Internet.
19
Under Resolution of the Cabinet of
Ministers No. 232 of 2002, UzACI provides information security and coordinates providers’ activities in this field. All Internet service providers and
operators must obtain a license from UzACI. 20
Under order no. 216 Internet providers and operators cannot disseminate information that inter
alia calls for the violent overthrowing of the constitutional order of Uzbekistan, instigates war and
violence, contains pornography, or degrades and
defames human dignity. 21 UzbekTelecom, the
national telecommunications operator, has discretionary power to oversee the ISPs’ observance of this order. 22 In 2005 the ISPs in
Uzbekistan faced another regulatory hindrance in
the form of resolution no. 155 (Cabinet of
Ministers), which stipulated that only legal entities
should be entitled to provide licensed telecommunication services. Individuals have to register
as legal entities and obtain new licenses before
continuing to provide Internet services.
In 2004 the Cabinet of Ministers adopted
regulation no. 555, establishing a Center for
Mass Media Monitoring within UzACI. The
Center’s key objectives are to analyze the content of information disseminated through the
Internet and ensure its compliance with existing
laws and regulations. 23 Another regulatory body,
the Uzbek Agency for Press and Information
(UzPIA), monitors the observance of media law,
issues registrations and licenses for media outlets. 24 This agency has the power to suspend
media licenses for “systematic” breaches of
Uzbekistan’s restrictive media and information
laws.
The 2002 Law on Principles and Guarantees
on Access to Information reserves the government’s right to restrict access to information
when necessary to protect the individual “from
negative informational psychological influence.” 25 The government further controls information streams by authorizing the use of political, economic, or other measures when necessary to counteract “threats in the sphere of information security” or “ideas of terrorism and religious extremism.” 26
Uzbekistan’s principal intelligence agency,
the National Security Service (SNB), monitors the
Uzbek sector of the Internet and thereby compels
ISPs, including cybercafés, to self-censor. Sovietstyle censorship structures were replaced by
“monitoring sections” that basically work under
the SNB’s guidance. There is no mandatory government pre-publication review, but the ISPs risk
having their licenses revoked if they post “inappropriate” information. On some occasions, the
SNB has ordered ISPs to block access to opposition or religious Web sites. 27 The SNB’s censorship is selective and often targets articles on government corruption, violations of human rights,
and organized crime. Usually this censorship
affects specific pages instead of top-level
domain names. The SNB regularly exchanges
data with Russian intelligence sources and
allegedly collaborates with the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Academy.
Paradoxically, Internet filtering in Uzbekistan
did not begin with the security forces but rather
with the academic and research network, whose
existence was funded with foreign development
assistance. 28 UzSCINET was the first Uzbek ISP
to implement a filtering policy, using an open
source filtering product (Squid Guard) and publicly available list of pornographic sites.
UzSCINET justified its position of filtering pornography on the basis of being a provider to schools
and universities, as well as the need to conserve
bandwidth. However, UzSCINET lacked formal
legal status in Uzbekistan and as a result was
dependent on UzInfoCom, a quasi-government
agency for maintaining its license as a service
provider. As it happened, the formal “head” of
UzSCINET was also the director of UzInfoCom
and a deputy director of UzASCI, the government
communications agency and regulator. Simultaneously, he was also acting as an adviser to the
presidential Security Council. As a result pressure was exerted on UzSCINET to cooperate with
412
Country Summaries
19
Under Resolution of the Cabinet of
Ministers No. 232 of 2002, UzACI provides information security and coordinates providers’ activities in this field. All Internet service providers and
operators must obtain a license from UzACI. 20
Under order no. 216 Internet providers and operators cannot disseminate information that inter
alia calls for the violent overthrowing of the constitutional order of Uzbekistan, instigates war and
violence, contains pornography, or degrades and
defames human dignity. 21 UzbekTelecom, the
national telecommunications operator, has discretionary power to oversee the ISPs’ observance of this order. 22 In 2005 the ISPs in
Uzbekistan faced another regulatory hindrance in
the form of resolution no. 155 (Cabinet of
Ministers), which stipulated that only legal entities
should be entitled to provide licensed telecommunication services. Individuals have to register
as legal entities and obtain new licenses before
continuing to provide Internet services.
In 2004 the Cabinet of Ministers adopted
regulation no. 555, establishing a Center for
Mass Media Monitoring within UzACI. The
Center’s key objectives are to analyze the content of information disseminated through the
Internet and ensure its compliance with existing
laws and regulations. 23 Another regulatory body,
the Uzbek Agency for Press and Information
(UzPIA), monitors the observance of media law,
issues registrations and licenses for media outlets. 24 This agency has the power to suspend
media licenses for “systematic” breaches of
Uzbekistan’s restrictive media and information
laws.
The 2002 Law on Principles and Guarantees
on Access to Information reserves the government’s right to restrict access to information
when necessary to protect the individual “from
negative informational psychological influence.” 25 The government further controls information streams by authorizing the use of political, economic, or other measures when necessary to counteract “threats in the sphere of information security” or “ideas of terrorism and religious extremism.” 26
Uzbekistan’s principal intelligence agency,
the National Security Service (SNB), monitors the
Uzbek sector of the Internet and thereby compels
ISPs, including cybercafés, to self-censor. Sovietstyle censorship structures were replaced by
“monitoring sections” that basically work under
the SNB’s guidance. There is no mandatory government pre-publication review, but the ISPs risk
having their licenses revoked if they post “inappropriate” information. On some occasions, the
SNB has ordered ISPs to block access to opposition or religious Web sites. 27 The SNB’s censorship is selective and often targets articles on government corruption, violations of human rights,
and organized crime. Usually this censorship
affects specific pages instead of top-level
domain names. The SNB regularly exchanges
data with Russian intelligence sources and
allegedly collaborates with the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Academy.
Paradoxically, Internet filtering in Uzbekistan
did not begin with the security forces but rather
with the academic and research network, whose
existence was funded with foreign development
assistance. 28 UzSCINET was the first Uzbek ISP
to implement a filtering policy, using an open
source filtering product (Squid Guard) and publicly available list of pornographic sites.
UzSCINET justified its position of filtering pornography on the basis of being a provider to schools
and universities, as well as the need to conserve
bandwidth. However, UzSCINET lacked formal
legal status in Uzbekistan and as a result was
dependent on UzInfoCom, a quasi-government
agency for maintaining its license as a service
provider. As it happened, the formal “head” of
UzSCINET was also the director of UzInfoCom
and a deputy director of UzASCI, the government
communications agency and regulator. Simultaneously, he was also acting as an adviser to the
presidential Security Council. As a result pressure was exerted on UzSCINET to cooperate with
412
Country Summaries