378
Thailand
challenges — for instance, the unintended consequences of posting sensitive personal
information and confusion over privacy settings. While Thailand ranks in the top 20
fastest-growing user countries for Facebook, little awareness has been raised about the
privacy implications of these popular applications.
There is a dearth of advocacy work in Thai civil society when it comes to privacy.
Local NGOs working in the areas of information and communication are mainly
focused on freedom of expression, freedom of information, consumer protection,
intellectual property, and access rights. However, there is no identifi able civic entity
whose main focus is privacy. The last time a privacy issue emerged at a public level,
it was advocated by a consumer-protection NGO that viewed the mass texting of
greeting messages from the then-incoming Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to all
mobile phone users as a violation of privacy.
50
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative conducted testing between April and May 2010 following Thailand ’ s State of Emergency Decree invoked on April 8, 2010. Testing was conducted on
two major Thai ISPs: TRUE and TOTNET. Results indicate that these ISPs primarily
block content related to political opposition sites, pornography, gambling, and circumvention tools. A central focus of this blocking is on political content related to
the red shirts and Thai-language content.
Testing by ONI on the 36 Web sites ordered blocked determined that neither TRUE
nor TOTNET fi ltered the entirety of the Thai government ’ s block list. TOTNET blocked
only ten URLs from the list, and TOTNET fi ltered this same set and an additional 13
for a total of 23 URLs. The sites found blocked included pro – red shirt Web sites ( http://
thaipeoplevoice.org , http://sunshine.redthai.org , and http://xat.com/uddtoday ) and
news sites that provided updates on the unrest ( http://prachatai.com and http://
thaipeoplevoice.org ). Pages on social media Web sites used by the red shirts to disseminate messages and organize demonstrations were also blocked on both ISPs,
including the presence of the United Front for Democracy and Dictatorship on
Twitter ( http://twitter.com/uddtoday ), Facebook ( http://facebook.com/note.php?note
_id=344691628328 ), and Ning ( http://uddtoday.ning.com ). Web sites belonging to the
anticoup site ( http://19sep.com ) and the Patani United Liberation Organization
( http://puloinfo.net ) that were blocked in 2007 were found accessible in 2010 testing.
Technical analysis of the data from TRUE and TOTNET found that fi ltering was
implemented similarly by both ISPs. Consistent with past ONI fi ndings, when users
on TRUE and TOTNET attempt to access blocked content they are redirected to an
MICT block page. TRUE ’ s block page notifi ed users that the content was blocked by
order of the emergency decree, whereas TOTNET ’ s block page did not.
Thailand
challenges — for instance, the unintended consequences of posting sensitive personal
information and confusion over privacy settings. While Thailand ranks in the top 20
fastest-growing user countries for Facebook, little awareness has been raised about the
privacy implications of these popular applications.
There is a dearth of advocacy work in Thai civil society when it comes to privacy.
Local NGOs working in the areas of information and communication are mainly
focused on freedom of expression, freedom of information, consumer protection,
intellectual property, and access rights. However, there is no identifi able civic entity
whose main focus is privacy. The last time a privacy issue emerged at a public level,
it was advocated by a consumer-protection NGO that viewed the mass texting of
greeting messages from the then-incoming Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to all
mobile phone users as a violation of privacy.
50
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative conducted testing between April and May 2010 following Thailand ’ s State of Emergency Decree invoked on April 8, 2010. Testing was conducted on
two major Thai ISPs: TRUE and TOTNET. Results indicate that these ISPs primarily
block content related to political opposition sites, pornography, gambling, and circumvention tools. A central focus of this blocking is on political content related to
the red shirts and Thai-language content.
Testing by ONI on the 36 Web sites ordered blocked determined that neither TRUE
nor TOTNET fi ltered the entirety of the Thai government ’ s block list. TOTNET blocked
only ten URLs from the list, and TOTNET fi ltered this same set and an additional 13
for a total of 23 URLs. The sites found blocked included pro – red shirt Web sites ( http://
thaipeoplevoice.org , http://sunshine.redthai.org , and http://xat.com/uddtoday ) and
news sites that provided updates on the unrest ( http://prachatai.com and http://
thaipeoplevoice.org ). Pages on social media Web sites used by the red shirts to disseminate messages and organize demonstrations were also blocked on both ISPs,
including the presence of the United Front for Democracy and Dictatorship on
Twitter ( http://twitter.com/uddtoday ), Facebook ( http://facebook.com/note.php?note
_id=344691628328 ), and Ning ( http://uddtoday.ning.com ). Web sites belonging to the
anticoup site ( http://19sep.com ) and the Patani United Liberation Organization
( http://puloinfo.net ) that were blocked in 2007 were found accessible in 2010 testing.
Technical analysis of the data from TRUE and TOTNET found that fi ltering was
implemented similarly by both ISPs. Consistent with past ONI fi ndings, when users
on TRUE and TOTNET attempt to access blocked content they are redirected to an
MICT block page. TRUE ’ s block page notifi ed users that the content was blocked by
order of the emergency decree, whereas TOTNET ’ s block page did not.