authorities, and over time the network became a
“testing ground” that security forces used to
develop a system for selecting and blocking
unwanted Web sites. As late as 2005 the system
was far from comprehensive, with previous ONI
research showing a great deal of divergence
among the access available on various ISPs,
where some comprehensively blocked content
while others allowed unfettered access. The suspicion is that some commercial ISPs had close
connections with Karimov’s inner circle and
hence were able to withstand pressure to implement filtering, which gave them a commercial
advantage (as users who wished to access such
content would pay to access the Internet through
these ISPs).
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted on five of the largest ISPs
in Uzbekistan: ROL, Sarkor, SHARQ, TPS, and
UzPAK. ONI detected a consistent and substantial filtering system that re-directs users to another Web site (www.live.com). Blocked sites included numerous political sites and a wide range of
sites with human rights contents from both the
local and regional list. In general, online publications tackling political issues deemed subversive
or sensitive to the government were heavily filtered. These Web sites are hosted outside of
Uzbekistan (www.ferghana.ru) because the ones
based in the country have been already forced to
shut down (www.uznews.net). Selective filtering
of Web sites displaying social topics was also
detected, including sites with religious, extremist,
porn, gay, and lesbian content. U.S. military Web
sites were largely inaccessible on some of the
ISPs, although this appears to be the rest of
“supply-side” blocking by U.S. authorities.
Several anonymizers, a few host URLs, and one
e-mail site were also within the list of blocked
Web sites.
Most of the cybercafés surveyed by ONI
researchers have announcements cautioning
users against visiting Web sites containing
extremist, obscene, sexually explicit, or pornographic content, and some cybercafé administrators do carry out surveillance on a regular
basis. However, observations demonstrate that
this is unevenly applied. In some cases, users
enjoy relatively unfettered Internet access. In others, notably during two visits by ONI researchers,
accessing an “unauthorized site” led to a swift
arrest by security forces who were summoned by
the Internet café owner. Regular visits by SNB
officers are reported at cybercafés in the Fergana
valley where they are said to manually check to
see if certain sites are accessible. Most cybercafés use commercially available software that
allows them to manage and bill clients remotely
for time spent online. This software is easily
adapted to warn administrators when unauthorized content is being accessed, and also to
block access.
Conclusion
Uzbekistan maintains the most extensive and
pervasive filtering system among tested CIS
countries. Although expressly banned in Uzbek
law, filtering is widespread and apparently growing. A large number of sites with political and
human rights content sensitive to the government
remain inaccessible to Internet users. The security forces in Uzbekistan manually check Internet
access at “edge locations” (such as cybercafés)
and monitor users’ activities. The regulatory
framework is so intricately woven that, in most
cases, ISPs and Internet publishers are unaware
of the governing law. To avoid inflicting the wrath
of authorities, Internet actors frequently undertake self-censorship.
NOTES
1. See International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
Country Summaries
413
“testing ground” that security forces used to
develop a system for selecting and blocking
unwanted Web sites. As late as 2005 the system
was far from comprehensive, with previous ONI
research showing a great deal of divergence
among the access available on various ISPs,
where some comprehensively blocked content
while others allowed unfettered access. The suspicion is that some commercial ISPs had close
connections with Karimov’s inner circle and
hence were able to withstand pressure to implement filtering, which gave them a commercial
advantage (as users who wished to access such
content would pay to access the Internet through
these ISPs).
ONI testing results
Testing was conducted on five of the largest ISPs
in Uzbekistan: ROL, Sarkor, SHARQ, TPS, and
UzPAK. ONI detected a consistent and substantial filtering system that re-directs users to another Web site (www.live.com). Blocked sites included numerous political sites and a wide range of
sites with human rights contents from both the
local and regional list. In general, online publications tackling political issues deemed subversive
or sensitive to the government were heavily filtered. These Web sites are hosted outside of
Uzbekistan (www.ferghana.ru) because the ones
based in the country have been already forced to
shut down (www.uznews.net). Selective filtering
of Web sites displaying social topics was also
detected, including sites with religious, extremist,
porn, gay, and lesbian content. U.S. military Web
sites were largely inaccessible on some of the
ISPs, although this appears to be the rest of
“supply-side” blocking by U.S. authorities.
Several anonymizers, a few host URLs, and one
e-mail site were also within the list of blocked
Web sites.
Most of the cybercafés surveyed by ONI
researchers have announcements cautioning
users against visiting Web sites containing
extremist, obscene, sexually explicit, or pornographic content, and some cybercafé administrators do carry out surveillance on a regular
basis. However, observations demonstrate that
this is unevenly applied. In some cases, users
enjoy relatively unfettered Internet access. In others, notably during two visits by ONI researchers,
accessing an “unauthorized site” led to a swift
arrest by security forces who were summoned by
the Internet café owner. Regular visits by SNB
officers are reported at cybercafés in the Fergana
valley where they are said to manually check to
see if certain sites are accessible. Most cybercafés use commercially available software that
allows them to manage and bill clients remotely
for time spent online. This software is easily
adapted to warn administrators when unauthorized content is being accessed, and also to
block access.
Conclusion
Uzbekistan maintains the most extensive and
pervasive filtering system among tested CIS
countries. Although expressly banned in Uzbek
law, filtering is widespread and apparently growing. A large number of sites with political and
human rights content sensitive to the government
remain inaccessible to Internet users. The security forces in Uzbekistan manually check Internet
access at “edge locations” (such as cybercafés)
and monitor users’ activities. The regulatory
framework is so intricately woven that, in most
cases, ISPs and Internet publishers are unaware
of the governing law. To avoid inflicting the wrath
of authorities, Internet actors frequently undertake self-censorship.
NOTES
1. See International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
Country Summaries
413