where the targets are clearly dark nets, there can be collateral impacts on the communications environment for civic networks.
Filtering Data Analysis
The results of the ONI’s testing as outlined in this volume present a wide array of categories
targeted for filtering, in both English and local languages, across numerous countries and
several regions. In this section, we highlight several categories of filtering where it can be
imputed that states are deliberately targeting content or communication channels of civic, resistance, and/or dark nets. We also note those instances of collateral filtering, where filtering of
content or communications channels of dark and resistance networks impact civic networks
as well.
Human Rights
One area of importance to civic networks, both as a normative underpinning and a source of
content produced by those networks, is human rights. As many civic networks are critical of
states’ records in the areas of human rights, many of the affected states have been targeting
the sources of that content for filtering. Pakistan, Myanmar, India, Iran, Uzbekistan, Algeria,
Ethiopia, Tunisia, Vietnam, China, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand all block access to at
least one Web site categorized by the ONI as ‘‘human rights.’’ Among those countries, China,
Vietnam, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Iran are all pervasive filterers of human
rights–categorized content. Among the forty-eight sites that the Chinese government blocks in
this category are the Web sites of Chinese Rights Defenders, Human Rights in China, the
Asian Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Olympic
Watch—essentially the full panoply of international and country-specific organizations with an
interest in China’s human rights record. Iran’s coverage is similar to China’s, although it also
singles out prominent individuals for filtering, such as the infamous blogger, Hoder. Vietnam
tends to focus on country-specific human rights NGOs operating in the Vietnamese language,
Tunisia strikes a balance between ‘‘international’’ and ‘‘country-specific,’’ as does Myanmar,
while Uzbekistan targets mostly independent media, television, and radio Web sites related
to Uzbek human rights. For its part, Pakistan targets almost exclusively those human rights
sites related to the Balochistan liberation movement. Furthermore, eight states (Algeria, Ethiopia, Iran, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan Tunisia, and Yemen) block at least one women’s
rights site on the ONI’s testing lists, with one state, Iran, blocking the highest amount (seventeen of seventy tested). Additionally, seven states (China, Ethiopia, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan,
Syria, and Tunisia) all have at least one blocked in the category ‘‘minority rights,’’ with China
blocking all sites tested related to Tibet. Overall, the ONI’s testing results show a concerted
effort among many states to target human rights–related content.
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Filtering Data Analysis
The results of the ONI’s testing as outlined in this volume present a wide array of categories
targeted for filtering, in both English and local languages, across numerous countries and
several regions. In this section, we highlight several categories of filtering where it can be
imputed that states are deliberately targeting content or communication channels of civic, resistance, and/or dark nets. We also note those instances of collateral filtering, where filtering of
content or communications channels of dark and resistance networks impact civic networks
as well.
Human Rights
One area of importance to civic networks, both as a normative underpinning and a source of
content produced by those networks, is human rights. As many civic networks are critical of
states’ records in the areas of human rights, many of the affected states have been targeting
the sources of that content for filtering. Pakistan, Myanmar, India, Iran, Uzbekistan, Algeria,
Ethiopia, Tunisia, Vietnam, China, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand all block access to at
least one Web site categorized by the ONI as ‘‘human rights.’’ Among those countries, China,
Vietnam, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Iran are all pervasive filterers of human
rights–categorized content. Among the forty-eight sites that the Chinese government blocks in
this category are the Web sites of Chinese Rights Defenders, Human Rights in China, the
Asian Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Olympic
Watch—essentially the full panoply of international and country-specific organizations with an
interest in China’s human rights record. Iran’s coverage is similar to China’s, although it also
singles out prominent individuals for filtering, such as the infamous blogger, Hoder. Vietnam
tends to focus on country-specific human rights NGOs operating in the Vietnamese language,
Tunisia strikes a balance between ‘‘international’’ and ‘‘country-specific,’’ as does Myanmar,
while Uzbekistan targets mostly independent media, television, and radio Web sites related
to Uzbek human rights. For its part, Pakistan targets almost exclusively those human rights
sites related to the Balochistan liberation movement. Furthermore, eight states (Algeria, Ethiopia, Iran, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan Tunisia, and Yemen) block at least one women’s
rights site on the ONI’s testing lists, with one state, Iran, blocking the highest amount (seventeen of seventy tested). Additionally, seven states (China, Ethiopia, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan,
Syria, and Tunisia) all have at least one blocked in the category ‘‘minority rights,’’ with China
blocking all sites tested related to Tibet. Overall, the ONI’s testing results show a concerted
effort among many states to target human rights–related content.
Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet
133