eral impact of the filtering is felt strongly by civil society networks that rely on such low-cost
means of communicating. Iran, Syrian, Yemen, and Myanmar all block access to a small but
significant number of popular free e-mail services. United Arab Emirates (UAE) highly targets
VoIP Web sites for filtering. UAE and Myanmar both block the popular VoIP tool Skype and
UAE is joined by Syria in blocking www.dialpad.com and www.iconnecthere.com. Vietnam
also blocks two sites in the ONI’s VoIP category (www.evoiz.com and www.mediaring.com).
Jordan blocked access to Skype in 2006, citing national security concerns.
Hacking and WAREZ
Both resistance and dark nets (and to a lesser degree civic networks) can occasionally make
use of Web sites found in the ONI’s ‘‘hacking’’ and ‘‘WAREZ category.’’ For civic and resistance networks, some of these Web sites and resources provide tools, information, and strategies associated with hacktivism that can be useful to their networking, social mobilization,
and political activism. For dark nets, the Web sites of most interest are found in the ‘‘WAREZ’’
category and relate to illicit trade in pirated software and other material, although other dark
nets make use of hacker tools as well. Iran, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, and China all block a high amount of ONI’s ‘‘WAREZ’’ and ‘‘hacking’’ categories,
Tunisia blocks a somewhat lesser amount, while South Korea, Oman, Myanmar, and Azerbaijan all target a minimal amount. Hacktivist groups, such as cultdeadcow.com (Algeria, China,
Iran, and Yemen), hacktivismo.com (Tunisia and Yemen), nmrc.org (Algeria and Yemen), and
thehacktivist.com (Iran and Yemen) are also caught in the ‘‘hacking’’ and ‘‘WAREZ’’ net and
blocked in some of these countries. In ONI’s 2005 tests, Yemen did not block any sites in our
‘‘hacking’’ category. Now, one of the two ISPs tested, YNET, blocked access to twenty of
forty-six URLs we tested, most likely as a result of enabling the ‘‘hacking’’ category on their
Websense filtering system.
Miltancy, Extremists, and Armed Separatist Movements
Many states justify their filtering practices as a way to target those members of dark nets that
are armed social movements—that is, either militants, extremists, or armed separatist movements. Eleven states, (Algeria, Azerbaijan, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) all block at least one URL that the ONI categorized as a
content provider in the ‘‘militancy, military group’’ category. Most of these Web sites relate to
country-specific security issues involving extremist groups or organizations advocating or being associated with violent change. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan blocks all Web sites related
to the Balochistan insurgency.
The results of the ONI’s testing strongly suggest a concerted effort among some states to
target the content and communicative infrastructure of global civil society, including civic, resistance, and dark nets. Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the states that do so tend to be democratically challenged or nondemocratic regimes, as these states face the stiffest challenges
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means of communicating. Iran, Syrian, Yemen, and Myanmar all block access to a small but
significant number of popular free e-mail services. United Arab Emirates (UAE) highly targets
VoIP Web sites for filtering. UAE and Myanmar both block the popular VoIP tool Skype and
UAE is joined by Syria in blocking www.dialpad.com and www.iconnecthere.com. Vietnam
also blocks two sites in the ONI’s VoIP category (www.evoiz.com and www.mediaring.com).
Jordan blocked access to Skype in 2006, citing national security concerns.
Hacking and WAREZ
Both resistance and dark nets (and to a lesser degree civic networks) can occasionally make
use of Web sites found in the ONI’s ‘‘hacking’’ and ‘‘WAREZ category.’’ For civic and resistance networks, some of these Web sites and resources provide tools, information, and strategies associated with hacktivism that can be useful to their networking, social mobilization,
and political activism. For dark nets, the Web sites of most interest are found in the ‘‘WAREZ’’
category and relate to illicit trade in pirated software and other material, although other dark
nets make use of hacker tools as well. Iran, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, and China all block a high amount of ONI’s ‘‘WAREZ’’ and ‘‘hacking’’ categories,
Tunisia blocks a somewhat lesser amount, while South Korea, Oman, Myanmar, and Azerbaijan all target a minimal amount. Hacktivist groups, such as cultdeadcow.com (Algeria, China,
Iran, and Yemen), hacktivismo.com (Tunisia and Yemen), nmrc.org (Algeria and Yemen), and
thehacktivist.com (Iran and Yemen) are also caught in the ‘‘hacking’’ and ‘‘WAREZ’’ net and
blocked in some of these countries. In ONI’s 2005 tests, Yemen did not block any sites in our
‘‘hacking’’ category. Now, one of the two ISPs tested, YNET, blocked access to twenty of
forty-six URLs we tested, most likely as a result of enabling the ‘‘hacking’’ category on their
Websense filtering system.
Miltancy, Extremists, and Armed Separatist Movements
Many states justify their filtering practices as a way to target those members of dark nets that
are armed social movements—that is, either militants, extremists, or armed separatist movements. Eleven states, (Algeria, Azerbaijan, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) all block at least one URL that the ONI categorized as a
content provider in the ‘‘militancy, military group’’ category. Most of these Web sites relate to
country-specific security issues involving extremist groups or organizations advocating or being associated with violent change. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan blocks all Web sites related
to the Balochistan insurgency.
The results of the ONI’s testing strongly suggest a concerted effort among some states to
target the content and communicative infrastructure of global civil society, including civic, resistance, and dark nets. Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the states that do so tend to be democratically challenged or nondemocratic regimes, as these states face the stiffest challenges
Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet
135