80
4 International Bioeconomy Governance …
Strictly speaking, such unilateral sustainability requirements are not a trade restriction: biofuels and feedstocks that do not meet the criteria can still be legally imported.
However, they do not count towards the US government or the EU’s mandatory
targets. By doing this, these actors have deftly avoided incompatibility with rules
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which could lead to legal contestation of
their policies (see Douma 2010). This example shows that the induced behaviors are
not necessarily detrimental to those on whom power is exerted. Nevertheless, they
give a clear demonstration of “who decides”—in this case, US and EU decisions
for the pre-eminence of climate and biodiversity concerns over the socio-economic
development needs that poorer countries tend to emphasize.
The second face of power—in the form of agenda-setting—has complemented
that and played a significant role in international biofuel governance. Its relevance
becomes clear when one observes the remarkable continuity of non-decisions on its
several contentious points despite major controversies such as the “food vs. fuel”
debate. This crafting exercise has taken place in two concurrent ways: first, by
blocking unwanted decisions in more representative fora, such as in the UN system;
second, by promoting institutions and organizations where representation is much
more restricted and where the agendas are limited to comparatively innocuous issues.
Since most decisions at the UN level depend on consensus, it has not been hard for
large biofuel producers to prevent any intrusive multilateral regulatory framework
from emerging. The US achieved that at the 2008 FAO High-level Conference on
World Food Security, as did Brazil at the 10th CBD COP in 2010 (Pomeroy and
Doyle 2008; Borger 2008; IISD 2008; Petermann 2010; Scott et al. 2014). After
the FAO conference, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de
Schutter, noted that smaller countries were concerned about the impacts of global
biofuel expansion but could do little against major biofuel countries, who accepted no
intervention in their agendas (Pomeroy and Doyle 2008). While bypassing decisions
at UN fora, those like-minded actors have structured their institutional framework
to promote biofuels under a leaner and less inclusive agenda. It suffices to add that,
quite unsurprisingly, it was Brazil who launched the International Biofuels Forum,
while the G8 + 5 launched the Global Bioenergy Partnership.
Finally, major biofuel producers have utilized discursive power to obtain consent
from other parties. Three major discourses have characterized biofuel promotion. The
first one is a securitization discourse, usually more aimed at domestic constituencies, framing biofuels as an essential tool to reduce economic—and, eventually,
“national”—vulnerability to political adversaries (see Boussena and Locatelli 2013).
The second one, the environmental labeling of biofuels as “sustainable”, “green” or
“low-carbon”, seems aimed at broader audiences such as the international community in order to obtain public approval, add legitimacy, and garner support for biofuel
promotion. This discourse is widely present in biofuel policy texts and the grey and
scientific literature, even if sometimes with small caveats about the risks to be avoided
(e.g., Farrell et al. 2006; Goldemberg et al. 2008). Lastly, there is the discourse—
aimed primarily at populations and countries eager to escape poverty—of “rural
employment creation” and “pro-poor development”, which most developing countries use (Bastos Lima 2012; see Chapters 5–8). Such an emphasis is often present
4 International Bioeconomy Governance …
Strictly speaking, such unilateral sustainability requirements are not a trade restriction: biofuels and feedstocks that do not meet the criteria can still be legally imported.
However, they do not count towards the US government or the EU’s mandatory
targets. By doing this, these actors have deftly avoided incompatibility with rules
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which could lead to legal contestation of
their policies (see Douma 2010). This example shows that the induced behaviors are
not necessarily detrimental to those on whom power is exerted. Nevertheless, they
give a clear demonstration of “who decides”—in this case, US and EU decisions
for the pre-eminence of climate and biodiversity concerns over the socio-economic
development needs that poorer countries tend to emphasize.
The second face of power—in the form of agenda-setting—has complemented
that and played a significant role in international biofuel governance. Its relevance
becomes clear when one observes the remarkable continuity of non-decisions on its
several contentious points despite major controversies such as the “food vs. fuel”
debate. This crafting exercise has taken place in two concurrent ways: first, by
blocking unwanted decisions in more representative fora, such as in the UN system;
second, by promoting institutions and organizations where representation is much
more restricted and where the agendas are limited to comparatively innocuous issues.
Since most decisions at the UN level depend on consensus, it has not been hard for
large biofuel producers to prevent any intrusive multilateral regulatory framework
from emerging. The US achieved that at the 2008 FAO High-level Conference on
World Food Security, as did Brazil at the 10th CBD COP in 2010 (Pomeroy and
Doyle 2008; Borger 2008; IISD 2008; Petermann 2010; Scott et al. 2014). After
the FAO conference, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de
Schutter, noted that smaller countries were concerned about the impacts of global
biofuel expansion but could do little against major biofuel countries, who accepted no
intervention in their agendas (Pomeroy and Doyle 2008). While bypassing decisions
at UN fora, those like-minded actors have structured their institutional framework
to promote biofuels under a leaner and less inclusive agenda. It suffices to add that,
quite unsurprisingly, it was Brazil who launched the International Biofuels Forum,
while the G8 + 5 launched the Global Bioenergy Partnership.
Finally, major biofuel producers have utilized discursive power to obtain consent
from other parties. Three major discourses have characterized biofuel promotion. The
first one is a securitization discourse, usually more aimed at domestic constituencies, framing biofuels as an essential tool to reduce economic—and, eventually,
“national”—vulnerability to political adversaries (see Boussena and Locatelli 2013).
The second one, the environmental labeling of biofuels as “sustainable”, “green” or
“low-carbon”, seems aimed at broader audiences such as the international community in order to obtain public approval, add legitimacy, and garner support for biofuel
promotion. This discourse is widely present in biofuel policy texts and the grey and
scientific literature, even if sometimes with small caveats about the risks to be avoided
(e.g., Farrell et al. 2006; Goldemberg et al. 2008). Lastly, there is the discourse—
aimed primarily at populations and countries eager to escape poverty—of “rural
employment creation” and “pro-poor development”, which most developing countries use (Bastos Lima 2012; see Chapters 5–8). Such an emphasis is often present