networks serve specific social functions, circumventing cultural or social taboos, or serving
highly specific economic interests. As a consequence, they are often deliberately ‘‘closed,’’
and thus may even be denied or downplayed by the communities they serve.
25
These networks are, nonetheless, among the most active of the dark nets, and hence tend
to get labeled with the same negative image as armed social movements or criminal networks because they appear to support or even appropriate the same means used by the latter. For example, diaspora communities are often used to facilitate the movement of funds
outside of the formal banking system, especially among migrant communities in the Gulf,
South Asia, and the Horn of Africa. So-called hawala networks, underground banking networks that in some counties carry a volume of funds equal to or larger than the official banking
system, have fallen under suspicion as having been the source of funds ending up in the
hands of local militant groups.
26 While this may be the case, both the number of hawala transfers used by terrorist groups as well as the amounts needed for carrying out terrorist attacks
are relatively small given the overall volume of hawala transfers, and could just as easily have
been hidden in regular banking or other online transactions (e.g., PayPal).
Although not often analyzed together by scholars with the civic networks described earlier,
the ‘‘uncivil’’ dark nets are as much a part of global civil society as are the former. Following
the LSE definition employed in our chapter, they constitute an arena of uncoerced collective
action around shared interests, purposes, and values. Their institutional forms are distinct
from those of the state, family, and market, though in practice, the boundaries between them
are often complex, blurred, and negotiated. What differentiates them from the civic networks
is, of course, their perceived illegitimacy, making them the target of state security and law enforcement. In the following section we turn to the ways in which states have attempted to control and contain the challenges presented by civic networks, resistance networks, and dark
nets through Internet filtering, surveillance, and control.
Assertions of State Power Over Civic, Resistance, and Dark Nets in Cyberspace
As the other chapters and the country summaries of this volume make clear, the problem of
Internet filtering and censorship is growing in scope, scale, and sophistication worldwide.
What began as a practice confined to a small handful of nondemocratic regimes has
expanded to countries throughout every region of the globe, and includes nondemocratic,
transition, and democratic countries. How much of this filtering can be attributed to attempts
by states to control the challenges presented by civic, resistance, and dark networks? Here
there is no plain answer, as the motivations for Internet filtering and censorship vary among
states and are often shrouded in secrecy and deceit. We can, however, identify several areas
from our research where states are asserting control over the Internet as a means to limit the
threats posed by the varied elements of global civil society. As we show, even in those cases
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Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
highly specific economic interests. As a consequence, they are often deliberately ‘‘closed,’’
and thus may even be denied or downplayed by the communities they serve.
25
These networks are, nonetheless, among the most active of the dark nets, and hence tend
to get labeled with the same negative image as armed social movements or criminal networks because they appear to support or even appropriate the same means used by the latter. For example, diaspora communities are often used to facilitate the movement of funds
outside of the formal banking system, especially among migrant communities in the Gulf,
South Asia, and the Horn of Africa. So-called hawala networks, underground banking networks that in some counties carry a volume of funds equal to or larger than the official banking
system, have fallen under suspicion as having been the source of funds ending up in the
hands of local militant groups.
26 While this may be the case, both the number of hawala transfers used by terrorist groups as well as the amounts needed for carrying out terrorist attacks
are relatively small given the overall volume of hawala transfers, and could just as easily have
been hidden in regular banking or other online transactions (e.g., PayPal).
Although not often analyzed together by scholars with the civic networks described earlier,
the ‘‘uncivil’’ dark nets are as much a part of global civil society as are the former. Following
the LSE definition employed in our chapter, they constitute an arena of uncoerced collective
action around shared interests, purposes, and values. Their institutional forms are distinct
from those of the state, family, and market, though in practice, the boundaries between them
are often complex, blurred, and negotiated. What differentiates them from the civic networks
is, of course, their perceived illegitimacy, making them the target of state security and law enforcement. In the following section we turn to the ways in which states have attempted to control and contain the challenges presented by civic networks, resistance networks, and dark
nets through Internet filtering, surveillance, and control.
Assertions of State Power Over Civic, Resistance, and Dark Nets in Cyberspace
As the other chapters and the country summaries of this volume make clear, the problem of
Internet filtering and censorship is growing in scope, scale, and sophistication worldwide.
What began as a practice confined to a small handful of nondemocratic regimes has
expanded to countries throughout every region of the globe, and includes nondemocratic,
transition, and democratic countries. How much of this filtering can be attributed to attempts
by states to control the challenges presented by civic, resistance, and dark networks? Here
there is no plain answer, as the motivations for Internet filtering and censorship vary among
states and are often shrouded in secrecy and deceit. We can, however, identify several areas
from our research where states are asserting control over the Internet as a means to limit the
threats posed by the varied elements of global civil society. As we show, even in those cases
132
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski