es allow the state “plausible deniability” of
any wrongdoing and require a great deal of contextual research to uncover the sources of the
practice.
Overall a general lack of transparency
affects most political/legal issues in the CIS, not
only the issue of Internet filtering. Often official
laws are breached in subtle but effective ways.
For example, in Azerbaijan the author of a Web
site critical of the government was detained without formal arrest; this was never followed up by
any formal legal sanctions. In other cases, such
as the pervasive filtering policies of Internet cafés
throughout the region, the decision to limit content is formally controlled by the café owners, so
it is difficult to argue whether their filtering results
from a fear of sanction for allowing politically sensitive material to be accessed, or from personal
choice. Certainly for most Internet café owners,
the objective is to make a living, not to run for
office. If certain content stands in the way of business, then it is not a difficult choice to decide
what measures to take. In Tajikistan, for example,
research suggests that filtering is really based on
economic choices rather than any overt fear of
political sanction from the security forces.
Emergent forms of information control
Overt Internet filtering, such as that undertaken
by China or Iran, is unlikely to occur in the CIS.
First, only in a very few cases (Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan) is the government willing to create
an informational blockade of the country that
could, in turn, jeopardize economic prospects
and stifle the “scientific potential” of these technologies. Second, as noted above, governments
generally have more subtle legal and quasi-legal
methods for putting pressure on content and
access providers to remove or otherwise eliminate “undesirable” content, so there is little need
to resort to overt technical means such as filtering. Third, many CIS states are dependent on
development aid and trade and have oriented
themselves toward integration with Europe and
the broader global economic system. Engaging
in widespread filtering of the kind conducted by
China or Iran would present the risk of being
labeled as an “international human rights pariah,”
an eventuality that most CIS countries would
rather avoid. Fourth, and perhaps most important, those CIS states that are concerned by the
Internet’s empowering potential—that is, their
potential to make possible further “color revolutions”—have found more subtle technical means
for ensuring that these capacities are curtailed, if
and when necessary.
Event-based interventions
The CIS is the first region in which ONI research
documented the presence of “event-based” filtering. This form of filtering differs in technical
execution from more conventional filtering forms
(such as those that rely on bloc lists) and is more
difficult to track and definitively ascertain. For
example, during Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 parliamentary
elections, two ISPs were disrupted by distributed
denial of service attacks (DOS), and then a
“hacker for hire” posted threats to the affected
ISPs’ visitor logs, stating that unless these sites
stayed offline the attacks would continue. 17 The
DOS attacks effectively disrupted the ISPs’ services because the hacker exploited the ISPs’ narrow bandwidths and dependence on a single
satellite-based connection. To this day is it
unclear who hired the hackers responsible for the
attack, although an investigation by ONI found
that they were based in Ukraine (and were also
responsible for an attack on a U.S. site using the
same “bot” network). The opposition accused
the government of ordering the attacks as a
means of undermining the opposition. The government responded by ordering the affected ISPs
to keep their resources online, but this was
impossible because the DOS attack had degraded their ability to provide any services. In the end,
the attack was stopped as a result of U.S. legal
action against the originating “bot net,” which
had also been attacking a U.S. site. When the
182
Regional Overviews
any wrongdoing and require a great deal of contextual research to uncover the sources of the
practice.
Overall a general lack of transparency
affects most political/legal issues in the CIS, not
only the issue of Internet filtering. Often official
laws are breached in subtle but effective ways.
For example, in Azerbaijan the author of a Web
site critical of the government was detained without formal arrest; this was never followed up by
any formal legal sanctions. In other cases, such
as the pervasive filtering policies of Internet cafés
throughout the region, the decision to limit content is formally controlled by the café owners, so
it is difficult to argue whether their filtering results
from a fear of sanction for allowing politically sensitive material to be accessed, or from personal
choice. Certainly for most Internet café owners,
the objective is to make a living, not to run for
office. If certain content stands in the way of business, then it is not a difficult choice to decide
what measures to take. In Tajikistan, for example,
research suggests that filtering is really based on
economic choices rather than any overt fear of
political sanction from the security forces.
Emergent forms of information control
Overt Internet filtering, such as that undertaken
by China or Iran, is unlikely to occur in the CIS.
First, only in a very few cases (Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan) is the government willing to create
an informational blockade of the country that
could, in turn, jeopardize economic prospects
and stifle the “scientific potential” of these technologies. Second, as noted above, governments
generally have more subtle legal and quasi-legal
methods for putting pressure on content and
access providers to remove or otherwise eliminate “undesirable” content, so there is little need
to resort to overt technical means such as filtering. Third, many CIS states are dependent on
development aid and trade and have oriented
themselves toward integration with Europe and
the broader global economic system. Engaging
in widespread filtering of the kind conducted by
China or Iran would present the risk of being
labeled as an “international human rights pariah,”
an eventuality that most CIS countries would
rather avoid. Fourth, and perhaps most important, those CIS states that are concerned by the
Internet’s empowering potential—that is, their
potential to make possible further “color revolutions”—have found more subtle technical means
for ensuring that these capacities are curtailed, if
and when necessary.
Event-based interventions
The CIS is the first region in which ONI research
documented the presence of “event-based” filtering. This form of filtering differs in technical
execution from more conventional filtering forms
(such as those that rely on bloc lists) and is more
difficult to track and definitively ascertain. For
example, during Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 parliamentary
elections, two ISPs were disrupted by distributed
denial of service attacks (DOS), and then a
“hacker for hire” posted threats to the affected
ISPs’ visitor logs, stating that unless these sites
stayed offline the attacks would continue. 17 The
DOS attacks effectively disrupted the ISPs’ services because the hacker exploited the ISPs’ narrow bandwidths and dependence on a single
satellite-based connection. To this day is it
unclear who hired the hackers responsible for the
attack, although an investigation by ONI found
that they were based in Ukraine (and were also
responsible for an attack on a U.S. site using the
same “bot” network). The opposition accused
the government of ordering the attacks as a
means of undermining the opposition. The government responded by ordering the affected ISPs
to keep their resources online, but this was
impossible because the DOS attack had degraded their ability to provide any services. In the end,
the attack was stopped as a result of U.S. legal
action against the originating “bot net,” which
had also been attacking a U.S. site. When the
182
Regional Overviews