180
Milton L. Mueller
institutions remain rooted in states, and any organically evolved Internet institutions
would have to be recognized by and subordinated to states. This quadrant is characterized by an acute tension between the boundaries of the national polity and the (transnational) boundaries of networked activity.
The lower-left quadrant encompasses those who advocate global governmentality —
namely, hierarchical control of the Internet by means of new institutions that transcend the nation-state. These new institutions are most likely to be private-sector based
and created to advance business interests, though they could also be multistakeholder
and public-private partnerships and even democratic for some version of democracy
not rooted in 20th-century nations.
The upper-left quadrant, which I call denationalized liberalism , also supports a transnational institutional framework but is less hierarchical in its approach to the need
for order. This quadrant combines economic and social liberalism; its adherents recognize individual network participants, not states or corporations, as the fundamental
source of legitimate Internet governance and propose to create new institutions around
them. Its adherents valorize freedom and propose to rely primarily on peer-production
processes, networked governance, and competitive markets to handle the issues of
Internet governance. Hierarchical interventions would be limited to the minimum
required to secure basic protections against theft, fraud, and coercion.
Within this political space, China (along with Burma, Russia, and other postcommunist nations such as Vietnam) is unambiguously cyber-nationalist. It strives mightily to reorder the Internet by fi ltering content and by licensing and regulating the
providers of Internet services in order to make them conform to national policy. Its
philosophy is clear from its own 2010 White Paper:
The Chinese government believes that the Internet is an important infrastructure facility for the
nation. Within Chinese territory the Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty.
The Internet sovereignty of China should be respected and protected. Citizens of the People ’ s
Republic of China and foreign citizens, legal persons and other organizations within Chinese
territory have the right and freedom to use the Internet; at the same time, they must obey the
laws and regulations of China and conscientiously protect Internet security.
4
Along with the emphasis on sovereignty, equally strong support for hierarchical
control exists. Both the telecommunication infrastructure and the services that run
on top of it are subject to strict licensing and entry restrictions, as well as outright
censorship and repression:
No organization or individual may produce, duplicate, announce or disseminate information
having the following contents: being against the cardinal principles set forth in the Constitution;
endangering state security, divulging state secrets, subverting state power and jeopardizing
national unifi cation; damaging state honor and interests; instigating ethnic hatred or discrimination and jeopardizing ethnic unity; jeopardizing state religious policy, propagating heretical or
superstitious ideas; spreading rumors, disrupting social order and stability; disseminating
Milton L. Mueller
institutions remain rooted in states, and any organically evolved Internet institutions
would have to be recognized by and subordinated to states. This quadrant is characterized by an acute tension between the boundaries of the national polity and the (transnational) boundaries of networked activity.
The lower-left quadrant encompasses those who advocate global governmentality —
namely, hierarchical control of the Internet by means of new institutions that transcend the nation-state. These new institutions are most likely to be private-sector based
and created to advance business interests, though they could also be multistakeholder
and public-private partnerships and even democratic for some version of democracy
not rooted in 20th-century nations.
The upper-left quadrant, which I call denationalized liberalism , also supports a transnational institutional framework but is less hierarchical in its approach to the need
for order. This quadrant combines economic and social liberalism; its adherents recognize individual network participants, not states or corporations, as the fundamental
source of legitimate Internet governance and propose to create new institutions around
them. Its adherents valorize freedom and propose to rely primarily on peer-production
processes, networked governance, and competitive markets to handle the issues of
Internet governance. Hierarchical interventions would be limited to the minimum
required to secure basic protections against theft, fraud, and coercion.
Within this political space, China (along with Burma, Russia, and other postcommunist nations such as Vietnam) is unambiguously cyber-nationalist. It strives mightily to reorder the Internet by fi ltering content and by licensing and regulating the
providers of Internet services in order to make them conform to national policy. Its
philosophy is clear from its own 2010 White Paper:
The Chinese government believes that the Internet is an important infrastructure facility for the
nation. Within Chinese territory the Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty.
The Internet sovereignty of China should be respected and protected. Citizens of the People ’ s
Republic of China and foreign citizens, legal persons and other organizations within Chinese
territory have the right and freedom to use the Internet; at the same time, they must obey the
laws and regulations of China and conscientiously protect Internet security.
4
Along with the emphasis on sovereignty, equally strong support for hierarchical
control exists. Both the telecommunication infrastructure and the services that run
on top of it are subject to strict licensing and entry restrictions, as well as outright
censorship and repression:
No organization or individual may produce, duplicate, announce or disseminate information
having the following contents: being against the cardinal principles set forth in the Constitution;
endangering state security, divulging state secrets, subverting state power and jeopardizing
national unifi cation; damaging state honor and interests; instigating ethnic hatred or discrimination and jeopardizing ethnic unity; jeopardizing state religious policy, propagating heretical or
superstitious ideas; spreading rumors, disrupting social order and stability; disseminating