ONI Country Profi le
379
While both ISPs similarly implemented fi ltering, ONI found that fi ltering was
inconsistent between them, and that the overall level of fi ltering on TOTNET was
greater than that of TRUE in all categories where fi ltering was found. For instance,
TOTNET blocked circumvention tools and anonymous proxy sites (e.g., http://proxify
.com , http://anonymouse.com ) and the online gambling Web site http://gamebookers
.net , whereas TRUE did not. Testing results also show that the blocking of pornography
remains inconsistent and observed a slight increase in the number of English-language
pornography sites blocked. No Thai-related pornography sites were found blocked.
The site http://sex.com was the only pornographic content from 2007 that continues
to be blocked.
These overall results are consistent with fi ndings from 2007 testing and show that
fi ltering continues to be inconsistently practiced in Thailand and that government
block lists are not uniformly implemented across ISPs.
Conclusion
As a result of highly volatile conditions and the politicization of online communication, Internet control in Thailand in the post-2006-coup period features a combination
of approaches — technical, legal, and social. Conventional ISP-level fi ltering, based on
state-mandated block lists, has been complemented by automatic URL fi ltering at the
IIG level as well as fi ltering at other points in the network, particularly at the OSP
level. Due to the enforcement of the new cybercrime law, which imposes severe intermediary liability, OSPs have emerged as important chokers for censorship, since they
host social networking services, blogs, and online political forums — all of which constitute the much-needed public sphere in the climate of otherwise suppressed speech.
Apart from fi ltering out problematic content and denying hosting space to politically
risky content providers, OSPs also construct an identifi cation clearance system to
enable surveillance of users and potential rule breakers.
In addition to the new Cybercrime Law, which legalizes Internet blocking through
court orders and helps enforce other fi ltering mechanisms, two other laws contribute
directly to the new regime of Internet control: the State of Emergency Decree and
l è se-majest é laws. While the former made censorship seem inevitable in the face of
crisis, the latter, as an entrenched social norm, helped justify it. What is more alarming is how members of online communities engaged in cyber witch-hunting using
l è se-majest é as a powerful rationale to publicly condemn and reprimand those who
represent dissenting opinions.
Such controlling schemes have not only created a chilling effect in cyberspace as
users and service providers resort to self-censorship and intermediary censorship,
but have also given rise to struggles and resistance. More technologically capable
379
While both ISPs similarly implemented fi ltering, ONI found that fi ltering was
inconsistent between them, and that the overall level of fi ltering on TOTNET was
greater than that of TRUE in all categories where fi ltering was found. For instance,
TOTNET blocked circumvention tools and anonymous proxy sites (e.g., http://proxify
.com , http://anonymouse.com ) and the online gambling Web site http://gamebookers
.net , whereas TRUE did not. Testing results also show that the blocking of pornography
remains inconsistent and observed a slight increase in the number of English-language
pornography sites blocked. No Thai-related pornography sites were found blocked.
The site http://sex.com was the only pornographic content from 2007 that continues
to be blocked.
These overall results are consistent with fi ndings from 2007 testing and show that
fi ltering continues to be inconsistently practiced in Thailand and that government
block lists are not uniformly implemented across ISPs.
Conclusion
As a result of highly volatile conditions and the politicization of online communication, Internet control in Thailand in the post-2006-coup period features a combination
of approaches — technical, legal, and social. Conventional ISP-level fi ltering, based on
state-mandated block lists, has been complemented by automatic URL fi ltering at the
IIG level as well as fi ltering at other points in the network, particularly at the OSP
level. Due to the enforcement of the new cybercrime law, which imposes severe intermediary liability, OSPs have emerged as important chokers for censorship, since they
host social networking services, blogs, and online political forums — all of which constitute the much-needed public sphere in the climate of otherwise suppressed speech.
Apart from fi ltering out problematic content and denying hosting space to politically
risky content providers, OSPs also construct an identifi cation clearance system to
enable surveillance of users and potential rule breakers.
In addition to the new Cybercrime Law, which legalizes Internet blocking through
court orders and helps enforce other fi ltering mechanisms, two other laws contribute
directly to the new regime of Internet control: the State of Emergency Decree and
l è se-majest é laws. While the former made censorship seem inevitable in the face of
crisis, the latter, as an entrenched social norm, helped justify it. What is more alarming is how members of online communities engaged in cyber witch-hunting using
l è se-majest é as a powerful rationale to publicly condemn and reprimand those who
represent dissenting opinions.
Such controlling schemes have not only created a chilling effect in cyberspace as
users and service providers resort to self-censorship and intermediary censorship,
but have also given rise to struggles and resistance. More technologically capable