was not feasible. 41 The number of blogs that have registered with the state is thought
to be very low. 42
Another key piece of legislation for regulating online content in Iran is the Bill of
Cyber Crimes’ Sanctions (Cyber Crimes Bill) ratified into law in November 2008. This
bill was still under review by the Guardian Council at the time of writing. 43 The bill
requires ISPs to ensure that ‘‘forbidden’’ content is not displayed on their servers, that
they immediately inform law enforcement agencies of violations, that they retain the
content as evidence, and that they restrict access to the prohibited content. 44 Under
the Cyber Crimes Bill, ISPs that do not abide by government regulations (including
filtering regulations) will be fined, and with subsequent offenses temporarily or permanently suspended. 45 The bill also includes provisions for the protection and disclosure
of confidential data and information as well as the publishing of obscene content. 46 A
prior draft of the legislation included provisions that made ISPs criminally liable for
content transmitted over their networks. These provisions have been removed from
the latest draft of the Cyber Crimes Bill.
The role of different government agencies in deciding on blocking, and the legality
of doing so, has been a point of contention. The Internet Bureau of the Judiciary has
issued mandates to ISPs to block Web sites through court orders, which are considered
a form of lawful punishment imposed on legal entities. 47 Tehran Prosecutor General
Saeed Mortazavi, who has led harsh crackdowns on media and has also been implicated in cases of torture of detainees, including 21 bloggers arrested in 2004, has also
ordered that certain sites be censored. 48
The legality of Iran’s filtering regime was brought into question following the blocking of the conservative online journal Baztab (formerly baztab.com) in February 2007.
Baztab was made accessible inside Iran again after the Supreme Court of Iran ruled
against the filtering of the Web site. 49 This incident sparked a debate within Iranian
legal and media circles over the authority of the CCDUS and whether as an executive
body of government it was improperly involved in making legislative or judicial decisions. 50 This debate did not forestall the eventual closing of the offices of Baztab. 51
Surveillance
Iran is reportedly investing in improving its technical capacity to extensively monitor
the behavior of its citizens on the Internet. The routing of Internet traffic through
proxy servers offers the potential for monitoring and logging essentially all unencrypted Web traffic, including e-mail, instant messaging, and browsing. The architecture of the Iranian Internet is particularly conducive to widespread surveillance, as all
traffic from the dozens of ISPs serving households is routed through the statecontrolled telecommunications infrastructure of TCI. The MICT, when announcing
Iran
551
to be very low. 42
Another key piece of legislation for regulating online content in Iran is the Bill of
Cyber Crimes’ Sanctions (Cyber Crimes Bill) ratified into law in November 2008. This
bill was still under review by the Guardian Council at the time of writing. 43 The bill
requires ISPs to ensure that ‘‘forbidden’’ content is not displayed on their servers, that
they immediately inform law enforcement agencies of violations, that they retain the
content as evidence, and that they restrict access to the prohibited content. 44 Under
the Cyber Crimes Bill, ISPs that do not abide by government regulations (including
filtering regulations) will be fined, and with subsequent offenses temporarily or permanently suspended. 45 The bill also includes provisions for the protection and disclosure
of confidential data and information as well as the publishing of obscene content. 46 A
prior draft of the legislation included provisions that made ISPs criminally liable for
content transmitted over their networks. These provisions have been removed from
the latest draft of the Cyber Crimes Bill.
The role of different government agencies in deciding on blocking, and the legality
of doing so, has been a point of contention. The Internet Bureau of the Judiciary has
issued mandates to ISPs to block Web sites through court orders, which are considered
a form of lawful punishment imposed on legal entities. 47 Tehran Prosecutor General
Saeed Mortazavi, who has led harsh crackdowns on media and has also been implicated in cases of torture of detainees, including 21 bloggers arrested in 2004, has also
ordered that certain sites be censored. 48
The legality of Iran’s filtering regime was brought into question following the blocking of the conservative online journal Baztab (formerly baztab.com) in February 2007.
Baztab was made accessible inside Iran again after the Supreme Court of Iran ruled
against the filtering of the Web site. 49 This incident sparked a debate within Iranian
legal and media circles over the authority of the CCDUS and whether as an executive
body of government it was improperly involved in making legislative or judicial decisions. 50 This debate did not forestall the eventual closing of the offices of Baztab. 51
Surveillance
Iran is reportedly investing in improving its technical capacity to extensively monitor
the behavior of its citizens on the Internet. The routing of Internet traffic through
proxy servers offers the potential for monitoring and logging essentially all unencrypted Web traffic, including e-mail, instant messaging, and browsing. The architecture of the Iranian Internet is particularly conducive to widespread surveillance, as all
traffic from the dozens of ISPs serving households is routed through the statecontrolled telecommunications infrastructure of TCI. The MICT, when announcing
Iran
551