5.3 Agency in Biofuel Governance in Brazil
113
productivity levels, which governments have not revised since 1975 (Ferreira et al.
2008). The agroecology coalition, therefore, claims this law is not being implemented. The agribusiness coalition, in turn, benefits from the leniency and regular
support of the judiciary—showing another instance of structural power (Gomes et al.
2010a; CPT 2013). Sometimes, this coalition resorts to instrumental power in the
form of violence by murdering community leaders or environmental activists, as in
the notorious case of Chico Mendes in 1988 or the hundreds assassinated in rural
conflicts.
All these actions are underpinned by contrasting discourses from the two coalitions. The agribusiness coalition has portrayed industrial biofuels as sustainable and
beneficial to national interests, emphasizing contributions to economic growth and
to Brazil’s competitiveness in the international market.
23 Agribusiness efforts on
various social and political levels to attach its agenda to Brazil’s national (self)image
is nothing new; this tactic dates as far back as at least the 1930s, with the promotion
of banana production and exports as a reason for national pride (see Rabelo 2018).
The bioeconomy has been embraced under an old practice and being only the newest
element or facet in a long-established advocacy repertoire.
In its latest incarnation, at least nominally embracing sustainability concerns,
the agribusiness coalition also tactically focuses on CO 2 emissions instead of total
greenhouse gas emissions or the environment as a whole. Agriculture and livestock
farming emit more greenhouse gases than Brazil’s entire energy sector—without
even taking land-use change (i.e., deforestation) emissions into account (Angelo and
Rittl 2019). That is also in addition to causing other environmental issues such as
agrobiodiversity loss and widespread pesticide contamination. However, by focusing
only on CO 2 , transport emissions appear more relevant and thus more important to
tackle.
Overall, the agribusiness coalition labels its adversaries as ideology-driven, out
of tune with the market, and incapable of fulfilling Brazil’s development needs.
It has also framed land invasions as criminal actions against private property. In
turn, the agroecology coalition also highlights national sovereignty interests, but
from a bottom-up, grassroots perspective. This framing is captured, for instance, by
peasant movements’ coining of the term Alimergia—an abbreviation that combines
food, environment, and energy—as a banner for locally controlled biofuels development within a smallholder agriculture framework (Patino et al. 2019). Such critics
have contended that the dominant, mainstream biofuel production is unsustainable,
primarily serves the vested interests of Brazilian elites and multinational corporations, and robs the poor of their access to resources (Mendonça 2009). Table 5.7
23 On this, Marcos Jank, then president of the Sugarcane Industry Union (UNICA), argued that
Brazil’s forest code was an “anachronic piece of legislation” that could “compromise 3.7 million
hectares of fertile land in São Paulo state and lead to R$5.6 million [USD 2.7 million] of annual
revenues loss” (Gomes et al. 2010a, p. 24). The economicist perspective is clear, and so is the
provocative nationalistic appeal used as a persuasion line. He continues: “[It is] sad to see an
anachronic legislation with such a capacity to transfer income, revenues and jobs to other countries,
who will certainly love this surprising modality of self-flagellation we are imposing on ourselves”
(Gomes et al. 2010a, p. 24). See also Jank (2011).
113
productivity levels, which governments have not revised since 1975 (Ferreira et al.
2008). The agroecology coalition, therefore, claims this law is not being implemented. The agribusiness coalition, in turn, benefits from the leniency and regular
support of the judiciary—showing another instance of structural power (Gomes et al.
2010a; CPT 2013). Sometimes, this coalition resorts to instrumental power in the
form of violence by murdering community leaders or environmental activists, as in
the notorious case of Chico Mendes in 1988 or the hundreds assassinated in rural
conflicts.
All these actions are underpinned by contrasting discourses from the two coalitions. The agribusiness coalition has portrayed industrial biofuels as sustainable and
beneficial to national interests, emphasizing contributions to economic growth and
to Brazil’s competitiveness in the international market.
23 Agribusiness efforts on
various social and political levels to attach its agenda to Brazil’s national (self)image
is nothing new; this tactic dates as far back as at least the 1930s, with the promotion
of banana production and exports as a reason for national pride (see Rabelo 2018).
The bioeconomy has been embraced under an old practice and being only the newest
element or facet in a long-established advocacy repertoire.
In its latest incarnation, at least nominally embracing sustainability concerns,
the agribusiness coalition also tactically focuses on CO 2 emissions instead of total
greenhouse gas emissions or the environment as a whole. Agriculture and livestock
farming emit more greenhouse gases than Brazil’s entire energy sector—without
even taking land-use change (i.e., deforestation) emissions into account (Angelo and
Rittl 2019). That is also in addition to causing other environmental issues such as
agrobiodiversity loss and widespread pesticide contamination. However, by focusing
only on CO 2 , transport emissions appear more relevant and thus more important to
tackle.
Overall, the agribusiness coalition labels its adversaries as ideology-driven, out
of tune with the market, and incapable of fulfilling Brazil’s development needs.
It has also framed land invasions as criminal actions against private property. In
turn, the agroecology coalition also highlights national sovereignty interests, but
from a bottom-up, grassroots perspective. This framing is captured, for instance, by
peasant movements’ coining of the term Alimergia—an abbreviation that combines
food, environment, and energy—as a banner for locally controlled biofuels development within a smallholder agriculture framework (Patino et al. 2019). Such critics
have contended that the dominant, mainstream biofuel production is unsustainable,
primarily serves the vested interests of Brazilian elites and multinational corporations, and robs the poor of their access to resources (Mendonça 2009). Table 5.7
23 On this, Marcos Jank, then president of the Sugarcane Industry Union (UNICA), argued that
Brazil’s forest code was an “anachronic piece of legislation” that could “compromise 3.7 million
hectares of fertile land in São Paulo state and lead to R$5.6 million [USD 2.7 million] of annual
revenues loss” (Gomes et al. 2010a, p. 24). The economicist perspective is clear, and so is the
provocative nationalistic appeal used as a persuasion line. He continues: “[It is] sad to see an
anachronic legislation with such a capacity to transfer income, revenues and jobs to other countries,
who will certainly love this surprising modality of self-flagellation we are imposing on ourselves”
(Gomes et al. 2010a, p. 24). See also Jank (2011).