7.3 Agency in Biofuel Governance in Indonesia
167
Bastos Lima and Gupta 2014). However, such Western leverage is gradually eclipsing
as Indonesia’s oil palm sector turns increasingly inwards and to other Asian markets.
Amid this conflict between plantation advocates and conservationists, it remains
unclear to what extent smallholder interests are represented. Oil palm farmers’ advocacy relies only on their own capabilities—primarily through GAPPERINDO, the
national plantation farmers union, and APKASINDO, the national oil palm farmers
union. Others in rural communities do not have even that; they have no direct participation in the agenda-setting and no discursive power to speak of. Their primary
agency is through demonstrations and protests—that is, by using themselves as
“mobilizable troops,” a typical resource of poor actors (Sabatier and Weible 2007).
That has been done particularly as resistance to land evictions and in conflicts with
plantation companies (Saragih 2012). However, this sometimes results in murder
and torture, as companies rely on government military protection or private security
(Asian Human Rights Commission 2011).
The advocacy of conservationists, too, has threatened rural and forest-based
communities, such as through various cases of “green grabbing” (i.e., private leases
of forest areas for conservation without taking into account populations who depend
on local resources uses; Fairhead et al. 2012). These practices have increased in
Indonesia as international funds start to flow for conservation activities, such as under
the REDD+ framework (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). Governments at various levels in Indonesia have started to seek revenue
to keep forests standing (Astuti and McGregor 2017). Meanwhile, policies that
reconcile conservation with traditional rural livelihoods such as hutan desa (“village
forests”), which has received much praise from local NGOs and smallholders, appear
to have been blocked on the agenda. Issuance of new village forest licenses by the
central government has been scarce, and local governments have shown little interest
as they have not received many economic benefits from such ventures. Instead, local
governments often prefer to advance revenue-generating plantations or privately
funded conservation (Bastos Lima et al. 2013). As such, smallholders find themselves squashed between the strides of the two coalitions, having the least power and
yet the highest stakes (see Table 7.5).
7.4 Conclusions
7.4.1 Key Insights
Although many biofuel production chains were initially envisaged, palm oil reigns
solely and supremely as the only feedstock commercially used at scale in Indonesia.
While jatropha-biodiesel and sugarcane-ethanol have proved uneconomical and
failed to take off, oil palm cultivation expands faster than any other crop in the
country, and biodiesel production from palm oil grows substantially. Production
occurs either in large-scale plantations or through farming contracts between private
167
Bastos Lima and Gupta 2014). However, such Western leverage is gradually eclipsing
as Indonesia’s oil palm sector turns increasingly inwards and to other Asian markets.
Amid this conflict between plantation advocates and conservationists, it remains
unclear to what extent smallholder interests are represented. Oil palm farmers’ advocacy relies only on their own capabilities—primarily through GAPPERINDO, the
national plantation farmers union, and APKASINDO, the national oil palm farmers
union. Others in rural communities do not have even that; they have no direct participation in the agenda-setting and no discursive power to speak of. Their primary
agency is through demonstrations and protests—that is, by using themselves as
“mobilizable troops,” a typical resource of poor actors (Sabatier and Weible 2007).
That has been done particularly as resistance to land evictions and in conflicts with
plantation companies (Saragih 2012). However, this sometimes results in murder
and torture, as companies rely on government military protection or private security
(Asian Human Rights Commission 2011).
The advocacy of conservationists, too, has threatened rural and forest-based
communities, such as through various cases of “green grabbing” (i.e., private leases
of forest areas for conservation without taking into account populations who depend
on local resources uses; Fairhead et al. 2012). These practices have increased in
Indonesia as international funds start to flow for conservation activities, such as under
the REDD+ framework (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). Governments at various levels in Indonesia have started to seek revenue
to keep forests standing (Astuti and McGregor 2017). Meanwhile, policies that
reconcile conservation with traditional rural livelihoods such as hutan desa (“village
forests”), which has received much praise from local NGOs and smallholders, appear
to have been blocked on the agenda. Issuance of new village forest licenses by the
central government has been scarce, and local governments have shown little interest
as they have not received many economic benefits from such ventures. Instead, local
governments often prefer to advance revenue-generating plantations or privately
funded conservation (Bastos Lima et al. 2013). As such, smallholders find themselves squashed between the strides of the two coalitions, having the least power and
yet the highest stakes (see Table 7.5).
7.4 Conclusions
7.4.1 Key Insights
Although many biofuel production chains were initially envisaged, palm oil reigns
solely and supremely as the only feedstock commercially used at scale in Indonesia.
While jatropha-biodiesel and sugarcane-ethanol have proved uneconomical and
failed to take off, oil palm cultivation expands faster than any other crop in the
country, and biodiesel production from palm oil grows substantially. Production
occurs either in large-scale plantations or through farming contracts between private