world news, or voicing strong anti-Communist
sentiments—were inaccessible. In Pakistan,
though Balochi and Sindhi independence and
human rights sites have been filtered, other Web
sites pertaining to Pashtun secessionism were
fully accessible. In this case, filtering may be
seen as unnecessary, as the majority of Pashtuns
are illiterate in their local language.
Transparency
All countries in Asia engaged in technical filtering
exhibited a lack of transparency in the legal
authorization, technical processes, or implementation of filtering. Governments chose to remain
silent on their source of authority to filter content
from its citizens, or relied on indirect or implicit
authority found in existing laws and regulations.
Citizens in many countries were not put on notice
of filtering as it occurred, and instead the cause
of content inaccessibility was identified to be the
result of inadvertent or unintentional error.
Virtually all governments in Asia have yet to
develop procedures for official notification of
blocking to Web site owners, or appeal mechanisms for individuals to challenge blocking decisions in independent tribunals.
Governments often fail to disclose the extent
of filtering to the general public. One notable
exception is Singapore: before most Asian countries even had infrastructure in place to begin
engaging in technical censorship of the Internet,
Singapore announced in 1999 that a list of 100
pornographic Web sites would be blocked by the
three major ISPs. As a “gesture of concern” to
demonstrate the government’s commitment to
“Asian” values, 46 this figure has been continually
cited in coverage of Internet censorship in
Singapore, though the extent of actual filtering
has remained symbolic.
In South Korea, state regulation (through the
Internet Content Filtering Ordinance in 2001) 47
reportedly required ISPs to block as many as
120,000 Web sites on a state-compiled list, as
well as mandating that Internet access facilities
accessible to minors, such as public libraries and
schools, install filtering software. 48 However, ONI
testing indicated that Internet filtering in South
Korea is not as extensive as reports have suggested. In Thailand as well, the distinct lack of
transparency in the filtering process has persisted through the change in Thai governments.
Adding to the uncertainty, a range of figures for
the number of sites blocked by the Thai government continues to be circulated but not confirmed. A Thai police Web site citing the number
of blocked sites at over 34,000 sites since 2002
has been taken down.
However, both South Korean and Thai ISPs
do employ a blockpage, the most transparent
notification of filtering. For example, sites blocked
by KorNet through DNS tampering in South
Korea resolve to a blockpage hosted by the
police at 211.253.9.250. This blockpage not only
states that the page has been lawfully blocked
but also displays the user’s IP address, which
suggests the possibility of tracking the viewers
that have visited the blocked site. Only a few
countries provide clear notice that access is
being denied because of proscribed content. In
contrast, China’s filtering methods are set up so
that users in China who cannot access content
due to IP address blocking, DNS tampering, or
keyword search string filtering receive a network
timeout or error page. When a keyword block is
triggered, further requests made to the target site
(IP address) are blocked (including attempts to
access otherwise permissible sites) for a variable
period ranging from five to thirty minutes.
Civil society mobilization
In Asia, civil society groups (as characterized/
defined by Deibert and Rohozinski in Chapter 6)
have carved out a prominent role in monitoring
Internet censorship, advocating for greater
access to information and freedom of expression
and creating a space for issues shut out or marginalized in mainstream discourse. In response
to the collateral blocking of the entire Blogspot
162
Regional Overviews
sentiments—were inaccessible. In Pakistan,
though Balochi and Sindhi independence and
human rights sites have been filtered, other Web
sites pertaining to Pashtun secessionism were
fully accessible. In this case, filtering may be
seen as unnecessary, as the majority of Pashtuns
are illiterate in their local language.
Transparency
All countries in Asia engaged in technical filtering
exhibited a lack of transparency in the legal
authorization, technical processes, or implementation of filtering. Governments chose to remain
silent on their source of authority to filter content
from its citizens, or relied on indirect or implicit
authority found in existing laws and regulations.
Citizens in many countries were not put on notice
of filtering as it occurred, and instead the cause
of content inaccessibility was identified to be the
result of inadvertent or unintentional error.
Virtually all governments in Asia have yet to
develop procedures for official notification of
blocking to Web site owners, or appeal mechanisms for individuals to challenge blocking decisions in independent tribunals.
Governments often fail to disclose the extent
of filtering to the general public. One notable
exception is Singapore: before most Asian countries even had infrastructure in place to begin
engaging in technical censorship of the Internet,
Singapore announced in 1999 that a list of 100
pornographic Web sites would be blocked by the
three major ISPs. As a “gesture of concern” to
demonstrate the government’s commitment to
“Asian” values, 46 this figure has been continually
cited in coverage of Internet censorship in
Singapore, though the extent of actual filtering
has remained symbolic.
In South Korea, state regulation (through the
Internet Content Filtering Ordinance in 2001) 47
reportedly required ISPs to block as many as
120,000 Web sites on a state-compiled list, as
well as mandating that Internet access facilities
accessible to minors, such as public libraries and
schools, install filtering software. 48 However, ONI
testing indicated that Internet filtering in South
Korea is not as extensive as reports have suggested. In Thailand as well, the distinct lack of
transparency in the filtering process has persisted through the change in Thai governments.
Adding to the uncertainty, a range of figures for
the number of sites blocked by the Thai government continues to be circulated but not confirmed. A Thai police Web site citing the number
of blocked sites at over 34,000 sites since 2002
has been taken down.
However, both South Korean and Thai ISPs
do employ a blockpage, the most transparent
notification of filtering. For example, sites blocked
by KorNet through DNS tampering in South
Korea resolve to a blockpage hosted by the
police at 211.253.9.250. This blockpage not only
states that the page has been lawfully blocked
but also displays the user’s IP address, which
suggests the possibility of tracking the viewers
that have visited the blocked site. Only a few
countries provide clear notice that access is
being denied because of proscribed content. In
contrast, China’s filtering methods are set up so
that users in China who cannot access content
due to IP address blocking, DNS tampering, or
keyword search string filtering receive a network
timeout or error page. When a keyword block is
triggered, further requests made to the target site
(IP address) are blocked (including attempts to
access otherwise permissible sites) for a variable
period ranging from five to thirty minutes.
Civil society mobilization
In Asia, civil society groups (as characterized/
defined by Deibert and Rohozinski in Chapter 6)
have carved out a prominent role in monitoring
Internet censorship, advocating for greater
access to information and freedom of expression
and creating a space for issues shut out or marginalized in mainstream discourse. In response
to the collateral blocking of the entire Blogspot
162
Regional Overviews