112
5 Brazil Between Bioeconomy Barons and Grassroots Agroecology
farming’s economic importance and funding smallholder biofuel projects—even if
to a comparatively smaller extent.
20
It is worth noting the government’s ambivalent position in biofuel policy disputes
and how such a politically instituted bioeconomy agenda increased its power.
Although all along it has aligned mostly with large agroindustries, the government
has had branches sharing the agroecology coalition’s views, particularly on social
inclusion. This ambivalence became most evident when Brazil had a Ministry of
Agrarian Development distinct from the agribusiness-dominated Ministry of Agriculture during the Workers’ Party administrations (2003–2016). It explains why the
government pushed for the inclusion of smallholders in biodiesel production chains
even though that was not in the agribusiness coalition’s overall interest. It was,
instead, a demand of the agroecology coalition members that filtered through the
government.
The government’s power grew as it became a major financier of the biofuels
sector through the BNDES development bank. Similarly, it became an active player in
setting a regulatory framework, best illustrated by private companies’ near-obligation
to obtain a Social Fuel Seal and other sustainability requirements such as the sugarcane zoning. Such a powerful position allowed the government to pose further
demands and effectively lead the agribusiness coalition, according to its own policybeliefs. That was particularly the case throughout the Workers’ Party administrations (2003–2016), most notably during Lula da Silva’s second term (2007–2010).
However, it gradually waned afterward as economic and political crises engulfed the
country from 2015 on. Eventually, the agroecology coalition’s supportive minority
within the government would be largely squeezed out as President Temer took
power in 2016, with support to smallholders virtually disappearing later on under
the Bolsonaro administration.
The agroecology coalition, in an increasingly subordinate position, historically
has extensively relied on “mobilizable troops” (see Weible 2006). That refers to
marches, protests, and land invasions by smallholders and (often landless) rural
workers. It has been used both as policy advocacy
21 and as direct attempts to destabilize and gain ground from the agribusiness coalition.
22 The invasion and occupation
of private farms is a legal imbroglio in Brazil because although the law safeguards
individual property rights, it also establishes that land must fulfill a “social function”
or be taken by the state for land reform (upon financial compensation). This social
function has specific criteria, such as the absence of bonded labor and minimum
20 Government data shows that family farming creates higher economic value per hectare than
industrial monocultures in Brazil: on average BRL 677 (~USD 338) against BRL 368 (~USD 184)
per hectare (IBGE 2009).
21 Perhaps most notably, in 2011, the first year of Dilma Rousseff’s administration (she being Brazil’s
first female head of state), female smallholders used a Women’s Day march and encounter with
the president as a window of opportunity to demand a national policy on agroecology as their
number one request. The president acquiesced, and a National Policy of Agroecology and Organic
Production was launched in August 2012.
22 There were 200 land invasions in 2011, almost half of them in the so-called “Red April”, which
social movements organize every year (MDA 2011).
5 Brazil Between Bioeconomy Barons and Grassroots Agroecology
farming’s economic importance and funding smallholder biofuel projects—even if
to a comparatively smaller extent.
20
It is worth noting the government’s ambivalent position in biofuel policy disputes
and how such a politically instituted bioeconomy agenda increased its power.
Although all along it has aligned mostly with large agroindustries, the government
has had branches sharing the agroecology coalition’s views, particularly on social
inclusion. This ambivalence became most evident when Brazil had a Ministry of
Agrarian Development distinct from the agribusiness-dominated Ministry of Agriculture during the Workers’ Party administrations (2003–2016). It explains why the
government pushed for the inclusion of smallholders in biodiesel production chains
even though that was not in the agribusiness coalition’s overall interest. It was,
instead, a demand of the agroecology coalition members that filtered through the
government.
The government’s power grew as it became a major financier of the biofuels
sector through the BNDES development bank. Similarly, it became an active player in
setting a regulatory framework, best illustrated by private companies’ near-obligation
to obtain a Social Fuel Seal and other sustainability requirements such as the sugarcane zoning. Such a powerful position allowed the government to pose further
demands and effectively lead the agribusiness coalition, according to its own policybeliefs. That was particularly the case throughout the Workers’ Party administrations (2003–2016), most notably during Lula da Silva’s second term (2007–2010).
However, it gradually waned afterward as economic and political crises engulfed the
country from 2015 on. Eventually, the agroecology coalition’s supportive minority
within the government would be largely squeezed out as President Temer took
power in 2016, with support to smallholders virtually disappearing later on under
the Bolsonaro administration.
The agroecology coalition, in an increasingly subordinate position, historically
has extensively relied on “mobilizable troops” (see Weible 2006). That refers to
marches, protests, and land invasions by smallholders and (often landless) rural
workers. It has been used both as policy advocacy
21 and as direct attempts to destabilize and gain ground from the agribusiness coalition.
22 The invasion and occupation
of private farms is a legal imbroglio in Brazil because although the law safeguards
individual property rights, it also establishes that land must fulfill a “social function”
or be taken by the state for land reform (upon financial compensation). This social
function has specific criteria, such as the absence of bonded labor and minimum
20 Government data shows that family farming creates higher economic value per hectare than
industrial monocultures in Brazil: on average BRL 677 (~USD 338) against BRL 368 (~USD 184)
per hectare (IBGE 2009).
21 Perhaps most notably, in 2011, the first year of Dilma Rousseff’s administration (she being Brazil’s
first female head of state), female smallholders used a Women’s Day march and encounter with
the president as a window of opportunity to demand a national policy on agroecology as their
number one request. The president acquiesced, and a National Policy of Agroecology and Organic
Production was launched in August 2012.
22 There were 200 land invasions in 2011, almost half of them in the so-called “Red April”, which
social movements organize every year (MDA 2011).