responsive to informal requests to make certain content inaccessible, particularly when
information could prove embarrassing to the government or its officials. In one such
case, the popular Russian site—Kompromat.ru—known for publishing documents
and photographs of corrupt or illegal practices (roughly analogous to the Web
site wikileaks.com) was de-registered or filtered by several top-level ISPs (including
TransTeleKom and Rostelekom). Service was later restored, and the blocking of the
site was deemed ‘‘accidental.’’ Nonetheless, the Web site was inaccessible throughout
the February 2008 Russian presidential poll. 24 Similar incidents have been documented
in Azerbaijan, where Web sites critical of President Ilham Aliyev were filtered by ISPs,
apparently at the request of the security department of the office of the president. 25 A
similar dynamic is found in Kazakhstan, where a number of Web sites are inaccessible
on a regular basis, with no official reason ever being given. 26
Other, less subtle but nonetheless effective technical means include shutting down
Internet access, as well as selected telecommunications services such as cell phone services and especially short message services (SMS). Temporary outages of the Internet and
SMS services were employed by Belarus authorities during the February 2006 presidential elections as a means to limit the ability of the opposition to launch street demonstrations of the type that precipitated the color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia,
and Kyrgyzstan. At first, authorities denied that any interruptions had taken place,
and later they attributed the failures to technical reasons. 27 Similar instances
were reported (although not verified) to have occurred during the 2007 elections in
Azerbaijan.
Second-generation techniques also make extensive use of computer network attacks,
especially the use of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which can overwhelm
ISPs and selected sites, and which make tracking down perpetrators difficult, since the
attacks themselves are sold and engineered by ‘‘black hat hackers’’ and can be ordered
by anyone. Such attacks were used extensively during the 2005 Kyrgyz presidential
elections that precipitated the Tulip revolution. 28 They were also used during the
2006 Belarus elections against opposition political and news sites. In 2008, presidential
and parliamentary elections in many parts of the region saw the significant use of
DDoS attacks against the Web sites of major opposition leaders as well as prominent
human rights groups. Recently, computer network attacks have been conducted by
state-sanctioned ‘‘patriotic hackers’’ who act as vigilantes in cyberspace. A Russian
hacker who admitted that officers from the FSB encouraged him brought down the
pro-Chechen Web site ‘‘Kavkaz center’’ repeatedly. 29 There is strong suspicion that
the May 2007 DDoS attacks that brought down most of Estonia’s networks were the
work of state-sanctioned ‘‘patriotic hackers’’ responding to unofficial calls from the FSB
to ‘‘punish’’ Estonia over the removal of a monument to Soviet soldiers in Tallinn.
Such attacks were also a prominent feature of the Russian-Georgian crisis of 2008.
Several prominent investigations have been undertaken to determine attribution
26
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
information could prove embarrassing to the government or its officials. In one such
case, the popular Russian site—Kompromat.ru—known for publishing documents
and photographs of corrupt or illegal practices (roughly analogous to the Web
site wikileaks.com) was de-registered or filtered by several top-level ISPs (including
TransTeleKom and Rostelekom). Service was later restored, and the blocking of the
site was deemed ‘‘accidental.’’ Nonetheless, the Web site was inaccessible throughout
the February 2008 Russian presidential poll. 24 Similar incidents have been documented
in Azerbaijan, where Web sites critical of President Ilham Aliyev were filtered by ISPs,
apparently at the request of the security department of the office of the president. 25 A
similar dynamic is found in Kazakhstan, where a number of Web sites are inaccessible
on a regular basis, with no official reason ever being given. 26
Other, less subtle but nonetheless effective technical means include shutting down
Internet access, as well as selected telecommunications services such as cell phone services and especially short message services (SMS). Temporary outages of the Internet and
SMS services were employed by Belarus authorities during the February 2006 presidential elections as a means to limit the ability of the opposition to launch street demonstrations of the type that precipitated the color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia,
and Kyrgyzstan. At first, authorities denied that any interruptions had taken place,
and later they attributed the failures to technical reasons. 27 Similar instances
were reported (although not verified) to have occurred during the 2007 elections in
Azerbaijan.
Second-generation techniques also make extensive use of computer network attacks,
especially the use of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which can overwhelm
ISPs and selected sites, and which make tracking down perpetrators difficult, since the
attacks themselves are sold and engineered by ‘‘black hat hackers’’ and can be ordered
by anyone. Such attacks were used extensively during the 2005 Kyrgyz presidential
elections that precipitated the Tulip revolution. 28 They were also used during the
2006 Belarus elections against opposition political and news sites. In 2008, presidential
and parliamentary elections in many parts of the region saw the significant use of
DDoS attacks against the Web sites of major opposition leaders as well as prominent
human rights groups. Recently, computer network attacks have been conducted by
state-sanctioned ‘‘patriotic hackers’’ who act as vigilantes in cyberspace. A Russian
hacker who admitted that officers from the FSB encouraged him brought down the
pro-Chechen Web site ‘‘Kavkaz center’’ repeatedly. 29 There is strong suspicion that
the May 2007 DDoS attacks that brought down most of Estonia’s networks were the
work of state-sanctioned ‘‘patriotic hackers’’ responding to unofficial calls from the FSB
to ‘‘punish’’ Estonia over the removal of a monument to Soviet soldiers in Tallinn.
Such attacks were also a prominent feature of the Russian-Georgian crisis of 2008.
Several prominent investigations have been undertaken to determine attribution
26
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski