unprecedented for other industrialized countries. There are multiple players on the
Internet market, but few of these are the major ISPs that provide international traffic
to the groups of small regional providers. Interestingly, most of the big telecommunication operators (if not all) are owned or controlled by the large state company
Svyazinvest. Control in Russia is not easily detectable but permeates the ownership
and control structure of the operators. The Russian Internet (including operators
and popular blog servers) remains a playground of interests for the state and progovernment oligarchs.
Upstream Filtering
For its size, the CIS region has a relatively underdeveloped telecommunications system, much of which remains centered on Russia. At the same time, the region itself is
contiguous with (or borders) Europe, Asia, and—via the circumpolar route—North
America. This centrality means that most countries in the region obtain connectivity
from several different sources beyond Russia. This situation has created some interesting patterns in filtering behavior, such as similar content becoming inaccessible across
several different countries, but with different filtering patterns among content providers within any single country.
Some of the CIS countries are buying connectivity from European and Asian operators. An interesting phenomenon that ONI confirmed is that private operators sometimes effectively influence online behavior of foreign operators. For example, in 2008,
YouTube was not accessible in Georgia for a few days because the main ISP in the
country was buying international traffic from TurkTelecom. The Turkish operator,
however, often executes bans against the multimedia site in the implementation of
the controversial Internet law. 28 Since the local ISP provides Internet service to more
than 85 percent of the users, this block rendered YouTube inaccessible to the majority
of Georgians.
Judging by common indicators appearing in almost all CIS countries, ONI research
suggests that providers reselling connectivity to CIS countries may be providing prefiltered access, passing on filtered content either as part of their service offering or as a
consequence of the policies they use to manage traffic on their own networks. This
form of blocking, which we have dubbed ‘‘upstream’’ filtering (indicating that the filtering is happening in a jurisdiction other than that of the state in question), was first
observed during ONI testing in Uzbekistan in 2004. At that time, the traffic of one
Uzbek ISP was clearly filtered using a pattern similar to that employed by Chinese
ISPs. Further investigation revealed that the Uzbek ISP was buying connectivity from
China Telecom, which in this case may have sold access to its network as it would to
a regular Chinese client. Testing conducted by the ONI in 2006, 2007, and 2008 reveals
similar patterns of prepackaged filtering affecting Internet services within several other
CIS states where ISPs had purchased their connectivity from a Russian provider.
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CIS Overview
Internet market, but few of these are the major ISPs that provide international traffic
to the groups of small regional providers. Interestingly, most of the big telecommunication operators (if not all) are owned or controlled by the large state company
Svyazinvest. Control in Russia is not easily detectable but permeates the ownership
and control structure of the operators. The Russian Internet (including operators
and popular blog servers) remains a playground of interests for the state and progovernment oligarchs.
Upstream Filtering
For its size, the CIS region has a relatively underdeveloped telecommunications system, much of which remains centered on Russia. At the same time, the region itself is
contiguous with (or borders) Europe, Asia, and—via the circumpolar route—North
America. This centrality means that most countries in the region obtain connectivity
from several different sources beyond Russia. This situation has created some interesting patterns in filtering behavior, such as similar content becoming inaccessible across
several different countries, but with different filtering patterns among content providers within any single country.
Some of the CIS countries are buying connectivity from European and Asian operators. An interesting phenomenon that ONI confirmed is that private operators sometimes effectively influence online behavior of foreign operators. For example, in 2008,
YouTube was not accessible in Georgia for a few days because the main ISP in the
country was buying international traffic from TurkTelecom. The Turkish operator,
however, often executes bans against the multimedia site in the implementation of
the controversial Internet law. 28 Since the local ISP provides Internet service to more
than 85 percent of the users, this block rendered YouTube inaccessible to the majority
of Georgians.
Judging by common indicators appearing in almost all CIS countries, ONI research
suggests that providers reselling connectivity to CIS countries may be providing prefiltered access, passing on filtered content either as part of their service offering or as a
consequence of the policies they use to manage traffic on their own networks. This
form of blocking, which we have dubbed ‘‘upstream’’ filtering (indicating that the filtering is happening in a jurisdiction other than that of the state in question), was first
observed during ONI testing in Uzbekistan in 2004. At that time, the traffic of one
Uzbek ISP was clearly filtered using a pattern similar to that employed by Chinese
ISPs. Further investigation revealed that the Uzbek ISP was buying connectivity from
China Telecom, which in this case may have sold access to its network as it would to
a regular Chinese client. Testing conducted by the ONI in 2006, 2007, and 2008 reveals
similar patterns of prepackaged filtering affecting Internet services within several other
CIS states where ISPs had purchased their connectivity from a Russian provider.
132
CIS Overview