7.3 Agency in Biofuel Governance in Indonesia
165
On the other camp, the conservation coalition has relied mainly on information
as an advocacy resource.
8 Environmental NGOs (particularly Europe-based ones)
and like-minded scientists have published extensively on the negative impacts of oil
palm expansion in Indonesia, trying to expose the government and private agribusiness (e.g., Wakker 2005; Marti 2008; Colchester et al. 2006; Colchester 2011; Koh
et al. 2011). Their target audience is not so much the Indonesian public opinion
but the international community (mainly in palm oil-importing countries) to influence foreign policy-making (Personal interviews). Scientists have supplied evidence
and detailed analyses of environmental degradation caused by oil palm plantations
(e.g., Koh et al. 2011; Fitzherbert et al. 2008). In turn, NGOs have utilized “name
and shame” tactics and engaged in strong consumer-oriented campaigns against palm
oil, particularly targeting large food-processing companies in Europe (e.g., Unilever;
see The Economist 2010). As such, the agency of NGOs and that of scientists have
been complementary and mutually reinforcing. NGOs have been key in consumerled certification schemes such as RSPO, holding both structural power (as board
members that help craft the agenda) and discursive power (over companies and
consumers who adopted the certification).
Indigenous peoples, too, have targeted international audiences by denouncing
human rights violations from plantation expansion. Together with foreign and
Indonesian NGOs, indigenous peoples sent a request to the UN Human Rights
Council to internationally condemn the MIFEE project in Papua, which in their view
should be suspended (Sawit Watch et al. 2011). The Council responded by formally
requesting the Indonesian government to disclose information on the Merauke project
and accept inspection visits in Papua of the UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights,
indigenous peoples’ rights, and the right to food (UN Human Rights Council 2012).
Although the Indonesian government initially refused such requests (UPR Info 2012),
the UN Special Rapporteurs eventually visited and issued several critiques about
plantation expansion in Papua (see UN General Assembly 2018).
These strategies of weaker agents recognize the plantation coalition’s vulnerability to foreign consumers’ and investors’ decisions. Such actors seem more easily
swayed by environmental and human rights issues than dominant Indonesian ones.
Foreign support may strengthen the conservation coalition (e.g., by adding members
and resources). It may also impose resource constraints on the plantation coalition,
whose agenda depends on international trade and financing. For instance, oil palm
agribusiness resources suffered a setback between 2009 and 2011, when the World
Bank suspended its financing of the sector after substantive criticism from civil
society (see Van Gelder and Kouwenhoven 2011). Even if it did not significantly
alter Indonesia’s development course, it temporarily reduced the plantation coalition’s material capabilities. A more lasting achievement has been conservationists’
success in changing the initial assumption that biofuels were automatically sustainable, helping push sustainability standards in the EU and the US. The imposition of
standards—which broadly reject palm-oil biodiesel—has dealt a blow to Indonesia’s
8 See Weible 2006 on the use of information as an advocacy resource.
165
On the other camp, the conservation coalition has relied mainly on information
as an advocacy resource.
8 Environmental NGOs (particularly Europe-based ones)
and like-minded scientists have published extensively on the negative impacts of oil
palm expansion in Indonesia, trying to expose the government and private agribusiness (e.g., Wakker 2005; Marti 2008; Colchester et al. 2006; Colchester 2011; Koh
et al. 2011). Their target audience is not so much the Indonesian public opinion
but the international community (mainly in palm oil-importing countries) to influence foreign policy-making (Personal interviews). Scientists have supplied evidence
and detailed analyses of environmental degradation caused by oil palm plantations
(e.g., Koh et al. 2011; Fitzherbert et al. 2008). In turn, NGOs have utilized “name
and shame” tactics and engaged in strong consumer-oriented campaigns against palm
oil, particularly targeting large food-processing companies in Europe (e.g., Unilever;
see The Economist 2010). As such, the agency of NGOs and that of scientists have
been complementary and mutually reinforcing. NGOs have been key in consumerled certification schemes such as RSPO, holding both structural power (as board
members that help craft the agenda) and discursive power (over companies and
consumers who adopted the certification).
Indigenous peoples, too, have targeted international audiences by denouncing
human rights violations from plantation expansion. Together with foreign and
Indonesian NGOs, indigenous peoples sent a request to the UN Human Rights
Council to internationally condemn the MIFEE project in Papua, which in their view
should be suspended (Sawit Watch et al. 2011). The Council responded by formally
requesting the Indonesian government to disclose information on the Merauke project
and accept inspection visits in Papua of the UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights,
indigenous peoples’ rights, and the right to food (UN Human Rights Council 2012).
Although the Indonesian government initially refused such requests (UPR Info 2012),
the UN Special Rapporteurs eventually visited and issued several critiques about
plantation expansion in Papua (see UN General Assembly 2018).
These strategies of weaker agents recognize the plantation coalition’s vulnerability to foreign consumers’ and investors’ decisions. Such actors seem more easily
swayed by environmental and human rights issues than dominant Indonesian ones.
Foreign support may strengthen the conservation coalition (e.g., by adding members
and resources). It may also impose resource constraints on the plantation coalition,
whose agenda depends on international trade and financing. For instance, oil palm
agribusiness resources suffered a setback between 2009 and 2011, when the World
Bank suspended its financing of the sector after substantive criticism from civil
society (see Van Gelder and Kouwenhoven 2011). Even if it did not significantly
alter Indonesia’s development course, it temporarily reduced the plantation coalition’s material capabilities. A more lasting achievement has been conservationists’
success in changing the initial assumption that biofuels were automatically sustainable, helping push sustainability standards in the EU and the US. The imposition of
standards—which broadly reject palm-oil biodiesel—has dealt a blow to Indonesia’s
8 See Weible 2006 on the use of information as an advocacy resource.