decreasing one or more other objective values. If the planner has included objectives
which are of concern to policy makers (or the groups which influence the policymaking process), and a broad spectrum of alternatives has been formulated, it is not
unreasonable to argue that the planner has performed his function well. He can
present these alternatives to decision makers and, after a selection has been made,
proceed with plan implementation. The planner could thus avoid more than marginal
involvement with questions of political feasibility.
The viability of this approach rests on two assumptions:
(1) the planner must be capable of formulating Pareto efficient plans that may
include a large number of objectives.
(2) decision makers must be willing to examine a rather large set of complex
alternatives.
We have just indicated that there is little reason to believe that either assumption
is valid. The formulation of a multiobjective infrastructure plan is an expensive,
time-consuming process, and even in planning situations that are amenable to
mathematical modelling, we have seen that formulated plans may only approach a
feasibility frontier. Planning budgets are finite, and policy makers’ time is a scarce
resource. Thus policy makers may not wish to see a large number of planning
alternatives. Efficient use of policy makers’ time would dictate the screening of
plans so that they may select from a small set of promising alternatives. Hence, it is
difficult to eliminate politics from planning. The challenge, perhaps, is to make
considerations of political feasibility explicit rather than implicit in the planning
process.
The systematic identification of politically feasible infrastructure plans can be
approached in several ways. If decision makers can be involved in plan formulation,
methods are available for estimating their preferences for the various objectives and
plans. In this fashion, optimal trade-offs among objectives can be determined with
relative certainty, and one or more plans can be identified as being closely aligned
with the decision makers’ preferences. If policy makers have neither the time nor the
inclination for such involvement, optimal trade-offs will be uncertain, and planners
must utilize some means of estimating or predicting these trade-offs. Models appropriate to both situations will now be outlined.
14.7.1 When Preferences Are Certain
Earlier, plan selection was described as the identification of a plan on the feasible
frontier curve which attains the highest level of isopreference curve or political
feasibility (see Fig. 14.3). This selection can be effected using indifference analysis.
The procedure is illustrated in an example.
Consider a planning situation in which there are three objectives of concern to a
decision maker, described by objective functions F 1 (X k ), F 2 (X k ) and F 3 (X k ). Let the
level of objectives achieved by plan X k , F j (X k ) be indicated by F jk . Any plan can thus
14.7 Plan Selection: The Identification of Politically Feasible Alternatives
399
which are of concern to policy makers (or the groups which influence the policymaking process), and a broad spectrum of alternatives has been formulated, it is not
unreasonable to argue that the planner has performed his function well. He can
present these alternatives to decision makers and, after a selection has been made,
proceed with plan implementation. The planner could thus avoid more than marginal
involvement with questions of political feasibility.
The viability of this approach rests on two assumptions:
(1) the planner must be capable of formulating Pareto efficient plans that may
include a large number of objectives.
(2) decision makers must be willing to examine a rather large set of complex
alternatives.
We have just indicated that there is little reason to believe that either assumption
is valid. The formulation of a multiobjective infrastructure plan is an expensive,
time-consuming process, and even in planning situations that are amenable to
mathematical modelling, we have seen that formulated plans may only approach a
feasibility frontier. Planning budgets are finite, and policy makers’ time is a scarce
resource. Thus policy makers may not wish to see a large number of planning
alternatives. Efficient use of policy makers’ time would dictate the screening of
plans so that they may select from a small set of promising alternatives. Hence, it is
difficult to eliminate politics from planning. The challenge, perhaps, is to make
considerations of political feasibility explicit rather than implicit in the planning
process.
The systematic identification of politically feasible infrastructure plans can be
approached in several ways. If decision makers can be involved in plan formulation,
methods are available for estimating their preferences for the various objectives and
plans. In this fashion, optimal trade-offs among objectives can be determined with
relative certainty, and one or more plans can be identified as being closely aligned
with the decision makers’ preferences. If policy makers have neither the time nor the
inclination for such involvement, optimal trade-offs will be uncertain, and planners
must utilize some means of estimating or predicting these trade-offs. Models appropriate to both situations will now be outlined.
14.7.1 When Preferences Are Certain
Earlier, plan selection was described as the identification of a plan on the feasible
frontier curve which attains the highest level of isopreference curve or political
feasibility (see Fig. 14.3). This selection can be effected using indifference analysis.
The procedure is illustrated in an example.
Consider a planning situation in which there are three objectives of concern to a
decision maker, described by objective functions F 1 (X k ), F 2 (X k ) and F 3 (X k ). Let the
level of objectives achieved by plan X k , F j (X k ) be indicated by F jk . Any plan can thus
14.7 Plan Selection: The Identification of Politically Feasible Alternatives
399