Table 2.4
SPECTRUM OF CYBERSPACE CONTENT CONTROLS IN THE CIS
First Generation
Second Generation
Third Generation
Internet
Filtering
Policing
Cybercafe ´s
Legal
Environment for
Information
Control
1
Informal
Removal
Requests
Technical
Shutdowns
Computer
Network
Attack
Warrantless
Surveillance
National
Cyberzones
StateSponsored
Information
Campaigns
Direct
Action
Armenia
2
Azerbaijan
2
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
3
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Russia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
1. Legal and Normative Environment for Information Control includes the following:
a. Compelling Internet sites to register with authorities and using noncompliance as grounds for filtering ‘‘illegal’’ content.
b. Strict criteria pertaining to what is ‘‘acceptable’’ within the national media space, leading to the de-registration of sites that do not comply.
c. Expanded use of defamation, slander, and ‘‘veracity’’ laws to deter bloggers and independent media from posting material critical of the government or specific government officials.
d. Evoking national security concerns, especially at times of civic unrest, as the justification for blocking specific Internet content and services.
e. Legal regime for Internet surveillance.
2. CNA has been used by both Azeri and Armenian hackers in an ongoing series of attacks. It is unclear whether these are the actions of individual
hackers, or whether these groups receive tacit or direct support from the state. Attacks are directed against the Web sites of the opposing country,
so are not a content control mechanism.
3. The DDoS attacks were outsourced to commercial ‘‘black hat’’ hackers in Ukraine. The party ordering attacks is unknown, but suspicion falls on
rogue elements inside the security services.
Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
23
SPECTRUM OF CYBERSPACE CONTENT CONTROLS IN THE CIS
First Generation
Second Generation
Third Generation
Internet
Filtering
Policing
Cybercafe ´s
Legal
Environment for
Information
Control
1
Informal
Removal
Requests
Technical
Shutdowns
Computer
Network
Attack
Warrantless
Surveillance
National
Cyberzones
StateSponsored
Information
Campaigns
Direct
Action
Armenia
2
Azerbaijan
2
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
3
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Russia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
1. Legal and Normative Environment for Information Control includes the following:
a. Compelling Internet sites to register with authorities and using noncompliance as grounds for filtering ‘‘illegal’’ content.
b. Strict criteria pertaining to what is ‘‘acceptable’’ within the national media space, leading to the de-registration of sites that do not comply.
c. Expanded use of defamation, slander, and ‘‘veracity’’ laws to deter bloggers and independent media from posting material critical of the government or specific government officials.
d. Evoking national security concerns, especially at times of civic unrest, as the justification for blocking specific Internet content and services.
e. Legal regime for Internet surveillance.
2. CNA has been used by both Azeri and Armenian hackers in an ongoing series of attacks. It is unclear whether these are the actions of individual
hackers, or whether these groups receive tacit or direct support from the state. Attacks are directed against the Web sites of the opposing country,
so are not a content control mechanism.
3. The DDoS attacks were outsourced to commercial ‘‘black hat’’ hackers in Ukraine. The party ordering attacks is unknown, but suspicion falls on
rogue elements inside the security services.
Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace
23