10
Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain
than one does about the blocking of activists ’ speech on the fringe of nondemocratic
societies, but the practices involve similar technical mechanisms, as well as pitfalls, in
both types of settings. These practices have made Internet fi ltering a growing and
pervasive global norm.
Citizens with technical knowledge can generally circumvent fi lters that a state has
put in place. Some states acknowledge as much: the overseer of Saudi Arabia ’ s fi ltering
program, under the state-run Internet Services Unit, admits that technically savvy users
can simply not be stopped from accessing blocked content. Expatriates in China, as well
as those citizens who resist the state ’ s control, frequently fi nd up-to-date proxy servers
or virtual private-network services through which to connect to the Internet and
through which they can evade fi lters in the process. While no state will ultimately win
the game of cat-and-mouse with those citizens who are resourceful and dedicated
enough to employ circumvention measures, a preponderance of users will never do so —
rendering fi ltering regimes at least partially effective despite the obvious workarounds.
Some of the earliest theorizing about control in the online environment, from the
open-commons period, suggested that such state-run control of Internet activity would
not work.
6 States like China have proven that an ambitious regulatory body can, by
devoting substantial technical, fi nancial, and human resources, exert a large measure
of control over what their citizens do online. If they want, states can erect digital gates
at their borders, even in cyberspace, and can render these gates effective through a
wide variety of modes of control. These controls have proven right the claims of
Lawrence Lessig, Jack L. Goldsmith, Tim Wu, and others who have emphasized the
extent to which the online environment can be regulated and the ways in which
traditional international relations theory will govern in cyberspace as in real space.
7
Phase 3: Access Controlled (2005 to 2010)
The third phase, from 2005 roughly to the present day, is the “ access-controlled ”
phase. Access controlled characterizes a period during which states have emphasized
regulatory approaches that function not only like fi lters or blocks, but also as variable
controls. The salient feature of this phase is the notion that there is a large series of
mechanisms (including those that are nontechnological) at various points of control
that can be used to limit and shape access to knowledge and information. These
mechanisms can be layered on top of the basic fi lters and blocks established during
the previous era or implemented separately altogether in their absence.
8 They refl ect
a more nuanced understanding of the range of tools available to authorities to shape
and control, as opposed to block, access to information and freedom of speech. Notoriously, such tools include the use of more “ offensive ” (compared to passive or defensive) methods, including computer network attacks, espionage, and the projection of
ideas favorable to a state ’ s strategic interests.
Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain
than one does about the blocking of activists ’ speech on the fringe of nondemocratic
societies, but the practices involve similar technical mechanisms, as well as pitfalls, in
both types of settings. These practices have made Internet fi ltering a growing and
pervasive global norm.
Citizens with technical knowledge can generally circumvent fi lters that a state has
put in place. Some states acknowledge as much: the overseer of Saudi Arabia ’ s fi ltering
program, under the state-run Internet Services Unit, admits that technically savvy users
can simply not be stopped from accessing blocked content. Expatriates in China, as well
as those citizens who resist the state ’ s control, frequently fi nd up-to-date proxy servers
or virtual private-network services through which to connect to the Internet and
through which they can evade fi lters in the process. While no state will ultimately win
the game of cat-and-mouse with those citizens who are resourceful and dedicated
enough to employ circumvention measures, a preponderance of users will never do so —
rendering fi ltering regimes at least partially effective despite the obvious workarounds.
Some of the earliest theorizing about control in the online environment, from the
open-commons period, suggested that such state-run control of Internet activity would
not work.
6 States like China have proven that an ambitious regulatory body can, by
devoting substantial technical, fi nancial, and human resources, exert a large measure
of control over what their citizens do online. If they want, states can erect digital gates
at their borders, even in cyberspace, and can render these gates effective through a
wide variety of modes of control. These controls have proven right the claims of
Lawrence Lessig, Jack L. Goldsmith, Tim Wu, and others who have emphasized the
extent to which the online environment can be regulated and the ways in which
traditional international relations theory will govern in cyberspace as in real space.
7
Phase 3: Access Controlled (2005 to 2010)
The third phase, from 2005 roughly to the present day, is the “ access-controlled ”
phase. Access controlled characterizes a period during which states have emphasized
regulatory approaches that function not only like fi lters or blocks, but also as variable
controls. The salient feature of this phase is the notion that there is a large series of
mechanisms (including those that are nontechnological) at various points of control
that can be used to limit and shape access to knowledge and information. These
mechanisms can be layered on top of the basic fi lters and blocks established during
the previous era or implemented separately altogether in their absence.
8 They refl ect
a more nuanced understanding of the range of tools available to authorities to shape
and control, as opposed to block, access to information and freedom of speech. Notoriously, such tools include the use of more “ offensive ” (compared to passive or defensive) methods, including computer network attacks, espionage, and the projection of
ideas favorable to a state ’ s strategic interests.