4.4 Agency in International Biofuel Governance
81
in North-South and South-South cooperation on biofuels (Charles et al. 2009). This
discourse also finds broad resonance in the international development community
(see Von Braun and Pachauri 2006; UNEP 2009). Its capacity to captivate becomes
very clear, for instance, when African countries request Brazil’s support to expand
biofuel production (see Maximo 2007). What is often not unpacked is a general understanding of rural development only as job creation in monocultures and smallholders’
integration in contract-farming schemes with private companies (see Chapter 8). As
subsequent chapters will discuss, this discourse plays a crucial role in that relationship
with local actors.
4.5 Conclusions
There has long been a consensus that global biofuel expansion primarily owes to
domestic policies (Sagar and Kartha 2007; FAO 2008; Koh and Ghazoul 2008;
Pilgrim and Harvey 2010). However, this chapter has argued that institutional
arrangements, decisions and non-decisions at the international level have played
important roles, too. Biofuel governance has been marked by the pre-eminence of
national—or, in the EU case, supranational—policies and thinness of international
institutions. It is arguably the example of a “non-regime”, as there are no collectively
established rules and thus no rule-consistent behavior. Although the literature tends
to regard such cases as “institutional failures” (Dimitrov et al. 2007), they can only be
labeled as such by those who aspire for more robust governance. States or non-state
actors who prefer a neoliberal environment, without significant restrictions or rules
on behavior, are likely to see non-regimes as an institutional victory (see Chapter 9).
In the case of biofuels, however, this neoliberal approach cannot be considered an
agreement implicitly made, because not everyone agrees to it. Instead, it is because
the multilateral fora that could draft regulations, such as those within the UN system,
all operate under some form of consensus-based decision-making where unwilling
actors—notably Brazil and the US in this case—can easily block such attempts. Major
producers have, instead, promoted their own “pro-biofuel” international institutions
that treat it merely as an economic good, viewed automatically as sustainable and
subject to no regulation. This analysis reveals that those countries have not only been
leading biofuel producers but also key agents in international biofuel governance.
Figure 4.3 summarizes the nature of this governance and its interrelation with
the nature of biofuel production. Of particular concern is that biofuel governance
has had no place for critical voices, except for states in UN fora. As such, indigenous peoples, customary landowners, net food consumers such as the urban poor,
and others who have been impacted by biofuel expansion do not participate in the
policy- and decision-making processes. In a way, this explains why biofuels promotion continues unabated despite mounting criticism. Certain features of international
biofuel governance also reflect such a lack of access, such as the prevailing view
of biofuels as commodities for large-scale production and international trade, rather
than as a tool for local development; the absence of binding sustainability rules and
81
in North-South and South-South cooperation on biofuels (Charles et al. 2009). This
discourse also finds broad resonance in the international development community
(see Von Braun and Pachauri 2006; UNEP 2009). Its capacity to captivate becomes
very clear, for instance, when African countries request Brazil’s support to expand
biofuel production (see Maximo 2007). What is often not unpacked is a general understanding of rural development only as job creation in monocultures and smallholders’
integration in contract-farming schemes with private companies (see Chapter 8). As
subsequent chapters will discuss, this discourse plays a crucial role in that relationship
with local actors.
4.5 Conclusions
There has long been a consensus that global biofuel expansion primarily owes to
domestic policies (Sagar and Kartha 2007; FAO 2008; Koh and Ghazoul 2008;
Pilgrim and Harvey 2010). However, this chapter has argued that institutional
arrangements, decisions and non-decisions at the international level have played
important roles, too. Biofuel governance has been marked by the pre-eminence of
national—or, in the EU case, supranational—policies and thinness of international
institutions. It is arguably the example of a “non-regime”, as there are no collectively
established rules and thus no rule-consistent behavior. Although the literature tends
to regard such cases as “institutional failures” (Dimitrov et al. 2007), they can only be
labeled as such by those who aspire for more robust governance. States or non-state
actors who prefer a neoliberal environment, without significant restrictions or rules
on behavior, are likely to see non-regimes as an institutional victory (see Chapter 9).
In the case of biofuels, however, this neoliberal approach cannot be considered an
agreement implicitly made, because not everyone agrees to it. Instead, it is because
the multilateral fora that could draft regulations, such as those within the UN system,
all operate under some form of consensus-based decision-making where unwilling
actors—notably Brazil and the US in this case—can easily block such attempts. Major
producers have, instead, promoted their own “pro-biofuel” international institutions
that treat it merely as an economic good, viewed automatically as sustainable and
subject to no regulation. This analysis reveals that those countries have not only been
leading biofuel producers but also key agents in international biofuel governance.
Figure 4.3 summarizes the nature of this governance and its interrelation with
the nature of biofuel production. Of particular concern is that biofuel governance
has had no place for critical voices, except for states in UN fora. As such, indigenous peoples, customary landowners, net food consumers such as the urban poor,
and others who have been impacted by biofuel expansion do not participate in the
policy- and decision-making processes. In a way, this explains why biofuels promotion continues unabated despite mounting criticism. Certain features of international
biofuel governance also reflect such a lack of access, such as the prevailing view
of biofuels as commodities for large-scale production and international trade, rather
than as a tool for local development; the absence of binding sustainability rules and