Strict criteria pertaining to what is ‘‘acceptable’’ within the national media space, leading to the de-registration of sites that do not comply. In Kazakhstan, opposition
Web sites or Web sites carrying material critical of the government are regularly deregistered from the national domain. This includes a large number of opposition sites
and, notably, the Borat Web site, ostensibly because the owners of the site were not resident in Kazakhstan as required by the Kazakh domain authority. In Belarus, the popular portal tut.by refused to put up banners advertising opposition Web sites, possibly
for fear of reprisals (although those fears were not made explicit). 21
Expanded use of defamation, slander, and ‘‘veracity’’ laws, to deter bloggers and independent media from posting material critical of the government or specific government officials, however benignly (including humor). In Belarus, slander laws were
used to prosecute an owner of a Web site posting cartoons of the president. In both
Belarus and Uzbekistan, the law on mass media requires that reporting passes the ‘‘objectivity test.’’ Journalists and editors are held responsible for the ‘‘veracity’’ of publications and postings, leading to a high degree of self-censorship. In Kazakhstan, there are
several cases of oppositional and independent media Web sites being suspended for
providing links to publications about corruption among senior state offices and the
president.
Evoking national security concerns, especially at times of civic unrest, as the justification
for blocking specific Internet content and services. Most recently, this justification was evoked in Armenia when the opposition demonstrations that followed the
February 2008 presidential elections turned to violence leading to the death and injury
of several dozen protesters. A 20-day state of emergency was declared by President
Kocharian, which also led to the de-registration of popular Armenian political and
news sites, including a site carrying the Armenian-language BBC service and the filtering of YouTube (ostensibly because of allegations that footage of the rioting had been
posted to the popular video sharing site). 22 Similar filtering occurred during the RussianGeorgian crisis of 2008 when Georgia ordered ISPs to block access to Russian media.
The blocks had the unintended consequence of creating panic in Tbilisi, as some Georgians perceived the blocks as a signal of impending Russian invasion of the capital.
The technical capabilities typical of second-generation controls are calibrated to
effect ‘‘just-in-time’’ or event-based denial of selected content or services. 23 These techniques can be difficult to verify, as they can be made to look like technical errors. One
of the more common techniques involves formal and informal requests to ISPs. Providers in the CIS are under constant pressure to comply with government requests or
face any number of possible sanctions if they do not, from visits from the taxation police to revocations of their licenses. Such pressures make them vulnerable to requests
from authorities, especially those that are conveyed informally. In Russia, top-level
ISPs are in the hands of large telecommunication companies, such as TransTeleKom and Rostelecom, with strong ties to the government. These providers appear
Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
25
Web sites or Web sites carrying material critical of the government are regularly deregistered from the national domain. This includes a large number of opposition sites
and, notably, the Borat Web site, ostensibly because the owners of the site were not resident in Kazakhstan as required by the Kazakh domain authority. In Belarus, the popular portal tut.by refused to put up banners advertising opposition Web sites, possibly
for fear of reprisals (although those fears were not made explicit). 21
Expanded use of defamation, slander, and ‘‘veracity’’ laws, to deter bloggers and independent media from posting material critical of the government or specific government officials, however benignly (including humor). In Belarus, slander laws were
used to prosecute an owner of a Web site posting cartoons of the president. In both
Belarus and Uzbekistan, the law on mass media requires that reporting passes the ‘‘objectivity test.’’ Journalists and editors are held responsible for the ‘‘veracity’’ of publications and postings, leading to a high degree of self-censorship. In Kazakhstan, there are
several cases of oppositional and independent media Web sites being suspended for
providing links to publications about corruption among senior state offices and the
president.
Evoking national security concerns, especially at times of civic unrest, as the justification
for blocking specific Internet content and services. Most recently, this justification was evoked in Armenia when the opposition demonstrations that followed the
February 2008 presidential elections turned to violence leading to the death and injury
of several dozen protesters. A 20-day state of emergency was declared by President
Kocharian, which also led to the de-registration of popular Armenian political and
news sites, including a site carrying the Armenian-language BBC service and the filtering of YouTube (ostensibly because of allegations that footage of the rioting had been
posted to the popular video sharing site). 22 Similar filtering occurred during the RussianGeorgian crisis of 2008 when Georgia ordered ISPs to block access to Russian media.
The blocks had the unintended consequence of creating panic in Tbilisi, as some Georgians perceived the blocks as a signal of impending Russian invasion of the capital.
The technical capabilities typical of second-generation controls are calibrated to
effect ‘‘just-in-time’’ or event-based denial of selected content or services. 23 These techniques can be difficult to verify, as they can be made to look like technical errors. One
of the more common techniques involves formal and informal requests to ISPs. Providers in the CIS are under constant pressure to comply with government requests or
face any number of possible sanctions if they do not, from visits from the taxation police to revocations of their licenses. Such pressures make them vulnerable to requests
from authorities, especially those that are conveyed informally. In Russia, top-level
ISPs are in the hands of large telecommunication companies, such as TransTeleKom and Rostelecom, with strong ties to the government. These providers appear
Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
25