Internet access. Tunisians for whom personal computers remain prohibitively expensive may access the Internet from more than 300 Internet cafe ´s set up by the
authorities. 13
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
In addition to filtering Web content, the government of Tunisia utilizes laws, regulations, and surveillance to achieve strict control over the Internet.
For example, journalists have been prosecuted by Tunisia’s press code, which bans
offending the president, disturbing order, and publishing what the government perceives as false news. 14 The government also restricts the media by controlling the registration of print media and licensing of broadcasters, refusing permission to critical
outlets, and controlling the distribution of public sector advertisement. 15 Journalists
are also charged in court with vague violations of the penal code. 16
Online dissidents face severe punishment. For example, human rights lawyer
Mohamed Abbou was sentenced to three and a half years in prison in 2005 for publishing on a banned Web site a report in which he accused the government of torturing
Tunisian prisoners. 17
In a landmark legal case that challenged the Web-filtering regime in the country,
journalist and blogger Ziad El Heni filed a legal suit against the ATI for censoring the
social networking site Facebook. 18 The Tunisian Union of Free Radio Stations and
the Unionist Freedoms and Rights Observatory joined El Heni in the lawsuit and called
for Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to testify. 19 Facebook was blocked on
August 18, 2008, and then unblocked on September 2 at the Tunisian president’s
request. 20 The Third District Court of Tunisia, however, dismissed the case in November 2008 without providing any explanation. 21
In addition to being blocked in Tunisia, many opposition and dissident Web sites
and blogs have been targets of hacking attempts and, in some cases, successful content
removal and shutting down of servers. 22 Although it is not clear who is behind these
cyber attacks, many Tunisian opposition leaders believe the government is responsible. 23 For example, the independent news site Kalima (www.kalimatunisie.com) was
hacked into and shut down in October 2008. The eight-year Arabic and French
archives were completely destroyed. The Web site has been blocked since it was
launched in 2000. Its administrator accused the government of being responsible for
the attack because, as she told the Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘The only ones
who benefit from this attack are the authorities.’’ 24 She also stated, ‘‘I would not rule
out the possibility that this act was committed by the secret services, with the aid of
hackers or pirates based in Tunisia or abroad.’’ The Web-based newsletter Tunis News
(www.tunisnews.net) and a blog run by a judge (tunisiawatch.rsfblog.org) have been
subject to similar attacks. 25
Tunisia
583
authorities. 13
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
In addition to filtering Web content, the government of Tunisia utilizes laws, regulations, and surveillance to achieve strict control over the Internet.
For example, journalists have been prosecuted by Tunisia’s press code, which bans
offending the president, disturbing order, and publishing what the government perceives as false news. 14 The government also restricts the media by controlling the registration of print media and licensing of broadcasters, refusing permission to critical
outlets, and controlling the distribution of public sector advertisement. 15 Journalists
are also charged in court with vague violations of the penal code. 16
Online dissidents face severe punishment. For example, human rights lawyer
Mohamed Abbou was sentenced to three and a half years in prison in 2005 for publishing on a banned Web site a report in which he accused the government of torturing
Tunisian prisoners. 17
In a landmark legal case that challenged the Web-filtering regime in the country,
journalist and blogger Ziad El Heni filed a legal suit against the ATI for censoring the
social networking site Facebook. 18 The Tunisian Union of Free Radio Stations and
the Unionist Freedoms and Rights Observatory joined El Heni in the lawsuit and called
for Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to testify. 19 Facebook was blocked on
August 18, 2008, and then unblocked on September 2 at the Tunisian president’s
request. 20 The Third District Court of Tunisia, however, dismissed the case in November 2008 without providing any explanation. 21
In addition to being blocked in Tunisia, many opposition and dissident Web sites
and blogs have been targets of hacking attempts and, in some cases, successful content
removal and shutting down of servers. 22 Although it is not clear who is behind these
cyber attacks, many Tunisian opposition leaders believe the government is responsible. 23 For example, the independent news site Kalima (www.kalimatunisie.com) was
hacked into and shut down in October 2008. The eight-year Arabic and French
archives were completely destroyed. The Web site has been blocked since it was
launched in 2000. Its administrator accused the government of being responsible for
the attack because, as she told the Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘The only ones
who benefit from this attack are the authorities.’’ 24 She also stated, ‘‘I would not rule
out the possibility that this act was committed by the secret services, with the aid of
hackers or pirates based in Tunisia or abroad.’’ The Web-based newsletter Tunis News
(www.tunisnews.net) and a blog run by a judge (tunisiawatch.rsfblog.org) have been
subject to similar attacks. 25
Tunisia
583