measures designed to promote self-restraint (or
self–censorship) of both ISP providers as well as
content producers. Information control—in particular the protection of national informational
space—is clearly an issue of concern throughout
the CIS, and has encouraged more stringent
attention to telecommunications surveillance (as
has been happening in other parts of the world,
most notably the United States). In addition,
measures to protect regimes in power and stifle
opposition are often couched in the language of
“national security” and have resulted in the development of new measures and techniques aimed
at temporally “shaping” access to information at
strategic moments, such as “event-based filtering.” Another innovation that merits further investigation is “upstream filtering.” Although these
new measures are not present in all CIS countries, they are indicative of a new seriousness
with which strategies for information control are
being developed.
In 2007 a number of critical elections
will take place in Russia and several other CIS
countries. In Russia, exiled billionaire Boris
Berezovsky has expressed his intent to overturn
the existing regime. The Internet and other forms
of communications technologies are expected to
play an important role in the electoral process,
and as such they will no doubt be the object of
many actors’ attention.
Last, the re-emergence of stronger states in
the region following more than a decade of transition and general unhappiness concerning U.S.
policies in the region (which have, over the past
ten years, promoted media freedom and an
active if foreign-funded civil society), is also
sparking a degree of “blow-back” and renewed
competition between East and West. For example, ONI research found that many “.mil” sites are
not reachable in the CIS, suggesting that these
may be subject to “supply-side” filtering by U.S.
authorities. 19 Between greater assertiveness on
the part of CIS states and the stimulus of
renewed interstate competition, the CIS is a
region to watch as a global actor shaping norms
that will govern the Internet into the future.
Authors: Rafal Rohozinski, Vesselina Haralampieva
NOTES
1. The CIS consists of eleven countries: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan has been an associated member since 2005. With a strong political and
economic influence over its neighboring countries,
Russia remains the predominant political actor and
strategic economic power in the group.
2. Turkmenistan’s Internet is even more tightly restricted, with access available only via a single government provider. While our lack of test results do not
allow us to conclusively map the extent of filtered
content, preliminary analysis indicates that the
Turkmen authorities employ a “white list” that allows
only permitted sites to be visited.
3. Internet users in the CIS are predominantly young,
aged between fifteen and twenty-five. Around 55 percent of all users in Azerbaijan belong to this age
group, compared with 60 percent in Kyrgyzstan and
similar percentages in Uzbekistan. The number of
women using Internet in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
is equal to or larger than the number of their male
counterparts. The proportion is slightly in favor of
men in Ukraine, while in Tajikistan only 22.5 percent
of the Internet users are women.
4. See International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
5. In Kazakhstan 28.4 percent of users access Internet
at home, and 27.5 percent in Azerbaijan. The workplace is also a critical access point in Kazakhstan
(27.2 percent), Moldova, Belarus, and Uzbekistan. In
contrast, cybercafés in Kyrgyzstan are the main
Internet access point in the country (for approximately 57 percent of users).
6. Rafal Rohozinski, “Mapping Russian cyberspace:
Perspectives on democracy and the Net,” United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD) Discussion Paper 115, October 1999.
Available at unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/
public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016092.pdf.
7. Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The
Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics
and Business, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2006.
8. Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian
Federation, September 9, 2000, No. Pr-1895,
http://www.medialaw.ru/e_pages/laws/project/
d2-4.htm.
184
Regional Overviews
self–censorship) of both ISP providers as well as
content producers. Information control—in particular the protection of national informational
space—is clearly an issue of concern throughout
the CIS, and has encouraged more stringent
attention to telecommunications surveillance (as
has been happening in other parts of the world,
most notably the United States). In addition,
measures to protect regimes in power and stifle
opposition are often couched in the language of
“national security” and have resulted in the development of new measures and techniques aimed
at temporally “shaping” access to information at
strategic moments, such as “event-based filtering.” Another innovation that merits further investigation is “upstream filtering.” Although these
new measures are not present in all CIS countries, they are indicative of a new seriousness
with which strategies for information control are
being developed.
In 2007 a number of critical elections
will take place in Russia and several other CIS
countries. In Russia, exiled billionaire Boris
Berezovsky has expressed his intent to overturn
the existing regime. The Internet and other forms
of communications technologies are expected to
play an important role in the electoral process,
and as such they will no doubt be the object of
many actors’ attention.
Last, the re-emergence of stronger states in
the region following more than a decade of transition and general unhappiness concerning U.S.
policies in the region (which have, over the past
ten years, promoted media freedom and an
active if foreign-funded civil society), is also
sparking a degree of “blow-back” and renewed
competition between East and West. For example, ONI research found that many “.mil” sites are
not reachable in the CIS, suggesting that these
may be subject to “supply-side” filtering by U.S.
authorities. 19 Between greater assertiveness on
the part of CIS states and the stimulus of
renewed interstate competition, the CIS is a
region to watch as a global actor shaping norms
that will govern the Internet into the future.
Authors: Rafal Rohozinski, Vesselina Haralampieva
NOTES
1. The CIS consists of eleven countries: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan has been an associated member since 2005. With a strong political and
economic influence over its neighboring countries,
Russia remains the predominant political actor and
strategic economic power in the group.
2. Turkmenistan’s Internet is even more tightly restricted, with access available only via a single government provider. While our lack of test results do not
allow us to conclusively map the extent of filtered
content, preliminary analysis indicates that the
Turkmen authorities employ a “white list” that allows
only permitted sites to be visited.
3. Internet users in the CIS are predominantly young,
aged between fifteen and twenty-five. Around 55 percent of all users in Azerbaijan belong to this age
group, compared with 60 percent in Kyrgyzstan and
similar percentages in Uzbekistan. The number of
women using Internet in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
is equal to or larger than the number of their male
counterparts. The proportion is slightly in favor of
men in Ukraine, while in Tajikistan only 22.5 percent
of the Internet users are women.
4. See International Telecommunication Union, World
Telecommunication Indicators 2006.
5. In Kazakhstan 28.4 percent of users access Internet
at home, and 27.5 percent in Azerbaijan. The workplace is also a critical access point in Kazakhstan
(27.2 percent), Moldova, Belarus, and Uzbekistan. In
contrast, cybercafés in Kyrgyzstan are the main
Internet access point in the country (for approximately 57 percent of users).
6. Rafal Rohozinski, “Mapping Russian cyberspace:
Perspectives on democracy and the Net,” United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD) Discussion Paper 115, October 1999.
Available at unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/
public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016092.pdf.
7. Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The
Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics
and Business, Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2006.
8. Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian
Federation, September 9, 2000, No. Pr-1895,
http://www.medialaw.ru/e_pages/laws/project/
d2-4.htm.
184
Regional Overviews