is interesting to note that in Uzbekistan information obtained from the Internet is accepted as
being more accurate than from other sources,
reflecting the culture’s strong social networking
aspect.
Legal and normative environment
In general, the tendency in all CIS countries has
been toward greater government regulation of
the Internet to bring it in line with existing regulations that control the mass media (in Russia,
Uzbekistan, and Belarus, for example). To date,
government actions to enforce more restrictive
Internet environments have rarely been challenged—perhaps a reflection overall of the weakness of “opposition” parties in most countries, as
well as poorly defined or tested laws governing
the role of independent media. Nonetheless,
some exceptions exist. For example, in Tajikistan
and Azerbaijan concerted (if quiet) action by
“civic” actors led to the reversal of policies aimed
at removing politically sensitive content from
cyberspace. In Tajikistan political Web sites that
were banned during the December 2006 election
were restored. In Azerbaijan a banned Web site
that was critical of the government’s policy of
raising prices was restored and its author
released from police detention. Both cases are
significant because the initial order to “ban” the
Web sites was opaque from a legal perspective.
The constitutions of nearly all CIS countries
enshrine principles of freedom of expression and
prohibit censorship. Nevertheless, often these
provisions are interpreted “flexibly” when it
comes to implementation. In Kazakhstan authorities often resort to various quasi-legal or “administrative” mechanisms to suppress “inappropriate” information or shut down oppositional
domain names. In Uzbekistan the law on mass
media holds journalists and editors responsible
for the “veracity” of published materials, which
has caused independent media and bloggers to
practice self-censorship. The “objectivity” test is
applied also in Belarus, where independent journalists, editors, and opposition leaders are frequently subject to prosecutions and arrests.
In legislation and regulation, Russia remains
a leader in the region, and increasingly has been
proactive in seeking influence and extending
assistance to other CIS states. Since late 2000
Russia’s “Doctrine of Information Security” has
been adapted (in various forms and guises) as
the basic precept defining the national strategic
value of the Internet and the “national informational space” in most CIS countries. 8 Likewise,
Russia’s legal approach to Internet surveillance
for law enforcement (that is, the System for
Operational-Investigative Activities or SORM-II,
which allows security services unfettered physical access to ISP networks) has influenced the
way in which other CIS countries have
approached the problem (see the next section).
Some, including Kazakhstan, have adopted the
Russian system, while others have mirrored its
approach. In Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and
Ukraine, specialized units under the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (Department “K”) have been
established to combat “computer crime” with
specialized technical units also established in
other security services.
Surveillance
Obtaining a telecommunications license in
Russia and other CIS states requires close cooperation with state security agencies. Since the
mid-1990s a key requirement has been that
providers allow law enforcement and other
security agencies full monitoring access to the
communications systems. In Russia the enabling
acts and system used to monitor telecommunications, including the Internet, comes under the
rubric of SORM-II, which came into effect in
2000. 9
At the regulatory and technical level, SORMII requires ISPs to provide the Federal Security
Service (FSB) with statistics about all Internet traffic that goes through the ISP servers (including
the time of an online session, the IP address of
180
Regional Overviews
being more accurate than from other sources,
reflecting the culture’s strong social networking
aspect.
Legal and normative environment
In general, the tendency in all CIS countries has
been toward greater government regulation of
the Internet to bring it in line with existing regulations that control the mass media (in Russia,
Uzbekistan, and Belarus, for example). To date,
government actions to enforce more restrictive
Internet environments have rarely been challenged—perhaps a reflection overall of the weakness of “opposition” parties in most countries, as
well as poorly defined or tested laws governing
the role of independent media. Nonetheless,
some exceptions exist. For example, in Tajikistan
and Azerbaijan concerted (if quiet) action by
“civic” actors led to the reversal of policies aimed
at removing politically sensitive content from
cyberspace. In Tajikistan political Web sites that
were banned during the December 2006 election
were restored. In Azerbaijan a banned Web site
that was critical of the government’s policy of
raising prices was restored and its author
released from police detention. Both cases are
significant because the initial order to “ban” the
Web sites was opaque from a legal perspective.
The constitutions of nearly all CIS countries
enshrine principles of freedom of expression and
prohibit censorship. Nevertheless, often these
provisions are interpreted “flexibly” when it
comes to implementation. In Kazakhstan authorities often resort to various quasi-legal or “administrative” mechanisms to suppress “inappropriate” information or shut down oppositional
domain names. In Uzbekistan the law on mass
media holds journalists and editors responsible
for the “veracity” of published materials, which
has caused independent media and bloggers to
practice self-censorship. The “objectivity” test is
applied also in Belarus, where independent journalists, editors, and opposition leaders are frequently subject to prosecutions and arrests.
In legislation and regulation, Russia remains
a leader in the region, and increasingly has been
proactive in seeking influence and extending
assistance to other CIS states. Since late 2000
Russia’s “Doctrine of Information Security” has
been adapted (in various forms and guises) as
the basic precept defining the national strategic
value of the Internet and the “national informational space” in most CIS countries. 8 Likewise,
Russia’s legal approach to Internet surveillance
for law enforcement (that is, the System for
Operational-Investigative Activities or SORM-II,
which allows security services unfettered physical access to ISP networks) has influenced the
way in which other CIS countries have
approached the problem (see the next section).
Some, including Kazakhstan, have adopted the
Russian system, while others have mirrored its
approach. In Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and
Ukraine, specialized units under the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (Department “K”) have been
established to combat “computer crime” with
specialized technical units also established in
other security services.
Surveillance
Obtaining a telecommunications license in
Russia and other CIS states requires close cooperation with state security agencies. Since the
mid-1990s a key requirement has been that
providers allow law enforcement and other
security agencies full monitoring access to the
communications systems. In Russia the enabling
acts and system used to monitor telecommunications, including the Internet, comes under the
rubric of SORM-II, which came into effect in
2000. 9
At the regulatory and technical level, SORMII requires ISPs to provide the Federal Security
Service (FSB) with statistics about all Internet traffic that goes through the ISP servers (including
the time of an online session, the IP address of
180
Regional Overviews