Access Contested
9
Singapore, by contrast, blocks access to only a handful of sites, each pornographic in
nature. Most other states that we study implement fi ltering regimes that fall between
the poles of China and Singapore, each with signifi cant variation from one to the
next. These fi ltering regimes are properly understood only in the political, legal, religious, and social context in which they arise.
The blocked content spans a wide range of social, religious, and political information. Our studies have combined a review of whether individual citizens could access
sites in a “ global basket ” of bellwether sites to test in every jurisdiction across a variety
of sensitive areas — akin to a stock index sorted by sector — as well as a list of Web sites
likely to be sensitive in certain countries only. We found that in some instances governments justify their fi ltering by referring to one content category, such as pornography, while eliding the fact that other content categories were also being blocked.
We also noted the tendency toward what we called “ mission creep ” — that is, once
fi ltering systems were adopted for whatever reason, state authorities would be tempted
to employ them to deal with other vexing public policy issues.
4 For example, while
Pakistan began by blocking access to blasphemous content, it expanded its fi ltering
regime to include Web sites of opposition groups and insurgencies.
5 We also discovered
that governments tend to block local-language content more than that expressed in
English, and locally relevant sources of information more than general global content.
The extent, locus, and character of Internet fi ltering vary from state to state and
over time. Web fi ltering is inconsistent and prone to error. Numerous examples from
our research noted the tendencies of overblocking and underblocking, whereby
content is either missed or mistakenly included in block lists because of sloppy fi ltering techniques. What is hosted where is constantly changing (for example, IP addresses
are often recycled for other uses while states ’ IP blocking lists are not updated), and
Web content at any particular site is constantly changing, a fact that poses a problem
for the censors. Mobile devices and social networks have further complicated the task
of speech regulation online. No state we have yet studied, including China, seems able
to carry out its Web fi ltering in a comprehensive manner (i.e., consistently blocking
access to a range of sites meeting specifi ed criteria). China appears to be the most
nimble of the states that we have studied at responding to the shifting Web. This
ability likely refl ects a devotion of the most resources and political will to the enterprise of technical Internet fi ltering.
It would be a mistake to infer that Internet fi ltering is a phenomenon that takes
place only in states with histories of hostility to free expression. Democratic states
participate in extensive regulation of the Internet, just as authoritarian states do. We
have documented Internet fi ltering in northern Europe, for instance, associated with
child pornography. In the United States, the state regulates what children can see in
libraries and schools, as one of many means of limiting access to information deemed
to be harmful to them. One may feel differently about these child-protection measures
9
Singapore, by contrast, blocks access to only a handful of sites, each pornographic in
nature. Most other states that we study implement fi ltering regimes that fall between
the poles of China and Singapore, each with signifi cant variation from one to the
next. These fi ltering regimes are properly understood only in the political, legal, religious, and social context in which they arise.
The blocked content spans a wide range of social, religious, and political information. Our studies have combined a review of whether individual citizens could access
sites in a “ global basket ” of bellwether sites to test in every jurisdiction across a variety
of sensitive areas — akin to a stock index sorted by sector — as well as a list of Web sites
likely to be sensitive in certain countries only. We found that in some instances governments justify their fi ltering by referring to one content category, such as pornography, while eliding the fact that other content categories were also being blocked.
We also noted the tendency toward what we called “ mission creep ” — that is, once
fi ltering systems were adopted for whatever reason, state authorities would be tempted
to employ them to deal with other vexing public policy issues.
4 For example, while
Pakistan began by blocking access to blasphemous content, it expanded its fi ltering
regime to include Web sites of opposition groups and insurgencies.
5 We also discovered
that governments tend to block local-language content more than that expressed in
English, and locally relevant sources of information more than general global content.
The extent, locus, and character of Internet fi ltering vary from state to state and
over time. Web fi ltering is inconsistent and prone to error. Numerous examples from
our research noted the tendencies of overblocking and underblocking, whereby
content is either missed or mistakenly included in block lists because of sloppy fi ltering techniques. What is hosted where is constantly changing (for example, IP addresses
are often recycled for other uses while states ’ IP blocking lists are not updated), and
Web content at any particular site is constantly changing, a fact that poses a problem
for the censors. Mobile devices and social networks have further complicated the task
of speech regulation online. No state we have yet studied, including China, seems able
to carry out its Web fi ltering in a comprehensive manner (i.e., consistently blocking
access to a range of sites meeting specifi ed criteria). China appears to be the most
nimble of the states that we have studied at responding to the shifting Web. This
ability likely refl ects a devotion of the most resources and political will to the enterprise of technical Internet fi ltering.
It would be a mistake to infer that Internet fi ltering is a phenomenon that takes
place only in states with histories of hostility to free expression. Democratic states
participate in extensive regulation of the Internet, just as authoritarian states do. We
have documented Internet fi ltering in northern Europe, for instance, associated with
child pornography. In the United States, the state regulates what children can see in
libraries and schools, as one of many means of limiting access to information deemed
to be harmful to them. One may feel differently about these child-protection measures