“bot net” was taken down, the attacks against the
Kyrgyz sites also stopped.
During the March 2006 presidential elections in Belarus, several opposition Web sites
became suddenly inaccessible, ostensibly by
innocuous network faults and DNS failures.
Likewise, at the peak of protests against the election results, a major Minsk-based ISP ceased to
provide dialup services owing to “technical problems.” These occurrences meant that important
independent media and opposition political Web
sites were not accessible at periods when the
information they were conveying could have had
political significance or acted as a catalyst for further political action. Although nothing transpired
that could be identified as extralegal filtering, de
facto access was not available when and where
needed, with some evidence suggesting that
tampering may have been afoot. 18
This form of “event-based” information control, which temporally “shapes” Internet access,
can be said to represent the emerging “2.0 version of Internet controls.” Not unlike the shorter
supply line chains that boasted manufacturing
efficiencies under just-in-time production, eventbased filtering can also be considered to be “just
in time” as it offers greater efficiencies in denying
access to information when and where it is needed.
At the same time this form of targeted and timelimited filtering is much harder to prove, which
also removes the potential liabilities of being
“caught” undertaking more deliberative filtering.
Upstream filtering
For its size, the CIS region has a relatively underdeveloped telecommunications system, much of
which remains centered on Russia. At the same
time, the region itself is contiguous with (or borders) Europe, Asia, and—via the circumpolar
route—North America. This centrality means that
most countries in the region obtain connectivity
from several different sources beyond Russia.
This situation has created some interesting patterns in filtering behavior, such as similar content
becoming inaccessible across several different
countries, but with different filtering patterns
amongst content providers within any single
country. ONI research into this phenomenon is
still preliminary, and thus we are not yet in a position to provide conclusive evidence or observations on its implications.
However, preliminary indications suggest
that providers reselling connectivity to CIS countries may be providing pre-filtered access, passing on filtered content either as part of their service offering or as a consequence of the policies
they use to manage traffic on their own networks.
This form of blocking, which we have dubbed
“upstream” filtering (indicating that the filtering is
happening in a jurisdiction other than that of the
state in question), was first observed during ONI
testing in Uzbekistan in 2004. At that time the traffic of one Uzbek ISP was clearly filtered using a
pattern similar to that employed by Chinese ISPs.
Further investigation revealed that the Uzbek ISP
was buying connectivity from China Telecom,
which in this case may have sold access to its
network as it would to a regular Chinese client.
Our 2006 testing suggested similar patterns of
prepackaged filtering affecting Internet services
within several other CIS states where ISPs had
purchased their connectivity from a Russian
provider.
Conclusion
The CIS region is experiencing a general trend
toward greater regulation and control of the
national information space, which includes the
Internet. Although most CIS countries do not
practice the substantive or pervasive filtering—
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan excepted—Internet
content control through regulation or intimidation
is growing throughout the region. In most cases,
the legislative and judicial framework for filtering
(or other restrictions) is ambiguous and open to
interpretation. Moreover the laws are often
unevenly applied, with “flexible” implementation
often paired with other more subtle (but effective)
Regional Overviews
183
Kyrgyz sites also stopped.
During the March 2006 presidential elections in Belarus, several opposition Web sites
became suddenly inaccessible, ostensibly by
innocuous network faults and DNS failures.
Likewise, at the peak of protests against the election results, a major Minsk-based ISP ceased to
provide dialup services owing to “technical problems.” These occurrences meant that important
independent media and opposition political Web
sites were not accessible at periods when the
information they were conveying could have had
political significance or acted as a catalyst for further political action. Although nothing transpired
that could be identified as extralegal filtering, de
facto access was not available when and where
needed, with some evidence suggesting that
tampering may have been afoot. 18
This form of “event-based” information control, which temporally “shapes” Internet access,
can be said to represent the emerging “2.0 version of Internet controls.” Not unlike the shorter
supply line chains that boasted manufacturing
efficiencies under just-in-time production, eventbased filtering can also be considered to be “just
in time” as it offers greater efficiencies in denying
access to information when and where it is needed.
At the same time this form of targeted and timelimited filtering is much harder to prove, which
also removes the potential liabilities of being
“caught” undertaking more deliberative filtering.
Upstream filtering
For its size, the CIS region has a relatively underdeveloped telecommunications system, much of
which remains centered on Russia. At the same
time, the region itself is contiguous with (or borders) Europe, Asia, and—via the circumpolar
route—North America. This centrality means that
most countries in the region obtain connectivity
from several different sources beyond Russia.
This situation has created some interesting patterns in filtering behavior, such as similar content
becoming inaccessible across several different
countries, but with different filtering patterns
amongst content providers within any single
country. ONI research into this phenomenon is
still preliminary, and thus we are not yet in a position to provide conclusive evidence or observations on its implications.
However, preliminary indications suggest
that providers reselling connectivity to CIS countries may be providing pre-filtered access, passing on filtered content either as part of their service offering or as a consequence of the policies
they use to manage traffic on their own networks.
This form of blocking, which we have dubbed
“upstream” filtering (indicating that the filtering is
happening in a jurisdiction other than that of the
state in question), was first observed during ONI
testing in Uzbekistan in 2004. At that time the traffic of one Uzbek ISP was clearly filtered using a
pattern similar to that employed by Chinese ISPs.
Further investigation revealed that the Uzbek ISP
was buying connectivity from China Telecom,
which in this case may have sold access to its
network as it would to a regular Chinese client.
Our 2006 testing suggested similar patterns of
prepackaged filtering affecting Internet services
within several other CIS states where ISPs had
purchased their connectivity from a Russian
provider.
Conclusion
The CIS region is experiencing a general trend
toward greater regulation and control of the
national information space, which includes the
Internet. Although most CIS countries do not
practice the substantive or pervasive filtering—
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan excepted—Internet
content control through regulation or intimidation
is growing throughout the region. In most cases,
the legislative and judicial framework for filtering
(or other restrictions) is ambiguous and open to
interpretation. Moreover the laws are often
unevenly applied, with “flexible” implementation
often paired with other more subtle (but effective)
Regional Overviews
183