A second practice associated with first-generation blocking is policing and surveillance of Internet cafe ´s. In Uzbekistan, SNB officers monitor Internet cafe ´s, often enlisting cafe ´ owners to notify them of individual users who try to access ‘‘banned’’ sites.
Many Uzbek Internet cafe ´s now openly post notices that viewing illegal sites is subject
to fine and arrest. On several occasions, ONI researchers have manually verified the
surveillance.
Second-Generation Controls
Second-generation controls aim to create a legal and normative environment and
technical capabilities that enable state actors to deny access to information resources
as and when needed, while reducing the possibility of blowback or discovery. Secondgeneration controls have an overt and a covert track. The overt track aims to legalize
content controls by specifying the conditions under which access can be denied.
Instruments here include the doctrine of information security as well as the application of existent laws, such as slander and defamation, to the online environment. The
covert track establishes procedures and technical capabilities that allow content controls to be applied ‘‘just in time,’’ when the information being targeted has the highest
value (e.g., during elections or public demonstrations), and to be applied in ways that
assure plausible deniability.
The legal mechanisms used by the overt track vary from country to country, but
most share the characteristic of establishing double jeopardy for RUNET users, making
requirements such that compliance sets the grounds for prosecution, and noncompliance establishes a legal basis for sanction.
The following are among the more common legal mechanisms being applied:
Compelling Internet sites to register with authorities and to use noncompliance as
grounds for taking down or filtering ‘‘illegal’’ content, and possibly revoking service
providers’ licenses. This tack is effectively used in Kazakhstan and Belarus, and it is
currently being considered in Russia. The mechanism is particularly effective because
it creates multiple disincentives for potential Web site owners who must go through
the hassle of registering with authorities, which leaves them open to legal sanction
should their site be deemed to be carrying illegal content. It also creates double jeopardy for international content providers (such as the BBC, CNN, and others) and opens
the question whether they should register their services locally. In practice, the registration requirement applies to them so long as their audience is local, and a failure to
comply leaves open the option to filter their content for ‘‘noncompliance’’ with local
registration requirements. On the other hand, registering would make the content they
carry subject to local laws, which may deem their content ‘‘unacceptable’’ or ‘‘slanderous’’ and could lead to legally sanctioned filtering.
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Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
Many Uzbek Internet cafe ´s now openly post notices that viewing illegal sites is subject
to fine and arrest. On several occasions, ONI researchers have manually verified the
surveillance.
Second-Generation Controls
Second-generation controls aim to create a legal and normative environment and
technical capabilities that enable state actors to deny access to information resources
as and when needed, while reducing the possibility of blowback or discovery. Secondgeneration controls have an overt and a covert track. The overt track aims to legalize
content controls by specifying the conditions under which access can be denied.
Instruments here include the doctrine of information security as well as the application of existent laws, such as slander and defamation, to the online environment. The
covert track establishes procedures and technical capabilities that allow content controls to be applied ‘‘just in time,’’ when the information being targeted has the highest
value (e.g., during elections or public demonstrations), and to be applied in ways that
assure plausible deniability.
The legal mechanisms used by the overt track vary from country to country, but
most share the characteristic of establishing double jeopardy for RUNET users, making
requirements such that compliance sets the grounds for prosecution, and noncompliance establishes a legal basis for sanction.
The following are among the more common legal mechanisms being applied:
Compelling Internet sites to register with authorities and to use noncompliance as
grounds for taking down or filtering ‘‘illegal’’ content, and possibly revoking service
providers’ licenses. This tack is effectively used in Kazakhstan and Belarus, and it is
currently being considered in Russia. The mechanism is particularly effective because
it creates multiple disincentives for potential Web site owners who must go through
the hassle of registering with authorities, which leaves them open to legal sanction
should their site be deemed to be carrying illegal content. It also creates double jeopardy for international content providers (such as the BBC, CNN, and others) and opens
the question whether they should register their services locally. In practice, the registration requirement applies to them so long as their audience is local, and a failure to
comply leaves open the option to filter their content for ‘‘noncompliance’’ with local
registration requirements. On the other hand, registering would make the content they
carry subject to local laws, which may deem their content ‘‘unacceptable’’ or ‘‘slanderous’’ and could lead to legally sanctioned filtering.
24
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski