166
7 Bioeconomy in the Oil Palm Republic of Indonesia
oil palm sector, which has continuously questioned them. Such civil society advocacy in importing countries also led industry boards in Belgium, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom to limit non-certified palm oil (Balch 2013). These moves
may not have changed the policy-core beliefs of the plantation coalition (as it regards
these restrictions as unjustifiable). However, they affect its material capabilities by
limiting access to export markets. The reorientation of Indonesia’s palm oil producers
increasingly towards the domestic market, especially pulled by ever more ambitious
biodiesel consumption targets, is in a way a response to the closing of some markets
abroad.
The plantation coalition has responded with information and discourse, too.
Supportive scientists have played key roles in publishing studies that buttress the
coalition’s policy beliefs. For instance, analyses that refute criticism on oil palm
plantations’ environmental profile,
9 or reassert the potentials and worth of largescale fossil fuel replacement by biofuels, and overall give tacit or explicit support
to Indonesia’s biofuel policy (see, e.g., Silitonga et al. 2011; Gunawan et al. 2011;
Jayed et al. 2011). For instance, a common argument has been to emphasize oil
palm’s climate benefits as a carbon sink—while ignoring or downplaying its other
environmental problems.
10 Similar scientific backing was pivotal for the jatropha
hype in Indonesia, primarily based on published overestimations (Afiff 2014). The
private sector, too, has tried to gain discursive leverage, mostly by highlighting the
importance of oil palm for the country’s economy, but on occasion also blaming
deforestation on smallholder agriculture instead (see Bahroeny 2009; World Growth
2011).
The creation of Indonesia’s own palm oil certification scheme (ISPO), in turn,
can be seen as a response to the perceived NGO-influenced consumer-orientation
of RSPO. ISPO, in contrast, has a government-set agenda, granting the plantation
coalition more structural power than it has in RSPO. Even if Europe and the US
reject it, Indonesia can still rely on large emerging markets such as India and China,
which impose no sustainability standards and where the discursive power of this
conservation coalition is far weaker.
This agency context shows that Indonesia’s more substantial reliance on global
markets makes foreign affairs related to biofuels far more relevant here than in
India or Brazil. Perhaps strangely, most of the discursive battle about Indonesia’s
development arguably takes place abroad. From a theoretical perspective, this case
provides a good illustration of the importance of “forum shopping” and multilevel
policy entrepreneurship. In practice, it means that Indonesia’s biofuel governance—
or land-use governance in general—is highly vulnerable to factors out of its domestic
actors’ control. Such a vulnerability is not only to international price volatility but also
to foreign policy-makers (as seen in the case of the US and EU sustainability criteria),
foreign investors, and multilateral financing organizations (see Caldecott et al. 2013;
9 See Tan et al. 2009 for a pro-plantation piece that treats and rejects various claims of environmental
degradation from oil palm expansion.
10 This same argument has been used in Indonesia (and elsewhere) to advocate for timber plantations,
too (see Bastos Lima et al. 2013).
7 Bioeconomy in the Oil Palm Republic of Indonesia
oil palm sector, which has continuously questioned them. Such civil society advocacy in importing countries also led industry boards in Belgium, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom to limit non-certified palm oil (Balch 2013). These moves
may not have changed the policy-core beliefs of the plantation coalition (as it regards
these restrictions as unjustifiable). However, they affect its material capabilities by
limiting access to export markets. The reorientation of Indonesia’s palm oil producers
increasingly towards the domestic market, especially pulled by ever more ambitious
biodiesel consumption targets, is in a way a response to the closing of some markets
abroad.
The plantation coalition has responded with information and discourse, too.
Supportive scientists have played key roles in publishing studies that buttress the
coalition’s policy beliefs. For instance, analyses that refute criticism on oil palm
plantations’ environmental profile,
9 or reassert the potentials and worth of largescale fossil fuel replacement by biofuels, and overall give tacit or explicit support
to Indonesia’s biofuel policy (see, e.g., Silitonga et al. 2011; Gunawan et al. 2011;
Jayed et al. 2011). For instance, a common argument has been to emphasize oil
palm’s climate benefits as a carbon sink—while ignoring or downplaying its other
environmental problems.
10 Similar scientific backing was pivotal for the jatropha
hype in Indonesia, primarily based on published overestimations (Afiff 2014). The
private sector, too, has tried to gain discursive leverage, mostly by highlighting the
importance of oil palm for the country’s economy, but on occasion also blaming
deforestation on smallholder agriculture instead (see Bahroeny 2009; World Growth
2011).
The creation of Indonesia’s own palm oil certification scheme (ISPO), in turn,
can be seen as a response to the perceived NGO-influenced consumer-orientation
of RSPO. ISPO, in contrast, has a government-set agenda, granting the plantation
coalition more structural power than it has in RSPO. Even if Europe and the US
reject it, Indonesia can still rely on large emerging markets such as India and China,
which impose no sustainability standards and where the discursive power of this
conservation coalition is far weaker.
This agency context shows that Indonesia’s more substantial reliance on global
markets makes foreign affairs related to biofuels far more relevant here than in
India or Brazil. Perhaps strangely, most of the discursive battle about Indonesia’s
development arguably takes place abroad. From a theoretical perspective, this case
provides a good illustration of the importance of “forum shopping” and multilevel
policy entrepreneurship. In practice, it means that Indonesia’s biofuel governance—
or land-use governance in general—is highly vulnerable to factors out of its domestic
actors’ control. Such a vulnerability is not only to international price volatility but also
to foreign policy-makers (as seen in the case of the US and EU sustainability criteria),
foreign investors, and multilateral financing organizations (see Caldecott et al. 2013;
9 See Tan et al. 2009 for a pro-plantation piece that treats and rejects various claims of environmental
degradation from oil palm expansion.
10 This same argument has been used in Indonesia (and elsewhere) to advocate for timber plantations,
too (see Bastos Lima et al. 2013).