vacuum in Georgia during crucial moments of the conflict, particularly as Russian
troops crossed the Ossetian border and moved in the direction of the Georgian capital.
While the Russian government denied responsibility for the cyber campaign, it did
little to stop these activities, even though most of the attacks originated from crowdsourcing on Russian Web sites and chat rooms. 26 In many respects, the cyber campaign
against Georgia resembled a scaled-up version of techniques previously used against
opposition Web sites and independent media during elections in the CIS, and the earlier cyber attack against Estonia.
The emergence of cross-border hacktivist activities, however, is not a new phenomenon within the CIS. Similar attacks—albeit on a much smaller scale—have taken place
between Armenia and Azerbaijan for more than a decade, where the moribund conflict
over the region of Nagorno Karabakh continues in cyberspace.
Administrative Mechanisms to Shut Down Access to the Internet
Legal Deregistration of Domain Names and Web Sites Authorities often resort to various quasi-legal or ‘‘administrative’’ mechanisms to suppress ‘‘inappropriate’’ information or shut down oppositional domain names (e.g., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). In
Armenia, the president created an unprecedented media and Internet blackout after
announcing a state of emergency following public protests. Based on the president’s
instructions, the registrar of the top-level country domain suspended a number of independent media and opposition Web sites.
Pro-government and patriotic social activism has become a feature of politics in
several CIS countries. In Russia, the pro-government Nashi youth movement ran an
aggressive campaign in cyberspace in support of the government during the 2008 parliamentary and 2009 presidential elections. 27 The volume of blogs, online newspapers,
and even posts to opposition and independent media sites overwhelmed and overmatched critical posts or articles, and has proven a more successful mechanism for
silencing the opposition than resorting to Internet filtering or other more heavy
handed repressive measures.
Self-Censorship The constitutions of the CIS countries prohibit censorship. Nonetheless, the net effect of the various sanctions (legal, administrative, technological) is
creating a general climate of self-censorship among ISPs in many CIS states, which are
fearful of jeopardizing their licenses, and among individuals for whom prosecution or
imprisonment is too high a price to pay for voicing criticism. Often, self-censorship is
aided by opaque state practices. Many CIS countries deny that they filter the Internet
or resort to extralegal methods. In Azerbaijan, for example, the author of Web sites critical of the government was detained on a number of occasions (on no legal grounds)
without any follow-up or prosecution. In other cases, such as the pervasive filtering
130
CIS Overview
troops crossed the Ossetian border and moved in the direction of the Georgian capital.
While the Russian government denied responsibility for the cyber campaign, it did
little to stop these activities, even though most of the attacks originated from crowdsourcing on Russian Web sites and chat rooms. 26 In many respects, the cyber campaign
against Georgia resembled a scaled-up version of techniques previously used against
opposition Web sites and independent media during elections in the CIS, and the earlier cyber attack against Estonia.
The emergence of cross-border hacktivist activities, however, is not a new phenomenon within the CIS. Similar attacks—albeit on a much smaller scale—have taken place
between Armenia and Azerbaijan for more than a decade, where the moribund conflict
over the region of Nagorno Karabakh continues in cyberspace.
Administrative Mechanisms to Shut Down Access to the Internet
Legal Deregistration of Domain Names and Web Sites Authorities often resort to various quasi-legal or ‘‘administrative’’ mechanisms to suppress ‘‘inappropriate’’ information or shut down oppositional domain names (e.g., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). In
Armenia, the president created an unprecedented media and Internet blackout after
announcing a state of emergency following public protests. Based on the president’s
instructions, the registrar of the top-level country domain suspended a number of independent media and opposition Web sites.
Pro-government and patriotic social activism has become a feature of politics in
several CIS countries. In Russia, the pro-government Nashi youth movement ran an
aggressive campaign in cyberspace in support of the government during the 2008 parliamentary and 2009 presidential elections. 27 The volume of blogs, online newspapers,
and even posts to opposition and independent media sites overwhelmed and overmatched critical posts or articles, and has proven a more successful mechanism for
silencing the opposition than resorting to Internet filtering or other more heavy
handed repressive measures.
Self-Censorship The constitutions of the CIS countries prohibit censorship. Nonetheless, the net effect of the various sanctions (legal, administrative, technological) is
creating a general climate of self-censorship among ISPs in many CIS states, which are
fearful of jeopardizing their licenses, and among individuals for whom prosecution or
imprisonment is too high a price to pay for voicing criticism. Often, self-censorship is
aided by opaque state practices. Many CIS countries deny that they filter the Internet
or resort to extralegal methods. In Azerbaijan, for example, the author of Web sites critical of the government was detained on a number of occasions (on no legal grounds)
without any follow-up or prosecution. In other cases, such as the pervasive filtering
130
CIS Overview