Independent Media and Free Expression
In many states, control over major media, like television and radio, is seen as an important
lever of power that can be tightly regulated and controlled, leaving independent media as
one of the only sources of news and free expression for civic and resistance networks. A total
of seventeen states (Algeria, Bahrain, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Oman,
Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen)
blocked at least one Web site categorized by the ONI as a content provider in the ‘‘independent media’’ category. Not surprisingly, there is a strong degree of overlap among those
countries that block a high amount of human rights content and independent media content.
Other notable instances of filtering of independent media occurred in countries during election
periods, a point discussed in more depth later in this chapter. Nineteen states (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen) blocked at least
one site in the ‘‘free expression’’ category. Of those countries, Syria, China, Iran, Myanmar,
Tunisia, and Vietnam block a high amount, with Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia blocking a moderate amount.
Internet Protection and Hacktivist Tools
As mentioned earlier, civic and resistance networks have been actively developing software
tools to protect and preserve freedom of speech and access to information online. The ONI
ran tests to capture filtering targeted against these tools and found several significant country
cases. China, Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia all block access to a
high amount of URLs in the ONI’s ‘‘anonymizers and circumvention’’ category. Uzbekistan
blocks access to a relatively few though significant number of anonymizer and proxy sites,
as does Vietnam, Myanmar, and Syria. China blocks access not only to known circumvention
sites, but sites that are known to provide information and tutorials about censorship circumvention. In the cases of other states, we conclude that some of this filtering is the result of
the use of categories built into commercial filtering products used by these regimes. Sudan,
Tunisia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia all use SmartFilter, which has an ‘‘anonymizer’’ blocking category, while Yemen uses Websense, which has a ‘‘proxy avoidance’’ category. The filtering
system used in Iran varies between ISPs and the specific product used is currently unknown.
The targeting of anonymizers and circumvention tools used by civil society (civic, resistance,
and dark) suggests states are moving to counter the Internet protection efforts described in
this chapter.
Tools of Communication
States have also blocked some of the major media of communication used by all spheres of
civil society, including free e-mail services and VoIP. In both cases, the filtering may be motivated by concerns over economic protection and monopoly preservation. However, the collat134
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
In many states, control over major media, like television and radio, is seen as an important
lever of power that can be tightly regulated and controlled, leaving independent media as
one of the only sources of news and free expression for civic and resistance networks. A total
of seventeen states (Algeria, Bahrain, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Oman,
Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen)
blocked at least one Web site categorized by the ONI as a content provider in the ‘‘independent media’’ category. Not surprisingly, there is a strong degree of overlap among those
countries that block a high amount of human rights content and independent media content.
Other notable instances of filtering of independent media occurred in countries during election
periods, a point discussed in more depth later in this chapter. Nineteen states (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen) blocked at least
one site in the ‘‘free expression’’ category. Of those countries, Syria, China, Iran, Myanmar,
Tunisia, and Vietnam block a high amount, with Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia blocking a moderate amount.
Internet Protection and Hacktivist Tools
As mentioned earlier, civic and resistance networks have been actively developing software
tools to protect and preserve freedom of speech and access to information online. The ONI
ran tests to capture filtering targeted against these tools and found several significant country
cases. China, Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia all block access to a
high amount of URLs in the ONI’s ‘‘anonymizers and circumvention’’ category. Uzbekistan
blocks access to a relatively few though significant number of anonymizer and proxy sites,
as does Vietnam, Myanmar, and Syria. China blocks access not only to known circumvention
sites, but sites that are known to provide information and tutorials about censorship circumvention. In the cases of other states, we conclude that some of this filtering is the result of
the use of categories built into commercial filtering products used by these regimes. Sudan,
Tunisia, Oman, and Saudi Arabia all use SmartFilter, which has an ‘‘anonymizer’’ blocking category, while Yemen uses Websense, which has a ‘‘proxy avoidance’’ category. The filtering
system used in Iran varies between ISPs and the specific product used is currently unknown.
The targeting of anonymizers and circumvention tools used by civil society (civic, resistance,
and dark) suggests states are moving to counter the Internet protection efforts described in
this chapter.
Tools of Communication
States have also blocked some of the major media of communication used by all spheres of
civil society, including free e-mail services and VoIP. In both cases, the filtering may be motivated by concerns over economic protection and monopoly preservation. However, the collat134
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski