, communication skills (Ott 2015) and openness to a
world “outside”. The (gradual) ability to communicate deserves special attention
(Hendlin and Ott 2016). One has long underestimated the ability to communicate
within nature, and has wrongly silenced nature. In nature, however, there is both
noise and voice. If animals can give a voice to their mental state, we can and should
interpret such voices and translate them, as advocates, into human discourse.
Most scholars would attribute inherent moral values to sentient creatures. If
inherent moral values are based on the assumption of morally relevant attributes
and the most relevant attributes (sensation, communication) are gradual, then it
might be permissible to graduate inherent moral values. We should better not
homogenize morally relevant traits. The concept of equality could trigger the errors
of homogenization of natural beings with morally relevant traits. The principle of
equal consideration of each individual sentient member of the moral community
makes grading possible. The survival strategies of mice, frogs, turtles, etc. as such
(so called “r-selection”) place hardly any value to the individual. This is of some
relevance of how we should value such r-species individuals. The moral standpoint
does not require all small wild sentient animals to be protected from suffering and
premature death (Horta 2017). Egalitarian animal welfare activism and the idea of
“policing” wild food webs exaggerate sentientism in an absurd way. The egalitarian
animal rights movement is completely reversing the way humans have treated
animals since the Neolithic Revolution. It is an absurd demand that man should
strive to reduce the pain of prey in terrestrial and even marine systems and ideally
148
K. Ott and K. C. Reinmuth