Tunisia does not have specific laws that regulate online broadcasting. As a result, a
group of journalists exploited the lack of legal obstacles to broadcast on the Internet
and on December 10, 2007, launched Tunisia’s first Internet radio station, Radio 6, to
mark the 59th anniversary of the World Declaration of Human Rights. 26
Web filtering in Tunisia is achieved through the use of a commercial software program, SmartFilter, sold by the U.S.-based company Secure Computing. Since all fixedline Internet traffic passes through facilities controlled by ATI, the government is able
to load the software onto its servers and filter content consistently across Tunisia’s 11
ISPs. Tunisia purposefully hides its filtering from Internet users. SmartFilter is designed
to display a 403 error message when a user attempts to access a blocked Web site; the
Tunisian government has replaced this message with a standard 404 error message,
which gives no hint that the requested Web site is actively blocked. 27
Surveillance
The Tunisian authorities practice various forms of Internet surveillance and request
that service providers such as Internet cafe ´s become partners in controlling Internet
use. For example, the authorities monitor Internet cafe ´s, instruct Internet users to
show identification before they can use the Internet in some regions, and hold Internet
cafe ´ operators responsible by law for their clients’ online activities.
There is also technical surveillance, whereby downloading or adding attachments
to an e-mail must go through a central server. Under the pretext of protecting public
order and national security, a 1998 post and telecommunications law enables the
authorities to intercept and check the content of e-mail messages; 28 in fact, electronic
surveillance such as the filtering of e-mail messages of government opponents has
been reported. 29 Global Voices Advocacy director and Tunisian activist Sami Ben
Gharbia conducted a test from the Netherlands with two Tunisia-based activists, and
confirmed by logging on to their e-mail accounts from the Netherlands that what he
saw was not what the bloggers saw when they logged on from Tunisia, and that the
bloggers could not access some of the messages they received. 30
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative carried out tests in Tunisia using the ISPs Planet Tunisie
and TopNet. Similar to 2006–2007 test results, 2008–2009 testing revealed pervasive
filtering of Web sites of political opposition groups such as the Democratic Forum for
Labor and Liberty (www.fdtl.org), Al-Nadha Movement (www.nahdha.info), Tunisian
Workers’ Communist Party (www.albadil.org), and Democratic Progressive Party
(pdpinfo.org).
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Tunisia
group of journalists exploited the lack of legal obstacles to broadcast on the Internet
and on December 10, 2007, launched Tunisia’s first Internet radio station, Radio 6, to
mark the 59th anniversary of the World Declaration of Human Rights. 26
Web filtering in Tunisia is achieved through the use of a commercial software program, SmartFilter, sold by the U.S.-based company Secure Computing. Since all fixedline Internet traffic passes through facilities controlled by ATI, the government is able
to load the software onto its servers and filter content consistently across Tunisia’s 11
ISPs. Tunisia purposefully hides its filtering from Internet users. SmartFilter is designed
to display a 403 error message when a user attempts to access a blocked Web site; the
Tunisian government has replaced this message with a standard 404 error message,
which gives no hint that the requested Web site is actively blocked. 27
Surveillance
The Tunisian authorities practice various forms of Internet surveillance and request
that service providers such as Internet cafe ´s become partners in controlling Internet
use. For example, the authorities monitor Internet cafe ´s, instruct Internet users to
show identification before they can use the Internet in some regions, and hold Internet
cafe ´ operators responsible by law for their clients’ online activities.
There is also technical surveillance, whereby downloading or adding attachments
to an e-mail must go through a central server. Under the pretext of protecting public
order and national security, a 1998 post and telecommunications law enables the
authorities to intercept and check the content of e-mail messages; 28 in fact, electronic
surveillance such as the filtering of e-mail messages of government opponents has
been reported. 29 Global Voices Advocacy director and Tunisian activist Sami Ben
Gharbia conducted a test from the Netherlands with two Tunisia-based activists, and
confirmed by logging on to their e-mail accounts from the Netherlands that what he
saw was not what the bloggers saw when they logged on from Tunisia, and that the
bloggers could not access some of the messages they received. 30
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative carried out tests in Tunisia using the ISPs Planet Tunisie
and TopNet. Similar to 2006–2007 test results, 2008–2009 testing revealed pervasive
filtering of Web sites of political opposition groups such as the Democratic Forum for
Labor and Liberty (www.fdtl.org), Al-Nadha Movement (www.nahdha.info), Tunisian
Workers’ Communist Party (www.albadil.org), and Democratic Progressive Party
(pdpinfo.org).
584
Tunisia