the creation of a centralized filtering system, indicated that they would keep a record of
Web sites visited by users. A later statement denied that this infrastructure would be
used for tracking browsing habits and identifying users. 52
In 2008, two European companies reportedly sold a sophisticated electronic surveillance system capable of monitoring Internet use that could be utilized for tracking and
monitoring the online activities of human rights organizations and political dissidents.
The Telecommunication Company of Iran is said to have received the equipment from
Nokia Siemens Networks, a joint venture between the Finnish cell phone maker and
the German company Siemens. 53 Women’s rights activists reported that they were
shown transcripts of instant messaging sessions by authorities after their arrest, which,
if true, would support the existence of an advanced surveillance program. 54
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative conducted testing in 2008 and 2009 on five ISPs in Iran: ITC,
Gostar, Parsonline, Datak, and Sepanta. The testing results confirm that Iran has continued to consolidate its position as one of the most extensive filterers of the Internet.
Iran consistently filters a broad range of Web sites that are offensive to the moral standards of Iran’s religious leadership. Internet censors in Iran have moved decisively
against a number of political targets over the past two years, including women’s rights
groups, human rights organizations, and political opposition parties.
Filtering in Iran is implemented by routing all public Internet traffic through proxy
servers. This allows the employment of filtering software to target specific Web pages as
well as the blocking of keywords. The blocking of Web sites is carried out in a transparent manner in Iran; a block page is displayed to users who attempt to access a blocked
site with a warning that they are not permitted to access a particular Web site. The
block pages, which vary by ISP, generally include a contact e-mail address for users
who might wish to contact the filtering administrators to question or contest the
blocking of a Web site.
A noteworthy recent development in Iran’s filtering regime is the implementation of
a centralized filtering regime. Historically, there has been substantial variation in
blocking across different ISPs, with several ISPs filtering fewer Web sites than TCI and
thereby offering a more permissive view of the Internet. 55 This variation in access to
Web sites was the result of differences in the implementation of government filtering
instructions by ISPs. This differential filtering practice has now been effectively
replaced by a uniform filtering pattern with the implementation of the supplementary
centralized filtering system. The vestiges of the ISP-based system, however, are still apparent: the source of filtering is made evident by the block page that appears, which in
some cases comes from the respective ISPs and in other cases from a standard block
page issued by TCI. It is unclear what the long-term structure of the filtering system
552
Iran
Web sites visited by users. A later statement denied that this infrastructure would be
used for tracking browsing habits and identifying users. 52
In 2008, two European companies reportedly sold a sophisticated electronic surveillance system capable of monitoring Internet use that could be utilized for tracking and
monitoring the online activities of human rights organizations and political dissidents.
The Telecommunication Company of Iran is said to have received the equipment from
Nokia Siemens Networks, a joint venture between the Finnish cell phone maker and
the German company Siemens. 53 Women’s rights activists reported that they were
shown transcripts of instant messaging sessions by authorities after their arrest, which,
if true, would support the existence of an advanced surveillance program. 54
ONI Testing Results
The OpenNet Initiative conducted testing in 2008 and 2009 on five ISPs in Iran: ITC,
Gostar, Parsonline, Datak, and Sepanta. The testing results confirm that Iran has continued to consolidate its position as one of the most extensive filterers of the Internet.
Iran consistently filters a broad range of Web sites that are offensive to the moral standards of Iran’s religious leadership. Internet censors in Iran have moved decisively
against a number of political targets over the past two years, including women’s rights
groups, human rights organizations, and political opposition parties.
Filtering in Iran is implemented by routing all public Internet traffic through proxy
servers. This allows the employment of filtering software to target specific Web pages as
well as the blocking of keywords. The blocking of Web sites is carried out in a transparent manner in Iran; a block page is displayed to users who attempt to access a blocked
site with a warning that they are not permitted to access a particular Web site. The
block pages, which vary by ISP, generally include a contact e-mail address for users
who might wish to contact the filtering administrators to question or contest the
blocking of a Web site.
A noteworthy recent development in Iran’s filtering regime is the implementation of
a centralized filtering regime. Historically, there has been substantial variation in
blocking across different ISPs, with several ISPs filtering fewer Web sites than TCI and
thereby offering a more permissive view of the Internet. 55 This variation in access to
Web sites was the result of differences in the implementation of government filtering
instructions by ISPs. This differential filtering practice has now been effectively
replaced by a uniform filtering pattern with the implementation of the supplementary
centralized filtering system. The vestiges of the ISP-based system, however, are still apparent: the source of filtering is made evident by the block page that appears, which in
some cases comes from the respective ISPs and in other cases from a standard block
page issued by TCI. It is unclear what the long-term structure of the filtering system
552
Iran