the user, and the data that were transmitted).
10
ISPs themselves are responsible for the cost and
maintenance of the hardware and connections.
ISP objections to SORM-II, which raised concerns about individual privacy, resulted in the
providers being stripped of their licenses. 11
In many respects, SORM is not unlike a combination of the Unites States’ Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) 12 and the recent “warrantless” provisions for wiretapping, including the USA PATRIOT
Act 13 passed after the attacks of 9/11. Russian
legislation formally protects individual privacy,
prohibiting wiretapping of any kind without a court
order. 14 As a consequence, SORM requires government personnel to obtain a court order to intercept telephone conversations, electronic communications, or postal correspondence. 15 In reality,
however, the FSB will not bother to seek a warrant.
Recently a senior FSB official sought to apply similar registration requirements for all mobile phones
with Internet capabilities. However, despite this
formidable surveillance potential, there is doubt
about the actual capacity of the FSB to analyze
the data collected. 16
At present, several CIS countries have
followed Russia’s lead in implementing Internet
surveillance.
• Kazakhstan followed the Russian example
requiring ISPs to install special software in
order to register and maintain electronic
records of customers’ Internet activities.
• Azerbaijan made an unsuccessful attempt
to employ technologies similar to the
SORM-II. At present surveillance does
occur, but mainly by way of visits to ISPs and
Internet cafés by officials from the State
Security Service.
• In Uzbekistan the principal intelligence
agency, the National Security Service (SNB),
monitors the Uzbek segment of the Internet
and works with the main regulatory body to
impose censorship. As all ISPs must rent
channels from the state monopoly
providers. Credible anecdotal evidence
strongly suggests that Internet traffic is
recorded and monitored via a centralized
system purchased from an Israeli vendor.
• In Ukraine, the security services have developed a capacity to monitor Internet traffic
and legislation has been proposed to limit
access to “questionable” content for reasons of national security. The security services are also empowered to initiate criminal
investigations and use wiretapping devices.
• In Belarus, special services conduct active
and warrantless surveillance of Internet
activities under the pretext of national security using a system similar to SORM-II.
Transparency
Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
once said when asked about the Soviet Union,
“It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an
enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is…
national interest.” Transparency with regard to
filtering practices varies across the region, but in
all cases it is defined by the interest of the state
(or the group that holds the reins of power).
Protection of state interests (usually cast in terms
of national security or the protection of public or
cultural values) generally trump the written rules
for regulation of Internet content, although often
the laws themselves are ambiguous and open to
interpretation. In addition, the restrictive practices
of states are often fairly subtle. As an example,
Uzbekistan—which was until recently the most
egregious Internet censor in the region—denied
that it was engaged in censorship practices. The
plausibility of this claim was increased because
filtering was neither uniform nor universal across
all ISPs, which left open the possible, although
highly improbable, chance that observed filtering
practices were self-imposed by ISPs rather than
proscribed by higher ups. Such subtle approachRegional Overviews
181
10
ISPs themselves are responsible for the cost and
maintenance of the hardware and connections.
ISP objections to SORM-II, which raised concerns about individual privacy, resulted in the
providers being stripped of their licenses. 11
In many respects, SORM is not unlike a combination of the Unites States’ Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) 12 and the recent “warrantless” provisions for wiretapping, including the USA PATRIOT
Act 13 passed after the attacks of 9/11. Russian
legislation formally protects individual privacy,
prohibiting wiretapping of any kind without a court
order. 14 As a consequence, SORM requires government personnel to obtain a court order to intercept telephone conversations, electronic communications, or postal correspondence. 15 In reality,
however, the FSB will not bother to seek a warrant.
Recently a senior FSB official sought to apply similar registration requirements for all mobile phones
with Internet capabilities. However, despite this
formidable surveillance potential, there is doubt
about the actual capacity of the FSB to analyze
the data collected. 16
At present, several CIS countries have
followed Russia’s lead in implementing Internet
surveillance.
• Kazakhstan followed the Russian example
requiring ISPs to install special software in
order to register and maintain electronic
records of customers’ Internet activities.
• Azerbaijan made an unsuccessful attempt
to employ technologies similar to the
SORM-II. At present surveillance does
occur, but mainly by way of visits to ISPs and
Internet cafés by officials from the State
Security Service.
• In Uzbekistan the principal intelligence
agency, the National Security Service (SNB),
monitors the Uzbek segment of the Internet
and works with the main regulatory body to
impose censorship. As all ISPs must rent
channels from the state monopoly
providers. Credible anecdotal evidence
strongly suggests that Internet traffic is
recorded and monitored via a centralized
system purchased from an Israeli vendor.
• In Ukraine, the security services have developed a capacity to monitor Internet traffic
and legislation has been proposed to limit
access to “questionable” content for reasons of national security. The security services are also empowered to initiate criminal
investigations and use wiretapping devices.
• In Belarus, special services conduct active
and warrantless surveillance of Internet
activities under the pretext of national security using a system similar to SORM-II.
Transparency
Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
once said when asked about the Soviet Union,
“It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an
enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is…
national interest.” Transparency with regard to
filtering practices varies across the region, but in
all cases it is defined by the interest of the state
(or the group that holds the reins of power).
Protection of state interests (usually cast in terms
of national security or the protection of public or
cultural values) generally trump the written rules
for regulation of Internet content, although often
the laws themselves are ambiguous and open to
interpretation. In addition, the restrictive practices
of states are often fairly subtle. As an example,
Uzbekistan—which was until recently the most
egregious Internet censor in the region—denied
that it was engaged in censorship practices. The
plausibility of this claim was increased because
filtering was neither uniform nor universal across
all ISPs, which left open the possible, although
highly improbable, chance that observed filtering
practices were self-imposed by ISPs rather than
proscribed by higher ups. Such subtle approachRegional Overviews
181