Access Contested
11
The mechanisms of the access-controlled period are more subtle and nuanced than
the fi rst-generation fi ltering and blocking mechanisms that they complement. These
controls can change over time to respond to changing political and cultural environments that arise online and offl ine. Filtering mechanisms can be made to work “ just
in time, ” in order to block content and services at politically sensitive moments, as
the Chinese government did in reaction to ethnic riots in the autonomous region of
Xinjiang in 2009 or as the Egyptian regime did in extreme form in response to the
January 2011 protests.
9
Many states also use registration, licensing, and identity requirements to control
what people do online and to create a climate of self-censorship. In some jurisdictions,
in order to publish information lawfully on the Internet, one needs to register oneself
with the state as a publisher. The fi rst-order controls associated with censorship are
combined with legal controls and surveillance, the effect of which is to ensure that
those publishing online know that they are being watched and that the state is capable
of shutting them down or putting them in jail. These methods of regulation, working
in combination, are highly effective, both as a means of law enforcement and through
a chilling effect on online speech.
10
During this access-controlled period, states have also increased the number of
control points that are possible on this network and their use. While the image of the
“ Great Firewall of China ” is evocative and, to some extent, accurate as a description,
it is misleading insofar as it tells only a small part of the story of control online, in
China and elsewhere. States control the online environment not just at the national
border, as information fl ows in and out of the state, but in many environments within
states. For instance, in order to go into an Internet caf é to log on to the Internet in
Burma, one has to establish one ’ s identity and log in at the front of the store so that
the proprietor can link online activities to a certain machine and IP address and period
of time.
11 These registration and logging requirements are combined with surveillance
cameras that are trained on computer users in Internet caf é s. Law-enforcement offi -
cials, in turn, can monitor or later re-create the digital tracks of the large population
of Internet users who rely upon Internet caf é s, especially in developing countries
where fast connectivity to the home is prohibitively expensive or nonexistent.
Although new laws are being drafted to create a regulatory framework for cyberspace, in some cases old, obscure, or rarely enforced regulations are cited ex post facto
to justify acts of Internet censorship, surveillance, or silencing. In Pakistan, for
example, old laws concerning “ blasphemy ” have been used to ban access to Facebook,
ostensibly because there are Facebook groups that focus on cartoons of the Prophet
Mohammed.
12 Governments have also shown a willingness to invoke national-security
laws to justify broad acts of censorship. In Bangladesh, for example, the government
blocked access to all of YouTube because of video clips showing Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina defending her decision to negotiate with mutinous army guards. The
11
The mechanisms of the access-controlled period are more subtle and nuanced than
the fi rst-generation fi ltering and blocking mechanisms that they complement. These
controls can change over time to respond to changing political and cultural environments that arise online and offl ine. Filtering mechanisms can be made to work “ just
in time, ” in order to block content and services at politically sensitive moments, as
the Chinese government did in reaction to ethnic riots in the autonomous region of
Xinjiang in 2009 or as the Egyptian regime did in extreme form in response to the
January 2011 protests.
9
Many states also use registration, licensing, and identity requirements to control
what people do online and to create a climate of self-censorship. In some jurisdictions,
in order to publish information lawfully on the Internet, one needs to register oneself
with the state as a publisher. The fi rst-order controls associated with censorship are
combined with legal controls and surveillance, the effect of which is to ensure that
those publishing online know that they are being watched and that the state is capable
of shutting them down or putting them in jail. These methods of regulation, working
in combination, are highly effective, both as a means of law enforcement and through
a chilling effect on online speech.
10
During this access-controlled period, states have also increased the number of
control points that are possible on this network and their use. While the image of the
“ Great Firewall of China ” is evocative and, to some extent, accurate as a description,
it is misleading insofar as it tells only a small part of the story of control online, in
China and elsewhere. States control the online environment not just at the national
border, as information fl ows in and out of the state, but in many environments within
states. For instance, in order to go into an Internet caf é to log on to the Internet in
Burma, one has to establish one ’ s identity and log in at the front of the store so that
the proprietor can link online activities to a certain machine and IP address and period
of time.
11 These registration and logging requirements are combined with surveillance
cameras that are trained on computer users in Internet caf é s. Law-enforcement offi -
cials, in turn, can monitor or later re-create the digital tracks of the large population
of Internet users who rely upon Internet caf é s, especially in developing countries
where fast connectivity to the home is prohibitively expensive or nonexistent.
Although new laws are being drafted to create a regulatory framework for cyberspace, in some cases old, obscure, or rarely enforced regulations are cited ex post facto
to justify acts of Internet censorship, surveillance, or silencing. In Pakistan, for
example, old laws concerning “ blasphemy ” have been used to ban access to Facebook,
ostensibly because there are Facebook groups that focus on cartoons of the Prophet
Mohammed.
12 Governments have also shown a willingness to invoke national-security
laws to justify broad acts of censorship. In Bangladesh, for example, the government
blocked access to all of YouTube because of video clips showing Prime Minister Sheikh
Hasina defending her decision to negotiate with mutinous army guards. The