4.4 Agency in International Biofuel Governance
79
aspects” have been hardly elaborated on in international biofuel governance. (It
should be noted that, in some cases, agents might share one policy-belief but disagree
on others).
While the EU continues to pursue its own approach and other, more critical actors
remain vocal but mostly ineffectual, the main coalition that can be identified in
this context is between Brazil and the US. Not only have these countries held a
similar view on the subject, but they have also worked together to enhance bilateral
biofuel trade, knowledge exchange, and deployment of feedstock cultivation and
biofuel technology in third countries, particularly in Africa and Central America. This
alliance of sorts became institutionalized through a memorandum of understanding
between the two countries signed in 2007, followed in 2011 by a presidential-level
Strategic Energy Dialogue with biofuels as a priority area (Wright 2008; Seelke and
Meyer 2009; The White House 2012). Despite tariffs that either country may put in
place to control bilateral ethanol trade, globally they remain very much aligned on
biofuels, and cooperation continues despite the changes of administration in both
countries (Afionis and Stringer 2020).
4.4.2 Strategic Uses of Power
Agents have strategically used all three forms of power—instrumental, structural,
and discursive—to pursue their policy beliefs in international biofuel governance.
The first form, instrumental power, has been exerted primarily through foreign
investments and unilateral sustainability import criteria that aim at determining how,
where, and for whom biofuels are produced. Most knowledge, technology, and institutional experience on feedstock cultivation and biofuel production and utilization
are in the hands of government agencies and private companies from the EU, Brazil,
or the US. These actors also have the financial capabilities that most developing countries lack. The moment these assets are used to induce a change in others’ behavior,
they by definition become power instruments (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes
1974/2005). For example, this is seen in the biofuel investments in Africa, mostly
aimed at European markets—instead of, say, local decentralized energy consumption
or import substitution in African countries that depend on foreign oil (Charles et al.
2009).
Such foreign steering of biofuel production also appears in the form of unilateral
sustainability requirements. The policies of both the US and the EU are cases in point.
Although allegedly aimed at the global common good, they have set minimum environmental requirements that have not incorporated views, preferences or concerns
of any other countries to which they may be applied. Instead, those standards are
unilaterally elaborated and embraced a priori, then imposed as a conditionality for
development cooperation or import of feedstock and biofuels. Brazil has been a vocal
opponent of such unilateral rule-making (see Afionis and Stringer 2020), while other
emerging countries have generally critiqued the EU for often “talking at” rather than
“talking with” its overseas partners in governance matters (Chaban et al. 2017).
79
aspects” have been hardly elaborated on in international biofuel governance. (It
should be noted that, in some cases, agents might share one policy-belief but disagree
on others).
While the EU continues to pursue its own approach and other, more critical actors
remain vocal but mostly ineffectual, the main coalition that can be identified in
this context is between Brazil and the US. Not only have these countries held a
similar view on the subject, but they have also worked together to enhance bilateral
biofuel trade, knowledge exchange, and deployment of feedstock cultivation and
biofuel technology in third countries, particularly in Africa and Central America. This
alliance of sorts became institutionalized through a memorandum of understanding
between the two countries signed in 2007, followed in 2011 by a presidential-level
Strategic Energy Dialogue with biofuels as a priority area (Wright 2008; Seelke and
Meyer 2009; The White House 2012). Despite tariffs that either country may put in
place to control bilateral ethanol trade, globally they remain very much aligned on
biofuels, and cooperation continues despite the changes of administration in both
countries (Afionis and Stringer 2020).
4.4.2 Strategic Uses of Power
Agents have strategically used all three forms of power—instrumental, structural,
and discursive—to pursue their policy beliefs in international biofuel governance.
The first form, instrumental power, has been exerted primarily through foreign
investments and unilateral sustainability import criteria that aim at determining how,
where, and for whom biofuels are produced. Most knowledge, technology, and institutional experience on feedstock cultivation and biofuel production and utilization
are in the hands of government agencies and private companies from the EU, Brazil,
or the US. These actors also have the financial capabilities that most developing countries lack. The moment these assets are used to induce a change in others’ behavior,
they by definition become power instruments (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes
1974/2005). For example, this is seen in the biofuel investments in Africa, mostly
aimed at European markets—instead of, say, local decentralized energy consumption
or import substitution in African countries that depend on foreign oil (Charles et al.
2009).
Such foreign steering of biofuel production also appears in the form of unilateral
sustainability requirements. The policies of both the US and the EU are cases in point.
Although allegedly aimed at the global common good, they have set minimum environmental requirements that have not incorporated views, preferences or concerns
of any other countries to which they may be applied. Instead, those standards are
unilaterally elaborated and embraced a priori, then imposed as a conditionality for
development cooperation or import of feedstock and biofuels. Brazil has been a vocal
opponent of such unilateral rule-making (see Afionis and Stringer 2020), while other
emerging countries have generally critiqued the EU for often “talking at” rather than
“talking with” its overseas partners in governance matters (Chaban et al. 2017).