Conclusion
The CIS region is experiencing a general trend toward greater regulation and control
of the national information space, which includes the Internet. Although most CIS
countries do not practice substantive or pervasive filtering—with the exception of
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—Internet content control through regulation or intimidation is growing throughout the region. Countries deny allegations that filtering
based on ‘‘official’’ requests is taking place. Governments are becoming more creative
in designing new ways to influence the content posted online and to shape the information environment. At times, filtering is justified by national interests or by other
broad notions like ‘‘public morals’’ that answer the needs of the ruling elite and submit
the rest to self-censorship.
Moreover, the laws are often unevenly applied, with ‘‘flexible’’ implementation
often paired with other more subtle (but effective) measures designed to promote selfrestraint (or self-censorship) of both ISPs and content producers. Information control
—in particular the protection of national informational space—is clearly an issue of
concern throughout the CIS, and it has encouraged more stringent attention to telecommunications surveillance. In addition, measures to deny access to Internet content
at sensitive times, flagged as ‘‘event-based filtering,’’ to limit access to content geographically through ‘‘upstream filtering,’’ or to influence accessed information in a
neighboring country because of international control of the Internet traffic routes are
indicative of a new seriousness with which strategies for information control are being
developed. The CIS region is leading the world in the evolution of second- and thirdgeneration information controls. The trend toward new authoritarianism, combined
with shifts in regional power relations that include a relative decline in U.S. influence
and Chinese ascendancy, suggests a tendency toward greater control. These are unlikely to manifest themselves in Internet filtering as overt censorship, but rather will
take the form of attempts to shape the information space creating a growing climate
of self-censorship. The success (or lack thereof) of this approach is likely to shape
policy choices well beyond the CIS region.
Notes
1. The OpenNet Initiative did not conduct formal testing or monitoring during the 2008 Russian
parliamentary elections or the 2009 presidential elections. However, persistent allegations of
denial of service attacks being used against opposition Web sites, and the mobilization of progovernment hacktivism by pro-government groups such as Nashi, were widely reported in the
press. These tactics are consistent with those observed and documented by the ONI in Kyrgyzstan
and Belarus.
2. Internet users in the CIS are predominantly young, aged between 15 and 25. Around 55 percent of all users in Azerbaijan belong to this age group, compared with 60 percent in Kyrgyzstan
CIS Overview
133
The CIS region is experiencing a general trend toward greater regulation and control
of the national information space, which includes the Internet. Although most CIS
countries do not practice substantive or pervasive filtering—with the exception of
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—Internet content control through regulation or intimidation is growing throughout the region. Countries deny allegations that filtering
based on ‘‘official’’ requests is taking place. Governments are becoming more creative
in designing new ways to influence the content posted online and to shape the information environment. At times, filtering is justified by national interests or by other
broad notions like ‘‘public morals’’ that answer the needs of the ruling elite and submit
the rest to self-censorship.
Moreover, the laws are often unevenly applied, with ‘‘flexible’’ implementation
often paired with other more subtle (but effective) measures designed to promote selfrestraint (or self-censorship) of both ISPs and content producers. Information control
—in particular the protection of national informational space—is clearly an issue of
concern throughout the CIS, and it has encouraged more stringent attention to telecommunications surveillance. In addition, measures to deny access to Internet content
at sensitive times, flagged as ‘‘event-based filtering,’’ to limit access to content geographically through ‘‘upstream filtering,’’ or to influence accessed information in a
neighboring country because of international control of the Internet traffic routes are
indicative of a new seriousness with which strategies for information control are being
developed. The CIS region is leading the world in the evolution of second- and thirdgeneration information controls. The trend toward new authoritarianism, combined
with shifts in regional power relations that include a relative decline in U.S. influence
and Chinese ascendancy, suggests a tendency toward greater control. These are unlikely to manifest themselves in Internet filtering as overt censorship, but rather will
take the form of attempts to shape the information space creating a growing climate
of self-censorship. The success (or lack thereof) of this approach is likely to shape
policy choices well beyond the CIS region.
Notes
1. The OpenNet Initiative did not conduct formal testing or monitoring during the 2008 Russian
parliamentary elections or the 2009 presidential elections. However, persistent allegations of
denial of service attacks being used against opposition Web sites, and the mobilization of progovernment hacktivism by pro-government groups such as Nashi, were widely reported in the
press. These tactics are consistent with those observed and documented by the ONI in Kyrgyzstan
and Belarus.
2. Internet users in the CIS are predominantly young, aged between 15 and 25. Around 55 percent of all users in Azerbaijan belong to this age group, compared with 60 percent in Kyrgyzstan
CIS Overview
133