availability of information communications technology (ICT) technologies and the Internet.
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Libya continues to maintain strict limits on what
can be said or written in the country. Libya’s
penal code, for example, punishes with life
imprisonment or death anyone convicted of disseminating information that conflicts with the
constitutional principles or the country’s “fundamental social structures” or that tarnishes Libya’s
image abroad. Criticism of President Gaddafi is
punishable by death. 21
Further, by the press laws mentioned earlier,
print and broadcast media are owned and strictly controlled by the government, and expression
of opinions contrary to official policy is strictly forbidden. According to the Freedom House report,
the pervasive use of secret police, informants,
and arbitrary arrests intimidates citizens from
speaking out and renders independent and critical journalism virtually impossible. 22
With the rising threat from the Internet to
government control over political information, the
Libyan government appointed one of Gaddafi’s
closest friends to monitor and limit the growth of
oppositional Web sites. Experts from Russia,
Poland, and Pakistan were summoned to Libya
to help handle the situation. One tactic that
emerged was to force owners of Internet cafés
to place stickers on computers that warn
visitors from logging onto Web sites deemed
oppositional. 23
Beyond merely political content, the Libyan
official “.ly” registry rules mandate that “.ly”
domains “must not contain obscene, scandalous, indecent, or contrary to Libyan law or
Islamic morality words, phrases or abbreviations.” 24 ONI did not, however, find any social
blocking in its tests.
In 2006 Reporters Without Borders removed
Libya from their list of the Internet enemies after a
fact-finding visit found no evidence of Internet
censorship. 25 ONI’s test results contradict that
conclusion, however, as noted below.
ONI testing results
In 2007 ONI ran tests on Libya’s three ISPs: Libya
Telecom and Technology (LTT), Modern World of
Communications (MWC), and Al-Falak. All three
ISPs were found to block oppositional content
such as the Web site of the Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood (www.almukhtar.org) and the Libyan
Constitutional Union (www.lcu-libya.co.uk and
www.libyanconstitutionalunion.net).
The three ISPs also block Web sites containing information critical of the Libyan regime.
For example, ONI found Libya for Ever
(www.libya4ever.com), Libya al-Mostakbal
(www.libya-almostakbal.com), and Libya Our
Home (www.libya-watanona.com) to be blocked.
Access to Web sites containing information
about the Amazigh (Berbers), including the
preservation and teaching of the Tamazight language and culture, is restricted as well.
Examples in this category found to be blocked
are www.libyaimal.com, an Amazigh-related Web
site, and www.tawalt.com, a site run by a Libyan
Amazigh cultural foundation.
The filtering regime also targets content critical of the human rights situation in the country,
notably the Web site of the Libyan Union for
Human Rights Defenders (www.libyanhuman
rights.com).
Evidence from ONI testing reveals that Libya
employs IP blocking at the international gateway,
carried out by Libya Telecom and Technology
Company (LTT). Users who attempt to access
banned content are not served with a blockpage,
but rather encounter time-out messages.
Conclusion
Despite the general trend toward greater freedom and openness, Libya maintains an active
Internet filtration regime focused on Web sites of
political opposition groups, antigovernment news
and views, and content related to the minority
Country Summaries
323
Legal and regulatory frameworks
Libya continues to maintain strict limits on what
can be said or written in the country. Libya’s
penal code, for example, punishes with life
imprisonment or death anyone convicted of disseminating information that conflicts with the
constitutional principles or the country’s “fundamental social structures” or that tarnishes Libya’s
image abroad. Criticism of President Gaddafi is
punishable by death. 21
Further, by the press laws mentioned earlier,
print and broadcast media are owned and strictly controlled by the government, and expression
of opinions contrary to official policy is strictly forbidden. According to the Freedom House report,
the pervasive use of secret police, informants,
and arbitrary arrests intimidates citizens from
speaking out and renders independent and critical journalism virtually impossible. 22
With the rising threat from the Internet to
government control over political information, the
Libyan government appointed one of Gaddafi’s
closest friends to monitor and limit the growth of
oppositional Web sites. Experts from Russia,
Poland, and Pakistan were summoned to Libya
to help handle the situation. One tactic that
emerged was to force owners of Internet cafés
to place stickers on computers that warn
visitors from logging onto Web sites deemed
oppositional. 23
Beyond merely political content, the Libyan
official “.ly” registry rules mandate that “.ly”
domains “must not contain obscene, scandalous, indecent, or contrary to Libyan law or
Islamic morality words, phrases or abbreviations.” 24 ONI did not, however, find any social
blocking in its tests.
In 2006 Reporters Without Borders removed
Libya from their list of the Internet enemies after a
fact-finding visit found no evidence of Internet
censorship. 25 ONI’s test results contradict that
conclusion, however, as noted below.
ONI testing results
In 2007 ONI ran tests on Libya’s three ISPs: Libya
Telecom and Technology (LTT), Modern World of
Communications (MWC), and Al-Falak. All three
ISPs were found to block oppositional content
such as the Web site of the Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood (www.almukhtar.org) and the Libyan
Constitutional Union (www.lcu-libya.co.uk and
www.libyanconstitutionalunion.net).
The three ISPs also block Web sites containing information critical of the Libyan regime.
For example, ONI found Libya for Ever
(www.libya4ever.com), Libya al-Mostakbal
(www.libya-almostakbal.com), and Libya Our
Home (www.libya-watanona.com) to be blocked.
Access to Web sites containing information
about the Amazigh (Berbers), including the
preservation and teaching of the Tamazight language and culture, is restricted as well.
Examples in this category found to be blocked
are www.libyaimal.com, an Amazigh-related Web
site, and www.tawalt.com, a site run by a Libyan
Amazigh cultural foundation.
The filtering regime also targets content critical of the human rights situation in the country,
notably the Web site of the Libyan Union for
Human Rights Defenders (www.libyanhuman
rights.com).
Evidence from ONI testing reveals that Libya
employs IP blocking at the international gateway,
carried out by Libya Telecom and Technology
Company (LTT). Users who attempt to access
banned content are not served with a blockpage,
but rather encounter time-out messages.
Conclusion
Despite the general trend toward greater freedom and openness, Libya maintains an active
Internet filtration regime focused on Web sites of
political opposition groups, antigovernment news
and views, and content related to the minority
Country Summaries
323