response to protests over an “anti-Shivaji” community on Orkut, Pune police banned Orkut, temporarily shut down cybercafés where users were
found to be using the site, and began an investigation under the IT Act and penal code provisions for obscene publications and religious
insult. 36 In December 2006, a government official
made a similar blocking request after reportedly
“obscene” material about “Hindu girls” was posted on Orkut. 37 However, none of these efforts
resulted in a comprehensive ban on Orkut, for
though it was intermittently available in Pune it
was nevertheless accessible on all ISPs tested.
ONI testing determined that filtering
occurred at the ISP level, with considerable variation between ISPs. Direct, Pacenet, and VSNL
blocked more of the tested URLs than did other
ISPs. Filtering focused primarily on Web sites
seen as a threat to national security, as well as
sites offering untraceable communication such
as the VoIP site www.hotfoon.com and the SMS
gateway www.clickatell.com. Other sites, such as
www.kahane.org, appear to have been blocked
only because they shared an ISP address with a
targeted site.
In contrast to the collateral blocking of
Web sites in August 2003 38 and July 2006, where
ISPs in both incidents responded to CERT-IN
orders by cutting off access to parent Web sites
including Google’s www.blogspot.com, www.type
pad.com, and Yahoo!’s www.geocities.com,
banned Web site owners continue to migrate
their content successfully to other domains. For
example, while ISPs are clearly blocking on the
subdomain level (for example, the site
www.princesskimberley.blogspot.com is filtered
on four ISPs tested), the reportedly banned
Maoist Web site www.peoplesmarch.com was
accessible in other forms (www.peoplesmarch.
wordpress.com, www.naxalrevolution.blogspot.
com) on all ISPs at time of testing.
Conclusion
Amidst widespread speculation in the media and
blogosphere about the state of filtering in India,
the sites actually blocked indicate that while the
filtering system in place yields inconsistent
results, it nevertheless continues to be aligned
with and driven by government efforts. For example, efforts to block certain communities on
Orkut, and in some instances the entire site altogether, have been initiated largely by individuals,
but the government response has not resulted in
the systematic blocking of Orkut by the ISPs that
ONI tested. Government attempts at filtering
have not been entirely effective, as blocked content has quickly migrated to other Web sites and
users have found ways to circumvent filtering.
The government has also been criticized for a
poor understanding of the technical feasibility of
censorship and for haphazardly choosing which
Web sites to block. The amended IT Act, absolving intermediaries from being responsible for
third-party created content, could signal stronger
government monitoring in the future.
NOTES
1. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices, 2006: India,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78871.htm.
2. Ibid.
3. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., India-Key
Statistics and Telecommunications Market Overview,
2006, p. 2.
4. Internet and Mobile Association of India, Internet in
India: 2006, http://www.iamai.in/research_
index.php3.
5. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Indian
Telecom Services Performance Indicators April-June
2006, October 2006, p. 40, http://www.trai.gov.in/
Reports_content.asp?id=29.
6. Internet and Mobile Association of India, Internet in
India: 2006, p. 16, http://www.iamai.in/research_
index.php3.
7. Internet and Mobile Association of India, Internet in
India-2006, p. 37, http://www.iamai.in/research_
index.php3.
8. The Press Trust of India, “Indians prefer good-old
diary to blogs,” November 27, 2006.
290
Country Summaries
found to be using the site, and began an investigation under the IT Act and penal code provisions for obscene publications and religious
insult. 36 In December 2006, a government official
made a similar blocking request after reportedly
“obscene” material about “Hindu girls” was posted on Orkut. 37 However, none of these efforts
resulted in a comprehensive ban on Orkut, for
though it was intermittently available in Pune it
was nevertheless accessible on all ISPs tested.
ONI testing determined that filtering
occurred at the ISP level, with considerable variation between ISPs. Direct, Pacenet, and VSNL
blocked more of the tested URLs than did other
ISPs. Filtering focused primarily on Web sites
seen as a threat to national security, as well as
sites offering untraceable communication such
as the VoIP site www.hotfoon.com and the SMS
gateway www.clickatell.com. Other sites, such as
www.kahane.org, appear to have been blocked
only because they shared an ISP address with a
targeted site.
In contrast to the collateral blocking of
Web sites in August 2003 38 and July 2006, where
ISPs in both incidents responded to CERT-IN
orders by cutting off access to parent Web sites
including Google’s www.blogspot.com, www.type
pad.com, and Yahoo!’s www.geocities.com,
banned Web site owners continue to migrate
their content successfully to other domains. For
example, while ISPs are clearly blocking on the
subdomain level (for example, the site
www.princesskimberley.blogspot.com is filtered
on four ISPs tested), the reportedly banned
Maoist Web site www.peoplesmarch.com was
accessible in other forms (www.peoplesmarch.
wordpress.com, www.naxalrevolution.blogspot.
com) on all ISPs at time of testing.
Conclusion
Amidst widespread speculation in the media and
blogosphere about the state of filtering in India,
the sites actually blocked indicate that while the
filtering system in place yields inconsistent
results, it nevertheless continues to be aligned
with and driven by government efforts. For example, efforts to block certain communities on
Orkut, and in some instances the entire site altogether, have been initiated largely by individuals,
but the government response has not resulted in
the systematic blocking of Orkut by the ISPs that
ONI tested. Government attempts at filtering
have not been entirely effective, as blocked content has quickly migrated to other Web sites and
users have found ways to circumvent filtering.
The government has also been criticized for a
poor understanding of the technical feasibility of
censorship and for haphazardly choosing which
Web sites to block. The amended IT Act, absolving intermediaries from being responsible for
third-party created content, could signal stronger
government monitoring in the future.
NOTES
1. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices, 2006: India,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78871.htm.
2. Ibid.
3. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., India-Key
Statistics and Telecommunications Market Overview,
2006, p. 2.
4. Internet and Mobile Association of India, Internet in
India: 2006, http://www.iamai.in/research_
index.php3.
5. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, Indian
Telecom Services Performance Indicators April-June
2006, October 2006, p. 40, http://www.trai.gov.in/
Reports_content.asp?id=29.
6. Internet and Mobile Association of India, Internet in
India: 2006, p. 16, http://www.iamai.in/research_
index.php3.
7. Internet and Mobile Association of India, Internet in
India-2006, p. 37, http://www.iamai.in/research_
index.php3.
8. The Press Trust of India, “Indians prefer good-old
diary to blogs,” November 27, 2006.
290
Country Summaries