Also blocked were Web sites run by opposition figures such as activist Moncef Marzouki (www.moncefmarzouki.net) and Web sites that contain oppositional news and
politics such as www.nawaat.org, www.perspectivestunisiennes.net, www.tunisnews
.com, and www.tunezine.com.
Web sites that publish oppositional articles by Tunisian journalists were also
blocked. For example, ONI verified the blocking of the French daily Libe ´ration in February 2007 because articles by Tunisian journalist Taoufik Ben Brik critical of President
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali appeared on its Web site. 31
Also blocked are Web sites that criticize Tunisia’s human rights record. These include
the Web sites of Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org), Freedom House (www
.freedomhouse.org), Reporters Without Borders (www.rsf.org and www.rsf.fr), the
International Freedom of Expression eXchange (www.ifex.org), the Islamic Human
Rights Commission (www.ihrc.org), and the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (www.hrinfo.org). Although the home page of Human Rights Watch (HRW)
was accessible, the Arabic- and French-language versions of an HRW report on Internet
repression in Tunisia were blocked.
The prominent video sharing sites YouTube (www.youtube.com) and Dailymotion
(www.dailymotion.com) were found blocked, apparently because Tunisian activists
used them to disseminate content critical of the regime’s human rights practices. Interestingly, the Web site of ONI (opennet.net) was blocked. Also blocked was the Web
site of Global Voices (www.globalvoicesonline.org), a nonprofit global citizens’ media
project. Most of the tested Web sites in the anonymizers and circumvention tools
category were blocked. These include Psiphon (psiphon.civisec.org), TOR (tor.eff.org),
Anonymizer (www.anonymizer.com), e-mail privacy service provider Stealth Message
(www.stealthmessage.com), Guardster (www.guardster.com), and JAP (anon.inf.tu
-dresden.de).
The filtering regime pervasively filters pornographic content, several gay and lesbian
information or dating pages, provocative attire, and several online translation services.
Also blocked were a few Web sites that criticize the Quran (www.thequran.com) and
Islam (www.islameyat.com). Although the small number of such sites indicates that
there is limited filtering of religious content in Tunisia.
Conclusion
Tunisia’s government continues to suppress critical speech and oppositional activity,
both in real space and in cyberspace. Unlike other states that employ filtering software, Tunisia endeavors to conceal instances of filtering by supplying a fake error
page when a blocked Web site is requested. This technique makes filtering more
opaque and clouds users’ understanding of the boundaries of permissible content.
Tunisia
585
politics such as www.nawaat.org, www.perspectivestunisiennes.net, www.tunisnews
.com, and www.tunezine.com.
Web sites that publish oppositional articles by Tunisian journalists were also
blocked. For example, ONI verified the blocking of the French daily Libe ´ration in February 2007 because articles by Tunisian journalist Taoufik Ben Brik critical of President
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali appeared on its Web site. 31
Also blocked are Web sites that criticize Tunisia’s human rights record. These include
the Web sites of Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org), Freedom House (www
.freedomhouse.org), Reporters Without Borders (www.rsf.org and www.rsf.fr), the
International Freedom of Expression eXchange (www.ifex.org), the Islamic Human
Rights Commission (www.ihrc.org), and the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (www.hrinfo.org). Although the home page of Human Rights Watch (HRW)
was accessible, the Arabic- and French-language versions of an HRW report on Internet
repression in Tunisia were blocked.
The prominent video sharing sites YouTube (www.youtube.com) and Dailymotion
(www.dailymotion.com) were found blocked, apparently because Tunisian activists
used them to disseminate content critical of the regime’s human rights practices. Interestingly, the Web site of ONI (opennet.net) was blocked. Also blocked was the Web
site of Global Voices (www.globalvoicesonline.org), a nonprofit global citizens’ media
project. Most of the tested Web sites in the anonymizers and circumvention tools
category were blocked. These include Psiphon (psiphon.civisec.org), TOR (tor.eff.org),
Anonymizer (www.anonymizer.com), e-mail privacy service provider Stealth Message
(www.stealthmessage.com), Guardster (www.guardster.com), and JAP (anon.inf.tu
-dresden.de).
The filtering regime pervasively filters pornographic content, several gay and lesbian
information or dating pages, provocative attire, and several online translation services.
Also blocked were a few Web sites that criticize the Quran (www.thequran.com) and
Islam (www.islameyat.com). Although the small number of such sites indicates that
there is limited filtering of religious content in Tunisia.
Conclusion
Tunisia’s government continues to suppress critical speech and oppositional activity,
both in real space and in cyberspace. Unlike other states that employ filtering software, Tunisia endeavors to conceal instances of filtering by supplying a fake error
page when a blocked Web site is requested. This technique makes filtering more
opaque and clouds users’ understanding of the boundaries of permissible content.
Tunisia
585