Figure 1 shows an example for an evaluation yardstick which consists of different
criteria. For the purposes of this article it does not matter if we consider the criteria to
be moral, legal or political.
To justify the use of certain rules we need answers to the formulated questions.
And in order to answer these questions comprehensibly, we need arguments which
establish in a well-argued fashion the corresponding propositions. In these arguments we need some evidence which supports empirical claims.
In the following, the ways in which we can get answers to our criteria-related
questions, the role of evidence, and some of the obstacles for getting the answers are
discussed. Criteria form a main component of yardsticks and must be developed for
an evaluation. For example, the use of the criteria ‘deducibility’ and ‘harmlessness’
requires normative statements from which rules can be derived, or statements about
what morally questionable side effects are. The next step is to show how the criteria
can be specified using a moral theory. The theory of strong sustainability developed
by Konrad Ott and Ralf Döring will be used for this purpose. Rule systems are often
evaluated with regard to their moral quality. Such judgements are often spontaneous,
unsystematic, or made on an ad hoc basis and this can cause faults within the
evaluation process. So, it seems reasonable to reflect on the evaluation practise itself
and consequently to try to design or to adopt an evaluation method which results in
fewer faults.
4.1 The Deducibility Criterion
The question whether or how rules or norms can be argumentatively substantiated is
one of the core questions of moral and legal philosophy. One way to answer this
question is to provide a validation concept and to show how rule formulations can be
expressed in a form which allows analysing the argumentative substantiation of rules
in a formal way. For this an intuitively plausible rule-understanding is used, which is
based on the findings of Max Black, which were further developed by Geo Siegwart
(Black 1962; Siegwart 2010, 2011). According to this understanding, a rule is a
general, conditional action guide. Rules determine in which situations it is permitted,
required or forbidden that agents of a certain kind perform certain acts. Accordingly,
there are several components of rules: agents, situations, deontic modes and actions.
There are several rule-concepts. The term ‘rule’ is here used with a relatively broad
meaning. This broad usage of the term ‘rule’ is for example found in the work of the
mentioned social scientists Buchanan and Ostrom and in the work of the legal
philosopher Herbert Hart, who characterized the law as a rule system (Hart 1994).
A rule in standard form is a generally formulated if-then proposition in which the
agents and the situations are mentioned in the if-clause while the deontic mode and
the acts are specified in the then-clause. The rule quantifiers are due to the generality
of rules. And you can find in Fig. 2 the four components in the agent, the situation
and the action formula, and in the deontic phrase, respectively.
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K. C. Reinmuth
criteria. For the purposes of this article it does not matter if we consider the criteria to
be moral, legal or political.
To justify the use of certain rules we need answers to the formulated questions.
And in order to answer these questions comprehensibly, we need arguments which
establish in a well-argued fashion the corresponding propositions. In these arguments we need some evidence which supports empirical claims.
In the following, the ways in which we can get answers to our criteria-related
questions, the role of evidence, and some of the obstacles for getting the answers are
discussed. Criteria form a main component of yardsticks and must be developed for
an evaluation. For example, the use of the criteria ‘deducibility’ and ‘harmlessness’
requires normative statements from which rules can be derived, or statements about
what morally questionable side effects are. The next step is to show how the criteria
can be specified using a moral theory. The theory of strong sustainability developed
by Konrad Ott and Ralf Döring will be used for this purpose. Rule systems are often
evaluated with regard to their moral quality. Such judgements are often spontaneous,
unsystematic, or made on an ad hoc basis and this can cause faults within the
evaluation process. So, it seems reasonable to reflect on the evaluation practise itself
and consequently to try to design or to adopt an evaluation method which results in
fewer faults.
4.1 The Deducibility Criterion
The question whether or how rules or norms can be argumentatively substantiated is
one of the core questions of moral and legal philosophy. One way to answer this
question is to provide a validation concept and to show how rule formulations can be
expressed in a form which allows analysing the argumentative substantiation of rules
in a formal way. For this an intuitively plausible rule-understanding is used, which is
based on the findings of Max Black, which were further developed by Geo Siegwart
(Black 1962; Siegwart 2010, 2011). According to this understanding, a rule is a
general, conditional action guide. Rules determine in which situations it is permitted,
required or forbidden that agents of a certain kind perform certain acts. Accordingly,
there are several components of rules: agents, situations, deontic modes and actions.
There are several rule-concepts. The term ‘rule’ is here used with a relatively broad
meaning. This broad usage of the term ‘rule’ is for example found in the work of the
mentioned social scientists Buchanan and Ostrom and in the work of the legal
philosopher Herbert Hart, who characterized the law as a rule system (Hart 1994).
A rule in standard form is a generally formulated if-then proposition in which the
agents and the situations are mentioned in the if-clause while the deontic mode and
the acts are specified in the then-clause. The rule quantifiers are due to the generality
of rules. And you can find in Fig. 2 the four components in the agent, the situation
and the action formula, and in the deontic phrase, respectively.
114
K. C. Reinmuth