tries known for effective and sophisticated systems of information control, such as Singapore
and Malaysia, demonstrated surprisingly low levels of filtering. For these governments, the
strength of their historical interventions in freedom of the press and free speech may partially
obviate the need for rigorous filtering.
In contrast to its approach toward other
forms of media, the official policy of Singapore’s
Media Development Authority (MDA) has been to
apply a “light-touch” regulatory framework to the
Internet, promoting responsible use while giving
industry players “maximum flexibility.” Thus
Singapore filters content on a symbolic scale, but
also relies on established controls over print and
broadcast media to set a precedent for citizens’
online behavior, leading one scholar to call media
regulation a “dual regulatory regime.” 40 Greater
control of cyberspace may be obviated by existing restrictive laws, political ties to the judiciary,
and ownership and intimidation of the media that
are already used to suppress dissenting opinion
and opposition to the ruling People’s Action Party
(PAP). 41 Taken together, these economic and
legal controls contribute to a climate of pervasive
self-censorship of political commentary.
In Malaysia the state pledges not to censor
Internet content in its “Bill of Guarantees” to companies approved for its Multimedia Super
Corridor (MSC), a high-tech business center and
communications infrastructure designed to help
the country become an international information
technology leader. 42 However, rather than filter
content, Malaysia’s Communications and
Multimedia Act (CMA) targets “indecent” and
“offensive” online content by subjecting publishers and authors to civil and/or criminal liability.
Internet content publishers in Malaysia operate
under the constant risk that the CMA and numerous other laws regulating speech and content on
traditional media will be interpreted or amended
to extend to Internet publications. 43 Notably, the
bloggers Jeff Ooi and Ahirudin Attan were targeted under defamation laws and not the regulatory
framework for online speech, which delineates
fines and criminal penalties for persons using a
content applications service to provide content
that is “indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or
offensive in character.” 44
In Afghanistan and Nepal serious political
and economic challenges have perhaps made
technical filtering impracticable, but this does not
mean their citizens have unfettered access to
information and communication via the Internet.
Political instability has affected not merely the
quality of access, but also the question of access
altogether. The Internet in Afghanistan was
banned altogether by the Taliban in July 2001—
primarily because it was thought to broadcast
obscene, immoral, and anti-Islam material, and
the few Internet users at the time could not be
easily monitored because they obtained their
phone lines from Pakistan. 45 In 2005, citing deteriorating security conditions in Nepal due to
Maoist violence, the Nepali king imposed authoritarian rule and a week-long media blackout and
cut off all Internet access in the country.
In countries whose governments consider
free access to information and unrestricted freedom of expression to be threats to social stability and public order, filtering is overwhelmingly targeted at local language content and country-specific issues.
China, Myanmar, and Vietnam filter a significant portion of content addressing their own
human rights record and practices. Both China
Netcom and China Telecom chose to block only
one of the major international news organizations
tested—the BBC—but they denied their users
access to a significant number of overseas
Chinese-language media representing different
positions on the political spectrum. News in languages spoken by ethnic minorities in contested
regions was also blocked in China. In Vietnam,
sites only in English or French were rarely
blocked, but sites in Vietnamese only tangentially
or indirectly critical of the government—such as
those with content focusing on local communities,
Regional Overviews
161
and Malaysia, demonstrated surprisingly low levels of filtering. For these governments, the
strength of their historical interventions in freedom of the press and free speech may partially
obviate the need for rigorous filtering.
In contrast to its approach toward other
forms of media, the official policy of Singapore’s
Media Development Authority (MDA) has been to
apply a “light-touch” regulatory framework to the
Internet, promoting responsible use while giving
industry players “maximum flexibility.” Thus
Singapore filters content on a symbolic scale, but
also relies on established controls over print and
broadcast media to set a precedent for citizens’
online behavior, leading one scholar to call media
regulation a “dual regulatory regime.” 40 Greater
control of cyberspace may be obviated by existing restrictive laws, political ties to the judiciary,
and ownership and intimidation of the media that
are already used to suppress dissenting opinion
and opposition to the ruling People’s Action Party
(PAP). 41 Taken together, these economic and
legal controls contribute to a climate of pervasive
self-censorship of political commentary.
In Malaysia the state pledges not to censor
Internet content in its “Bill of Guarantees” to companies approved for its Multimedia Super
Corridor (MSC), a high-tech business center and
communications infrastructure designed to help
the country become an international information
technology leader. 42 However, rather than filter
content, Malaysia’s Communications and
Multimedia Act (CMA) targets “indecent” and
“offensive” online content by subjecting publishers and authors to civil and/or criminal liability.
Internet content publishers in Malaysia operate
under the constant risk that the CMA and numerous other laws regulating speech and content on
traditional media will be interpreted or amended
to extend to Internet publications. 43 Notably, the
bloggers Jeff Ooi and Ahirudin Attan were targeted under defamation laws and not the regulatory
framework for online speech, which delineates
fines and criminal penalties for persons using a
content applications service to provide content
that is “indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or
offensive in character.” 44
In Afghanistan and Nepal serious political
and economic challenges have perhaps made
technical filtering impracticable, but this does not
mean their citizens have unfettered access to
information and communication via the Internet.
Political instability has affected not merely the
quality of access, but also the question of access
altogether. The Internet in Afghanistan was
banned altogether by the Taliban in July 2001—
primarily because it was thought to broadcast
obscene, immoral, and anti-Islam material, and
the few Internet users at the time could not be
easily monitored because they obtained their
phone lines from Pakistan. 45 In 2005, citing deteriorating security conditions in Nepal due to
Maoist violence, the Nepali king imposed authoritarian rule and a week-long media blackout and
cut off all Internet access in the country.
In countries whose governments consider
free access to information and unrestricted freedom of expression to be threats to social stability and public order, filtering is overwhelmingly targeted at local language content and country-specific issues.
China, Myanmar, and Vietnam filter a significant portion of content addressing their own
human rights record and practices. Both China
Netcom and China Telecom chose to block only
one of the major international news organizations
tested—the BBC—but they denied their users
access to a significant number of overseas
Chinese-language media representing different
positions on the political spectrum. News in languages spoken by ethnic minorities in contested
regions was also blocked in China. In Vietnam,
sites only in English or French were rarely
blocked, but sites in Vietnamese only tangentially
or indirectly critical of the government—such as
those with content focusing on local communities,
Regional Overviews
161