China and Global Internet Governance
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obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, brutality and terror or abetting crime; humiliating
or slandering others, trespassing on the lawful rights and interests of others; and other contents
forbidden by laws and administrative regulations. These regulations are the legal basis for the
protection of Internet information security within the territory of the People ’ s Republic of China.
All Chinese citizens, foreign citizens, legal persons and other organizations within the territory
of China must obey these provisions.
5
As a logical extension of its cyber-nationalism, China steadfastly supports a traditional, sovereignty-based communications governance regime in the international
arena. It prefers an international regime organized around treaty-based intergovernmental organizations that rely on one-country, one-vote distributions of power. When
China uses the word “ democratic ” in this context, it means one country, one vote. Its
point of reference for “ democracy ” is not the rights and interests of the individual
citizen, but is equality among sovereign states: “ China believes that UN [United
Nations] should be given full scope in international Internet administration and supports the establishment of an authoritative and just international Internet administration organization under the UN system through democratic procedures on a worldwide
scale. All countries have equal rights in participating in the administration of the
fundamental international resources of the Internet. ”
6
Both the domestic and international aspects of China ’ s approach to the Internet
underscore the inevitability of its attempt to create a bordered Internet subject to
national policy. The Great Firewall of China (GFW) is but one aspect of this; more
important than the fi ltering of external information are the licensing requirements,
extensive state ownership, and entry controls that can be imposed upon domestic
Internet intermediaries and service providers, as well as the growing identifi cation and
surveillance of users and potential for severe, arbitrary punishment that can be imposed
on them domestically. This leads to extensive self-regulation and self-censorship.
All these points refer to the Chinese Communist Party ’ s theory of how things should
be — their preferred state of affairs. That preferred reality, however, is undercut by the
realities of the Internet. As Wang Chen, the State Council ’ s chief information offi cer,
put it, “ the Internet is a global open-information system. ” In a speech before the
Chinese parliament, he recognized the fact that
as long as our country ’ s Internet is linked to the global Internet, there will be channels and means
for all sorts of harmful foreign information to appear on our domestic Internet. As long as our
Internet is open to the public, there will be channels and means for netizens to express all sorts
of speech on the Internet. Judging from our country ’ s social development, our country is currently in a period of social transformation, rapid development, and conspicuous contradictions.
Unavoidably, actual contradictions and problems in our society are reported on the Internet.
Judging from our country ’ s Internet management practices, we are still in the process of exploration and improvement. Many weak links still exist in our work. These problems have weakened
our ability to manage the Internet scientifi cally and effectively.
7
181
obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, brutality and terror or abetting crime; humiliating
or slandering others, trespassing on the lawful rights and interests of others; and other contents
forbidden by laws and administrative regulations. These regulations are the legal basis for the
protection of Internet information security within the territory of the People ’ s Republic of China.
All Chinese citizens, foreign citizens, legal persons and other organizations within the territory
of China must obey these provisions.
5
As a logical extension of its cyber-nationalism, China steadfastly supports a traditional, sovereignty-based communications governance regime in the international
arena. It prefers an international regime organized around treaty-based intergovernmental organizations that rely on one-country, one-vote distributions of power. When
China uses the word “ democratic ” in this context, it means one country, one vote. Its
point of reference for “ democracy ” is not the rights and interests of the individual
citizen, but is equality among sovereign states: “ China believes that UN [United
Nations] should be given full scope in international Internet administration and supports the establishment of an authoritative and just international Internet administration organization under the UN system through democratic procedures on a worldwide
scale. All countries have equal rights in participating in the administration of the
fundamental international resources of the Internet. ”
6
Both the domestic and international aspects of China ’ s approach to the Internet
underscore the inevitability of its attempt to create a bordered Internet subject to
national policy. The Great Firewall of China (GFW) is but one aspect of this; more
important than the fi ltering of external information are the licensing requirements,
extensive state ownership, and entry controls that can be imposed upon domestic
Internet intermediaries and service providers, as well as the growing identifi cation and
surveillance of users and potential for severe, arbitrary punishment that can be imposed
on them domestically. This leads to extensive self-regulation and self-censorship.
All these points refer to the Chinese Communist Party ’ s theory of how things should
be — their preferred state of affairs. That preferred reality, however, is undercut by the
realities of the Internet. As Wang Chen, the State Council ’ s chief information offi cer,
put it, “ the Internet is a global open-information system. ” In a speech before the
Chinese parliament, he recognized the fact that
as long as our country ’ s Internet is linked to the global Internet, there will be channels and means
for all sorts of harmful foreign information to appear on our domestic Internet. As long as our
Internet is open to the public, there will be channels and means for netizens to express all sorts
of speech on the Internet. Judging from our country ’ s social development, our country is currently in a period of social transformation, rapid development, and conspicuous contradictions.
Unavoidably, actual contradictions and problems in our society are reported on the Internet.
Judging from our country ’ s Internet management practices, we are still in the process of exploration and improvement. Many weak links still exist in our work. These problems have weakened
our ability to manage the Internet scientifi cally and effectively.
7