Filtering can also be mandated through
licensing requirements. For example, ISPs seeking licenses to provide Internet services with the
DOT “shall block Internet sites and/or individual
subscribers, as identified and directed by the
Telecom Authority from time to time” in the interests of “national security.” 26 License agreements
also require ISPs to prevent the transmission of
obscene or otherwise “objectionable material.” 27
The proposed amendment to the IT Act
brought before Parliament on December 15,
2006, aims to address growing concerns about
information security and data theft that threaten
the vitality of India as an outsourcing hub. 28
Under specific conditions, the bill absolves intermediaries (including cybercafés) of responsibility
for making available information or links created
by third parties. 29 The government has also created “guidelines” for ISPs to follow, such as the
monitoring of subscriber traffic by keyword and
the disclosure of dynamic IP addresses of clients
by ISPs. 30
According to the Right to Information Act
passed in 2005, designated government officers
are required to respond to requests for information within thirty days. 31 Although it is not clear
whether information about the blocking of Web
sites falls within the exceptions listed in the Act, 32
which include information relating to national
security and state sovereignty, individuals have
filed RTI requests seeking greater transparency
in the filtering process. 33
ONI testing results
Results from ONI testing reveal that Indian ISPs
selectively filter sites identified by government
authorities as relating to national unity and state
security. ONI conducted testing on Bharti, Direct,
Reliance, YOU Telecom (formerly known as
Iqara), Pacenet, and VSNL. Variations in blocking
among ISPs of the same limited range of sites
suggest that CERT-IN and the DOT continue to
rely on ISPs to implement filtering instructions.
Although obscene information is the only type of
content to be made illegal under the IT Act, ONI
found no evidence that pornography is filtered in
India. Rather, nearly all the sites filtered had
already been reported publicly as blocked at
some time.
The only site made inaccessible by all ISPs
tested was the Hindu Unity Web site (www.hindu
unity.org). (A number of different URLs direct to
this site; these URLs were blocked with varying
consistency between ISPs.) Further evidence that
filtering has yet to be implemented through a uniform process can be found in the inconsistencies
in filtering of the Web sites named in the CERT-IN
blocking order following the bombings of suburban trains in Mumbai on July 11, 2006. On July
13, 2006, CERT-IN ordered access to seventeen
Web sites blocked, reportedly because the
attackers were believed to have communicated
via the blogosphere. The Web sites that were
ordered to be blocked included “American rightwing” sites (www.mypetjawa.mu.nu; www
.mackers-world.com), Hindu extremist or
“Hindutva” sites, and a defunct Web site supporting the formation of a “Dalit” homeland within India (www.dalitstan.org). 34
Among the ISPs, Bharti, YOU Telecom,
Reliance, and VSNL blocked the majority of sites
included on the July 13 CERT-IN order. In this
context, the personal Web site of a member of
the Hindutva party VHP (and a university student
in Indiana), www.rahulyadav.com, was filtered
almost certainly because it was included in the
July CERT-IN order, but the actual Web site of the
VHP party (www.vhp.org) was available on all
ISPs tested.
In 2006, filtering requests were also generated
by individuals protesting content they considered
offensive or obscene. In response to a Public
Interest Litigation (PIL) petition calling for the ban
of the social networking site Orkut for hosting a
“We Hate India” community, the Bombay High
Court had directed the Maharashtra government
to issue notice to Google for “alleged spread of
hatred about India” on Orkut. 35 A month later, in
Country Summaries
289
licensing requirements. For example, ISPs seeking licenses to provide Internet services with the
DOT “shall block Internet sites and/or individual
subscribers, as identified and directed by the
Telecom Authority from time to time” in the interests of “national security.” 26 License agreements
also require ISPs to prevent the transmission of
obscene or otherwise “objectionable material.” 27
The proposed amendment to the IT Act
brought before Parliament on December 15,
2006, aims to address growing concerns about
information security and data theft that threaten
the vitality of India as an outsourcing hub. 28
Under specific conditions, the bill absolves intermediaries (including cybercafés) of responsibility
for making available information or links created
by third parties. 29 The government has also created “guidelines” for ISPs to follow, such as the
monitoring of subscriber traffic by keyword and
the disclosure of dynamic IP addresses of clients
by ISPs. 30
According to the Right to Information Act
passed in 2005, designated government officers
are required to respond to requests for information within thirty days. 31 Although it is not clear
whether information about the blocking of Web
sites falls within the exceptions listed in the Act, 32
which include information relating to national
security and state sovereignty, individuals have
filed RTI requests seeking greater transparency
in the filtering process. 33
ONI testing results
Results from ONI testing reveal that Indian ISPs
selectively filter sites identified by government
authorities as relating to national unity and state
security. ONI conducted testing on Bharti, Direct,
Reliance, YOU Telecom (formerly known as
Iqara), Pacenet, and VSNL. Variations in blocking
among ISPs of the same limited range of sites
suggest that CERT-IN and the DOT continue to
rely on ISPs to implement filtering instructions.
Although obscene information is the only type of
content to be made illegal under the IT Act, ONI
found no evidence that pornography is filtered in
India. Rather, nearly all the sites filtered had
already been reported publicly as blocked at
some time.
The only site made inaccessible by all ISPs
tested was the Hindu Unity Web site (www.hindu
unity.org). (A number of different URLs direct to
this site; these URLs were blocked with varying
consistency between ISPs.) Further evidence that
filtering has yet to be implemented through a uniform process can be found in the inconsistencies
in filtering of the Web sites named in the CERT-IN
blocking order following the bombings of suburban trains in Mumbai on July 11, 2006. On July
13, 2006, CERT-IN ordered access to seventeen
Web sites blocked, reportedly because the
attackers were believed to have communicated
via the blogosphere. The Web sites that were
ordered to be blocked included “American rightwing” sites (www.mypetjawa.mu.nu; www
.mackers-world.com), Hindu extremist or
“Hindutva” sites, and a defunct Web site supporting the formation of a “Dalit” homeland within India (www.dalitstan.org). 34
Among the ISPs, Bharti, YOU Telecom,
Reliance, and VSNL blocked the majority of sites
included on the July 13 CERT-IN order. In this
context, the personal Web site of a member of
the Hindutva party VHP (and a university student
in Indiana), www.rahulyadav.com, was filtered
almost certainly because it was included in the
July CERT-IN order, but the actual Web site of the
VHP party (www.vhp.org) was available on all
ISPs tested.
In 2006, filtering requests were also generated
by individuals protesting content they considered
offensive or obscene. In response to a Public
Interest Litigation (PIL) petition calling for the ban
of the social networking site Orkut for hosting a
“We Hate India” community, the Bombay High
Court had directed the Maharashtra government
to issue notice to Google for “alleged spread of
hatred about India” on Orkut. 35 A month later, in
Country Summaries
289