136
6 India’s Bioeconomy and the Ambition over “Wastelands”
6.3 Agency in Biofuel Governance in India
6.3.1 Main Coalitions and Their Policy Beliefs
The state has dominated biofuel governance in India in cooperation with the private
sector and like-minded scientists. Under government leadership, those mainstream
agents have formed a dominant agribusiness coalition supporting the large-scale
biofuels agenda. There have been internal conflicts on secondary policy aspects, but
usually followed by successful negotiations. For instance, there have been continuous
rounds of negotiations between the government and the sugarcane industry on the
Minimum Purchase Prices paid for ethanol by the OMCs. The industry has repeatedly complained it is too low to make fuel-ethanol production attractive, and the
government has accommodated its requests numerous times. The biodiesel industry
has made similar requests, but so far without success. Clearly, the success of such
negotiations is essential to make biofuel production chains operational.
In this context, the government and the industry cannot concretize their policy
beliefs without agreement. As in Brazil, this need suggests a case of symbiotic interdependency between those two sets of actors (see Fenger and Klok 2001). Although
the scientific community is not essential for the functioning of those production
chains, it has become increasingly important as companies and the government decide
to utilize improved feedstock varieties (e.g., of jatropha). Common policy beliefs and
a need to cooperate have thus resulted in strong coordination within the coalition,
with all those actors being better-off by the concretization of their beliefs (Fenger and
Klok 2001). Furthermore, because this coalition has been dominant, it has had the
chance to implement its beliefs experimentally. That has meant continuous revisions
of secondary aspects, such as that jatropha could yield well without inputs or that a
20% replacement of diesel by jatropha-biodiesel by 2012 was attainable.
In contrast, critical voices have hardly displayed sufficient coordination to characterize them as an adversary coalition on the biofuels issue. Those voices include a
minority within the government, scientists, as well as NGOs and social businesses.
They all share a certain level of disagreement with the pursued policies, yet they do
not all share the same policy-core beliefs (see also Kumar et al. 2009). For instance,
some agree with the mainstream view that “wastelands” are available, but argue that
biofuels should be used for local consumption rather than sold to oil companies.
Others recognize the values in “wastelands” for the rural poor, but either argue that
biofuels have no role whatsoever in rural development or that biofuels need to be
promoted in a participatory way and focus on small farmers’ needs. While one could
downplay these disagreements as referring to secondary aspects, the actors do not
coordinate their criticism of the mainstream agenda as a single coalition, let alone
jointly propose an alternative approach. Even individually, it is questionable whether
their participation in governance is sufficient to consider them agents (see Table 6.3).
6 India’s Bioeconomy and the Ambition over “Wastelands”
6.3 Agency in Biofuel Governance in India
6.3.1 Main Coalitions and Their Policy Beliefs
The state has dominated biofuel governance in India in cooperation with the private
sector and like-minded scientists. Under government leadership, those mainstream
agents have formed a dominant agribusiness coalition supporting the large-scale
biofuels agenda. There have been internal conflicts on secondary policy aspects, but
usually followed by successful negotiations. For instance, there have been continuous
rounds of negotiations between the government and the sugarcane industry on the
Minimum Purchase Prices paid for ethanol by the OMCs. The industry has repeatedly complained it is too low to make fuel-ethanol production attractive, and the
government has accommodated its requests numerous times. The biodiesel industry
has made similar requests, but so far without success. Clearly, the success of such
negotiations is essential to make biofuel production chains operational.
In this context, the government and the industry cannot concretize their policy
beliefs without agreement. As in Brazil, this need suggests a case of symbiotic interdependency between those two sets of actors (see Fenger and Klok 2001). Although
the scientific community is not essential for the functioning of those production
chains, it has become increasingly important as companies and the government decide
to utilize improved feedstock varieties (e.g., of jatropha). Common policy beliefs and
a need to cooperate have thus resulted in strong coordination within the coalition,
with all those actors being better-off by the concretization of their beliefs (Fenger and
Klok 2001). Furthermore, because this coalition has been dominant, it has had the
chance to implement its beliefs experimentally. That has meant continuous revisions
of secondary aspects, such as that jatropha could yield well without inputs or that a
20% replacement of diesel by jatropha-biodiesel by 2012 was attainable.
In contrast, critical voices have hardly displayed sufficient coordination to characterize them as an adversary coalition on the biofuels issue. Those voices include a
minority within the government, scientists, as well as NGOs and social businesses.
They all share a certain level of disagreement with the pursued policies, yet they do
not all share the same policy-core beliefs (see also Kumar et al. 2009). For instance,
some agree with the mainstream view that “wastelands” are available, but argue that
biofuels should be used for local consumption rather than sold to oil companies.
Others recognize the values in “wastelands” for the rural poor, but either argue that
biofuels have no role whatsoever in rural development or that biofuels need to be
promoted in a participatory way and focus on small farmers’ needs. While one could
downplay these disagreements as referring to secondary aspects, the actors do not
coordinate their criticism of the mainstream agenda as a single coalition, let alone
jointly propose an alternative approach. Even individually, it is questionable whether
their participation in governance is sufficient to consider them agents (see Table 6.3).