policies of Internet cafe ´s throughout the region, the decision to limit content is formally controlled by the cafe ´ owners, so it is difficult to argue whether their filtering
results from a fear of sanction for allowing politically sensitive material to be accessed
or from personal choice. Certainly, for most Internet cafe ´ owners, the objective is to
make a living, not to defy state policy. In Russia, self-censorship is sometimes perceived
as a citizen’s responsibility. In Tajikistan, however, research suggests that filtering is
based on economic factors rather than fear of persecution from the security forces.
Emerging Second- and Third-Generation Controls in the CIS
Overt Internet filtering, such as that undertaken by China or Iran, is unlikely to occur
in the CIS for several reasons. First, only in a very few cases (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan)
is the government disposed to effect an informational blockade of the country that
could, in turn, jeopardize economic prospects and stifle the ‘‘scientific potential’’ of
these technologies. Second, as noted earlier, governments generally have more subtle
legal and quasi-legal methods for putting pressure on content and access providers to
remove or otherwise eliminate ‘‘undesirable’’ content, so there is little need to resort
to overt technical means such as filtering. Third, many CIS states are dependent on
development aid and trade, and have oriented themselves toward integration with the
global economy and are actively seeking to lower barriers on trade. Engaging in widespread filtering of the kind conducted by China or Iran would present the risk of being
labeled as an ‘‘international human rights pariah,’’ an eventuality that most CIS countries would rather avoid. Fourth, and perhaps most important, CIS states that are
concerned about the Internet’s empowering potential—that is, its potential to make
possible further ‘‘color revolutions’’—have found more subtle technical means for
ensuring that these capacities are curtailed, if and when necessary.
Telecoms and ISP Market Players Until recently, almost all CIS governments preserved the monopoly right of the state telecommunication provider over international
traffic. Under the pressure of international organizations (such as the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization), some CIS countries are abolishing the exclusivity provision over international
traffic (Armenia). However, the need to demonopolize the service continues to be a significant problem in the rest (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). Since the traffic
of all ISPs has to go through the state incumbent’s channels, filtering can be achieved
easily, without outside control, while using centralized resources. The ISPs may unknowingly receive filtered content because the main operator could install filters on
any information that it deems inappropriate.
Russia, for example, does not require that the ISPs buy international traffic
from a major state provider. Nonetheless, Russia has introduced other practices
CIS Overview
131
results from a fear of sanction for allowing politically sensitive material to be accessed
or from personal choice. Certainly, for most Internet cafe ´ owners, the objective is to
make a living, not to defy state policy. In Russia, self-censorship is sometimes perceived
as a citizen’s responsibility. In Tajikistan, however, research suggests that filtering is
based on economic factors rather than fear of persecution from the security forces.
Emerging Second- and Third-Generation Controls in the CIS
Overt Internet filtering, such as that undertaken by China or Iran, is unlikely to occur
in the CIS for several reasons. First, only in a very few cases (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan)
is the government disposed to effect an informational blockade of the country that
could, in turn, jeopardize economic prospects and stifle the ‘‘scientific potential’’ of
these technologies. Second, as noted earlier, governments generally have more subtle
legal and quasi-legal methods for putting pressure on content and access providers to
remove or otherwise eliminate ‘‘undesirable’’ content, so there is little need to resort
to overt technical means such as filtering. Third, many CIS states are dependent on
development aid and trade, and have oriented themselves toward integration with the
global economy and are actively seeking to lower barriers on trade. Engaging in widespread filtering of the kind conducted by China or Iran would present the risk of being
labeled as an ‘‘international human rights pariah,’’ an eventuality that most CIS countries would rather avoid. Fourth, and perhaps most important, CIS states that are
concerned about the Internet’s empowering potential—that is, its potential to make
possible further ‘‘color revolutions’’—have found more subtle technical means for
ensuring that these capacities are curtailed, if and when necessary.
Telecoms and ISP Market Players Until recently, almost all CIS governments preserved the monopoly right of the state telecommunication provider over international
traffic. Under the pressure of international organizations (such as the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization), some CIS countries are abolishing the exclusivity provision over international
traffic (Armenia). However, the need to demonopolize the service continues to be a significant problem in the rest (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan). Since the traffic
of all ISPs has to go through the state incumbent’s channels, filtering can be achieved
easily, without outside control, while using centralized resources. The ISPs may unknowingly receive filtered content because the main operator could install filters on
any information that it deems inappropriate.
Russia, for example, does not require that the ISPs buy international traffic
from a major state provider. Nonetheless, Russia has introduced other practices
CIS Overview
131