ation of the filtering certification body CERT-IN,
prohibits only the publication of obscene content;
however, CERT-IN has used its authority to issue
blocking instructions against religious and ethnic
inflammatory content.
Nonstate actors—especially ISPs—are deputized not only to shoulder monitoring duties and
legal responsibility for unauthorized online
behavior, but in many Asian countries they are
relied upon to implement technical filtering.
Countries that filter effectively at the international
gateway were the exception in Asia. The two
main state-owned ISPs in China each control a
backbone network, and filtering was remarkably
consistent between them. Blocking between
South Korean ISPs was extremely consistent,
even though both Korea Telecom (KorNet) and
Hanaro Telecom (HanaNet) are publicly held corporations. In most other countries, the implementation of filtering primarily at the “margins” of
state action has led to significant disparities
across ISPs (especially in a crowded market),
potential overblocking, and other inconsistencies
such that users in the same country experience
their “right” to access information differently and
are able ultimately to view and interact with different portions of the Internet.
Additionally, the scope of a state’s legal regulation of online activity often belies an implementation of state policy that is not entirely
monolithic. Myanmar, China, Vietnam, India, and
Pakistan all have regulations requiring cybercafés to monitor the online activities of their users
and demand personal identity information.
Generally these policies are difficult to enforce.
For example, though the Myanmar government
requires that users be registered and that screenshots of their activity be taken every five minutes,
cafés do not always comply and CDs of screenshots are requested only sporadically. 37
Impact of economic and social factors
Economic incentives and social factors have a
definite impact on filtering practices in Asia.
Global industry players such as Google and
Microsoft have engaged in censorship in order to
benefit from state investment in providing
improved speed and quality of access to
approved content while strengthening technical
filtering, particularly in China.
On June 29, 2006, India’s Department of
Telecommunications (DOT) reportedly instructed
around 150 ISPs to block the Web site of the
People’s War Group (PWG), a Maoist paramilitary
group that was hosted on Geocities. A month
later, the DOT informed ISPs that Yahoo! had
removed the PWG’s site, apparently the first time
a service provider had voluntarily removed a Web
site to avoid being blocked. 38
The Chinese and Vietnamese governments
must contend with the challenge of maintaining
control over specified corridors of information as
the space for approved or harmless topics grows
increasingly vast. Myanmar has taken a blunter
approach than its authoritarian neighbors, and in
the case of China, its stalwart ally and aid
provider. Internet access in Myanmar is structured so that broadband costs are prohibitive for
most of its citizens, and dialup access comes
bundled with state-monitored, fee-based e-mail
service and a small collection of pre-approved
sites on the country’s intranet. In a reported
attempt to not only censor communications but
also preserve its monopoly over telephone and email services as MPT’s revenues dipped, the
government blocked free e-mail services at
points in 2006. 39 ONI testing confirmed that
Yahoo! Mail, Gmail, Hushmail, and mail2web
were blocked, with the ISP Myanmar Posts and
Telecom taking the additional precaution of
blocking thirteen additional e-mail sites, including
Hotmail and Fastmail. Similar concerns about
loss of state revenue have factored into similar
tightening of VoIP services in Pakistan and China.
Economic motivations may also work to
achieve an opposite effect, where governments
explicitly refrain from Internet censorship in order
to encourage growth. A number of Asian coun160
Regional Overviews
prohibits only the publication of obscene content;
however, CERT-IN has used its authority to issue
blocking instructions against religious and ethnic
inflammatory content.
Nonstate actors—especially ISPs—are deputized not only to shoulder monitoring duties and
legal responsibility for unauthorized online
behavior, but in many Asian countries they are
relied upon to implement technical filtering.
Countries that filter effectively at the international
gateway were the exception in Asia. The two
main state-owned ISPs in China each control a
backbone network, and filtering was remarkably
consistent between them. Blocking between
South Korean ISPs was extremely consistent,
even though both Korea Telecom (KorNet) and
Hanaro Telecom (HanaNet) are publicly held corporations. In most other countries, the implementation of filtering primarily at the “margins” of
state action has led to significant disparities
across ISPs (especially in a crowded market),
potential overblocking, and other inconsistencies
such that users in the same country experience
their “right” to access information differently and
are able ultimately to view and interact with different portions of the Internet.
Additionally, the scope of a state’s legal regulation of online activity often belies an implementation of state policy that is not entirely
monolithic. Myanmar, China, Vietnam, India, and
Pakistan all have regulations requiring cybercafés to monitor the online activities of their users
and demand personal identity information.
Generally these policies are difficult to enforce.
For example, though the Myanmar government
requires that users be registered and that screenshots of their activity be taken every five minutes,
cafés do not always comply and CDs of screenshots are requested only sporadically. 37
Impact of economic and social factors
Economic incentives and social factors have a
definite impact on filtering practices in Asia.
Global industry players such as Google and
Microsoft have engaged in censorship in order to
benefit from state investment in providing
improved speed and quality of access to
approved content while strengthening technical
filtering, particularly in China.
On June 29, 2006, India’s Department of
Telecommunications (DOT) reportedly instructed
around 150 ISPs to block the Web site of the
People’s War Group (PWG), a Maoist paramilitary
group that was hosted on Geocities. A month
later, the DOT informed ISPs that Yahoo! had
removed the PWG’s site, apparently the first time
a service provider had voluntarily removed a Web
site to avoid being blocked. 38
The Chinese and Vietnamese governments
must contend with the challenge of maintaining
control over specified corridors of information as
the space for approved or harmless topics grows
increasingly vast. Myanmar has taken a blunter
approach than its authoritarian neighbors, and in
the case of China, its stalwart ally and aid
provider. Internet access in Myanmar is structured so that broadband costs are prohibitive for
most of its citizens, and dialup access comes
bundled with state-monitored, fee-based e-mail
service and a small collection of pre-approved
sites on the country’s intranet. In a reported
attempt to not only censor communications but
also preserve its monopoly over telephone and email services as MPT’s revenues dipped, the
government blocked free e-mail services at
points in 2006. 39 ONI testing confirmed that
Yahoo! Mail, Gmail, Hushmail, and mail2web
were blocked, with the ISP Myanmar Posts and
Telecom taking the additional precaution of
blocking thirteen additional e-mail sites, including
Hotmail and Fastmail. Similar concerns about
loss of state revenue have factored into similar
tightening of VoIP services in Pakistan and China.
Economic motivations may also work to
achieve an opposite effect, where governments
explicitly refrain from Internet censorship in order
to encourage growth. A number of Asian coun160
Regional Overviews